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With increased availability of data in various fields, researchers often need to combine
efficient empirical methods with innovative analytical modeling techniques to make data-
driven decisions and gain managerial insights from the large-scale raw data. In light of this,
my thesis combines empirical methods and analytical modeling to study several data-related
problems in the fields of financial economics and healthcare management. The first two parts
of the thesis focus on two topics in financial economics: the role of dynamic information
in asset pricing and the link between index-based investment and intraday stock dynamics.
The last two parts of the thesis study the ICU admission decisions and cardiac surgery
scheduling using data from different hospital units.
The first part of the thesis focuses on the role of information in financial market. As a
fundamental topic in asset pricing, information is known to play an important role in deter-
mining asset prices and market volatility. In most of the existing literature, the information
environment, i.e., the amount of knowable information, is assumed to be fixed and indepen-
dent of investor’s choice. However, in a dynamic market, the level of available information
can vary substantially due to changes in technology and regulations. On the other hand,
rational news producers may respond to investors’ demand for information. Such effects
are commonly seen in the reality, but are less studied in the literature. To bridge this gap,
we develop a model of investor information choices and asset prices where the availability
of information about fundamentals is time-varying. A competitive research sector produces
more information when more investors are willing to pay for that research. This feedback,
from investor willingness to pay for information to more information production, generates
two regimes in equilibrium, one having high prices and low volatility, the other the opposite.
Information dynamics move the market between regimes, creating large price drops even
with no change in fundamentals. In our calibration, the model suggests an important role
for information dynamics in financial crises.
In the second part of this thesis, we investigate how the growth of index-based investing
impacts the intraday stock dynamics using a large high-frequency dataset, which consists
of 1-second level trade data for all S&P 500 constituents from 2004 to 2018 (500GB). We
estimate intraday trading volume, volatility, correlation, and beta using estimators that
are statistically efficient under market microstructure noise and observation asynchronicity.
We find the intraday patterns indeed change substantially over time. For example, in the
recent decade, the trading volume and correlation significantly increase at the end of trading
session; the betas of different stocks start dispersed in the morning, but generally move
towards one during the day. Besides, the daily dispersion in trading volume is high at
the market open and low near the market close. These intraday patterns demonstrate
the implication of the growth of index-based strategies and the active-open, passive-close
intraday trading profile. We theoretically support our interpretation via a market impact
model with time-varying liquidity provision from both single-stock and index-fund investors.
In the third part of the thesis, we study the intensive care units (ICUs) admission deci-
sions in a large hospital system. In the case of ICUs, which provide the highest level of care
for the most severe patients, it is known that admission rates of some patients decrease as
occupancy increases. It is also known that, for at least some conditions, ICU admission is
not just a function of patients’ illness, and that a significant proportion of the variation in
ICU admission rates is due to hospital, not patient, factors. To understand such variation,
we employ two years of data from patients admitted to 21 Kaiser Permanente Northern
California ICUs from the ED. We quantify the variation in ICU admission from the ED
under varying degrees of ICU and ED occupancy. We find that substantial heterogeneity in
admission rates is present, and that it cannot be explained either by patient factors or occu-
pancy levels alone. We use a structural model to understand the extent that intertemporal
externalities could account for some of this variation. Using counterfactual simulations, we
find that, if hospitals had more information regarding their behaviors, and if it were possible
to alter hospital admission processes to incorporate such information, hospitals could reduce
their ICU congestion in a safe way.
The last part of the thesis focuses on the impact of system workload on service time
and quality in the context of cardiac surgeries. Using a detailed data set of more than
5,600 cardiac surgeries in a large hospital, we quantify how surgeon’s daily workload level
(e.g., number of surgeries) affects surgery duration and patient outcomes. To handle the
endogeneity of surgeon’s daily workload, we construct instrument variables using hospital
operational factors, including the block schedule of surgeons. We find high daily workload of
surgeons is associated with longer incision times and worse patient outcomes. Specifically,
increased daily workload of surgeons leads to longer post-surgery length-of-stay in ICU
and hospital, as well as higher likelihoods of reoperation and readmission for their patients.
These results highlight the potential negative impact of surgeon’s fatigue under long working
hours. We then develop a surgery scheduling model that incorporates the effects of surgeon’s
daily workload levels.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Information Regimes in Financial Markets
1.1 Introduction
Most research linking investor information acquisition and asset prices assumes a con-
stant information environment. But why should the level of potentially available informa-
tion remain constant in a market that is perpetually in flux? Changes in technology and
regulation can generate persistent shocks to what an investor can learn about company fun-
damentals; and changes in what can be learned should influence investors as they decide
whether to acquire costly information. Pushing this idea a step further, we investigate what
happens when the information environment itself changes in response to investor demand
for information. In other words, we posit that the news media, financial intermediaries,
company executives, regulators, and prominent investors are not simply passive streams of
information: the level of information they provide depends on investor demand. We then
find that asset prices can change dramatically in response to changes in the supply and
demand for information.
To capture these ideas, we develop a dynamic model of information and asset prices
in which the level of available information changes in response to exogenous shocks and
endogenous investor demand. In our model, an information shock changes the precision
of information about fundamentals. An information shock is neither good news nor bad
news – it is simply a change in the amount of knowable information. It is possible that
information shocks occur in the absence of any shocks to fundamentals. Surprisingly we
find that even such pure information shocks can have very large price impacts. This is a
novel result and it has important ramifications. When increased information production
accompanies a negative shock to fundamentals, our model suggests that the information
shock greatly exacerbates the shock to fundamentals.
1
Examples of pure information shocks that are independent of fundamentals include reg-
ulatory changes (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or Regulation Fair Disclosure), changes in
accounting standards, or voluntary disclosure decisions by firms or governments. Such ex-
ogenous shocks trigger an endogenous response in the number of investors who choose to
become informed. As more investors become informed, more information about fundamen-
tals becomes available. This happens because a competitive information production sector,
with a zero marginal cost of transmitting information once it has been discovered, will
produce more information when more investors are willing to pay for it. This mechanism
magnifies the asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, it tends to increase
price volatility, and it can amplify small information shocks into large price drops. In the
model, such price drops result from an endogenous transition of the economy from a low-
to a high-information regime.
Information shocks – that is changes in the amount of information being produced in
the economy – often coincide with shocks to fundamentals. For example, in 2009 the Greek
government revised its estimated budget deficit. This revision triggered a large increase
in investor demand for information about Greek debt, as reflected for example in media
attention and internet searches. Figure 1.1 shows the large and persistent increase in the
number of Bloomberg articles mentioning Greece starting in 2009, and it provides at least
circumstantial evidence that greater demand for information was met with greater supply.
More information followed in the form of further revisions to official statistics, revelations
about falsified data, stories of investment banks complicit in masking true conditions, re-
search reports by industry analysts and non-governmental organizations, and a downgrade
to junk by Standard & Poor’s followed by Moody’s. In turn, this increase in information
invited further investor scrutiny, which just begot further information production.
Contemporaneous with these events, the price of Greece’s debt dropped sharply as the
volatility of its sovereign credit default swap spreads rose. In our model, the feedback be-
tween the demand and supply of information can lead to large price drops and increased
volatility. Such price drops can occur even without a change in fundamentals; but they are
amplified when an increase in information precision and a decline in fundamentals occur
together. The model suggests that had the Greece shock not captured quite as much in-
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Figure 1.1: Number of Bloomberg articles per month that mention Greece.
vestor and media attention, the associated financial crisis would have been much smaller in
magnitude and of considerably shorter duration.
Two more examples of increased information production that accompanied fundamentals
shocks are worth mentioning. In June 2007, Bear Stearns disclosed that two of its hedge
funds were on the brink of failure, fueling investor demand for information about the type
of subprime mortgages in which the funds had invested. Indeed, Gorton and Ordonez
(2014) and Dang et al. (2012, 2020) have argued that the demand for information about
“safe” collateral triggered the ensuing crisis. In our narrative, as more investors chose to
incur the cost of becoming informed, more information became available — through revised
credit ratings, academic and industry research, media scrutiny and regulatory reports —
as research producers, including rating agencies, news media, and sell-side research shops,
began to produce more information as more investors began to demand it. The less informed
investors, fearing an informational disadvantage, fled to safer assets.
Mamaysky (2020) argues that a portion of the volatility and price drops observed during
the early phase of the COVID-19 crisis is attributable to exactly this dynamic. In the lan-
guage of our model, the large fundamental shock of the coronavirus pandemic also triggered
a positive information shock in the form of increased information production, which in turn
caused the economy to temporarily transition to a high-information, low-price regime. In
our model, information dynamics on their own can produce crisis-like effects, with low prices
and high risk premia. Furthermore, fundamentals shocks that are accompanied by infor-
mation shocks lead to considerably more severe market disruptions than do fundamentals
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shocks in isolation.
Our model combines exogenous shocks to the quality of available information, an en-
dogenous response by investors who may choose to become informed at a cost, and feedback
from investor information choices to information producers, and ultimately to the amount
of information that is produced. Most of our analysis uses a reduced-form representation
of the feedback mechanism, but an appendix provides a microfoundation for the mecha-
nism through a competitive information production sector that supplies investor demand
for information. Information about fundamentals falls in three categories: publicly known,
privately knowable at a cost, and completely unknowable.1 In the interest of clarity, we
only treat the case in which the fraction of knowable information varies, while the portion
of knowable information that is publicly known is fixed.
In more detail, we develop an overlapping generations (OLG) model with a single risky
asset, which pays a dividend each period, and a riskless asset. In each period, a new
generation of investors observes the information environment, i.e. the current precision of
the signal about the end-of-period dividend, decides whether to become informed at a cost,
sets optimal demands, and trades to clear an exogenous net supply of shares. Market clearing
determines the price. At the end of the period, these investors receive their dividend and
sell their shares at the new price. The notion of “generations” should not be taken literally
in our setting; the OLG framework simply provides a tractable dynamic setting to model
changes in information, and it ensures that investors care about future prices as well as the
next dividend.
Crucially, in making their information choices at the start of the period, investors take
into account the distribution of exogenous shocks to information precision and the feedback
from information choices in the current period to future precision. The future precision will
affect the end-of-period asset price and thus investors’ capital gains. Incorporating such
time variation in information precision into a rational expectations setting is a technical
challenge, and we develop a new solution methodology to address it.
1Publicly known information includes a product release that is covered in the New York Times. Privately
knowable but costly information includes the performance of a firm’s supplier network, which can be analyzed
with painstaking analysis of public information. And information that is unknowable includes the outcome
of a future medical trial relative to expectations.
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Using this framework, we show that information shocks can lead to large and persistent
drops in prices and increases in volatility. This is the main contribution of this study. We
show that information shocks alone can produce prolonged periods of depressed prices and
elevated volatility; we know of no other model in the literature that exhibits this behavior.
Why does greater information precision have these adverse effects? Most of the paper is
devoted to explaining this pattern, but a key part of the answer is time-varying information
asymmetry: greater information precision for informed investors puts the uninformed at
a greater disadvantage; persistence in the information state amplifies this effect. Within
our framework, feedback from the demand for information to the amount of information
available is essential to producing this behavior. When we shut off the feedback, the effects
of information shocks become much more transient.
In an extension of our model, we allow for information shocks that are correlated with
shocks to dividends, as in the historical scenarios discussed above. The effects of greater
information precision are amplified when they are accompanied by negative shocks to divi-
dends. We believe information shocks are typical of crises — demand for information about
government deficits, subprime mortgages, or the spread of a virus grows with concerns about
negative effects on fundamentals. Fairly minor negative dividend shocks, when accompanied
by positive information shocks, can result in very large market disruptions — much larger
than what would have occurred without an increase in information production. This suggests
that while some market crises are precipitated by particularly large fundamentals shocks,
others can result from relatively minor shocks to fundamentals that are associated with
large increases in information production. More generally, if positive information shocks
coincide with adverse shocks to fundamentals, then information production may exhibit
countercyclical behavior and be a first order contributor to the market fluctuations that are
observed across the business cycle.
To examine the magnitude of price effects arising from information shocks, we calibrate
our model to stock market data. The equilibrium dynamics of the calibrated model fluctuate
between two regimes, one with low volatility and high prices, and one with high volatility
and low prices. The model can spend long intervals in each regime. A transition from
one to the other can be sudden and result in a price move of over 10%, with no change in
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fundamentals. The two regimes emerge from investor information choices; we do not impose
them in setting up the model. When information shocks co-occur with fundamentals shocks,
the former reinforce the latter, leading to much larger and longer lasting price moves. These
information effects are present even though our investors are fully rational: they understand
that the economy can transition from one regime to the other.
1.1.1 Contribution to the Literature
The interplay between information and asset prices is often studied through single-period
models of the type in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), and a
large subsequent literature. But there are four important features available in a dynamic
model that are inaccessible in a single-period model, and these merit discussion. First,
persistent exogenous information shocks are necessary, though it turns out not sufficient, to
generate endogenous low- and high-information regimes. For that, the feedback generated
by our microfoundation is also needed; more investors have to induce more information
production. Third, in a single-period model, exogenous shocks are often approximated by
changes in model parameters, but such changes are necessarily outside the model and, in
particular, not contemplated by the agents in the model. In contrast, our agents’ beliefs
take into account that the economy can transition between different information regimes;
such transitions are therefore a feature of the model itself.
Finally, a dynamic model captures two distinct aspects of an increase in available infor-
mation: greater information reduces uncertainty about the next dividend but can increase
volatility in future prices and thus in capital gains. The first of these effects is clear —
the information we model is information about dividends. To appreciate the second effect,
note that in the absence of dividend information, price volatility is driven entirely by supply
volatility; but when some investors have dividend information, this information is partly
reflected in the price, so a persistent increase in signal precision leads to persistent price
volatility. In a single-period model, the price merely determines the cost of a claim to an
end-of-period dividend. With overlapping generations, investors earn the change in price
over the period as well as a dividend, so the variance in this return affects their investment
decisions at the beginning of the period. The two information effects, on dividends and on
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end-of-period prices, are potentially offsetting and lead to more complex tradeoffs than can
be captured in a single-period setting.2 We will see that this dual role of information in
dynamic models can lead to starkly different conclusions than those of static models.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to capture a stochastic information
environment, endogenous investor information choices, and feedback from these choices to
available information. Spiegel (1998) and Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) develop overlapping
generations models in which all investors have the same information. Watanabe (2008) ex-
tends Spiegel (1998) model by introducing asymmetric information. Biais et al. (2010) also
model asymmetric information in an OLG setting. In their model, as in Watanabe (2008),
the fraction of informed investors and the precision of their signals are fixed and exogenous.
Wang (1993) develops a continuous-time model of trading among differentially informed
investors with a fixed fraction of informed investors and a fixed information environment;
Wang (1994) is a discrete-time version of the model that investigates trading volume. In
Avdis (2016), the fraction informed is endogenous but does not affect the information en-
vironment. The model of Veldkamp (2006) includes a dynamic information market, but
its investors are indifferent to end-of-period prices, leading to starkly different implications
than our model. The OLG model of Farboodi and Veldkamp (2020) incorporates a changing
information environment, but the change is limited to a deterministic increase in investor
information processing capacity over time. Signal precision also changes deterministically
over time in Brennan and Cao (1997).
Information revelation is at the center of the crisis explanation of Gorton and Ordonez
(2014). In their account, a crisis results when lenders choose to acquire information about
borrowers’ collateral; with less information available, borrowers with poor collateral have
access to credit, and the increased supply of credit sustains higher growth. We work in an
entirely different framework, but one contrast is particularly noteworthy. In Gorton and
Ordonez (2014), the information revealed is bad news; following an aggregate shock, some
2This dual role of information is also highlighted in the multiperiod models of Avdis (2016) and Dutta
and Nezlobin (2017), but those models do not include feedback effects. In Avdis (2016), serial correlation in
asset supply allows investors who acquire information about the current dividend to make inferences about
future discount rates. In Dutta and Nezlobin (2017), the tradeoff between current information and future
volatility is examined through a firm’s growth rate. These features are very different from the considerations
that drive our model.
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unobservable amount of collateral becomes bad, thus inducing more information acquisition.
In our setting, it suffices for the precision of information to change — a shock may bring
more news or less news without being specifically good or bad news. An increase in precision
leads to a price drop when it magnifies the information asymmetry between informed and
uninformed investors, leading the uninformed to reduce their demand for the risky asset.
As noted previously, negative correlation between information precision and fundamentals
amplifies the price drop.
We present our model in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 outlines the model solution and our
main theoretical results. Section 1.4 studies changes in the level of knowable information
and shows that feedback can lead to two information regimes, using parameters calibrated to
market data. To isolate the effect of information dynamics, and to emphasize the potential
effect of information alone, we focus most of the analysis in this section on the case of infor-
mation shocks which are uncorrelated with dividends. In Section 1.4.4 we extend the model
to handle the case of correlated information and dividend shocks. Section 1.5 explores the
mechanisms leading to large price changes across regimes and considers information asym-
metry, the cost of information production, and strategic complementarity in information
acquisition. Appendix A.1 microfounds our feedback mechanism, and subsequent appen-
dices provide proofs of our theoretical results. A Supplementary Appendix provides some
additional proofs and details of our calibration and numerical calculations.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Dividends and Timing
A single infinitely-lived security pays a dividend in each period. The dividend paid at
the end of period C is given by
C+1 = ̄ + d(C − ̄) + "C+1 = (1 − d)̄︸     ︷︷     ︸
`
+dC + "C+1. (1.1)
The innovation "C+1 decomposes as




with the following interpretation: <C is known to informed investors; \C is public information;
<̃C is the knowable portion of the innovation; and nC+1 is unknowable at the beginning of
period C. These are mean zero, normally distributed random variables, independent across
time,3 with variances given by
var(<̃C ) = 5Cvar(") and var(nC+1) = (1 − 5C )var("). (1.3)
and
var(<C ) = qvar(<̃C ) and var(\C ) = (1 − q)var(<̃C ). (1.4)
Thus,
5C = fraction of dividend innovation that is knowable;
1 − q = fraction of knowable part of dividend innovation that is public.
The parameter q will control the degree of asymmetry between informed and uninformed
investors. Higher q corresponds to higher asymmetry.
The economy contains overlapping generations of agents. The new generation is in the
market for two periods, C and C + 1. Before making investment decisions in period C, all
agents observe 5C , \C , C , (and q), and the time-C informed agents observe <C .4 A fraction
_C ∈ [0, 1] of agents are informed at time C. Becoming informed entails paying a fixed
cost 2 ; a fixed portion of this cost, 2" , goes to pay a news production sector to discover
new information. Under our model parameterization, informed agents find it optimal to
pay both 2 and 2" . The time-C uninformed agents, representing 1 − _C of the population,
in addition to observing \C and C , also observe the market clearing price %C . Since the
market-clearing price contains information about <C through the demands of the informed
traders, the uninformed also make rational inferences from the price about the innovation
<C . The price is not fully revealing about <C because of the presence of unobservable supply
shocks. In this respect, for a given 5C and q, our information environment is the same as in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). After observing all available (public or private) information,
investors set their demands as functions of the price, which determines the price through
3More precisely, they are conditionally independent given all 5C .
4We have solved the model with time-varying qC but, for clarity, we assume it is constant in this chapter.
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First, agents observe ft and decide whether
to become informed at cost cI
Then simultaneously,
• Agents observe public information Pt, Dt, θt
• Informed observe private information mt
• Agents submit their demands qIt ,q
U
t
• Price Pt clears the market:
λtq
I
t + (1 − λt)qUt = X̄ +Xt
Agents sell back their shares at price Pt+1
Agents earn excess return: Pt+1 +Dt+1 −RPt
Time = t Time = t+ 1
Figure 1.2: Sequence of events in each period.
market clearing. At time C + 1, investors receive the dividend, sell their shares at the time
C + 1 price, and the process repeats. Figure 1.2 summarizes the timing of the model; the
agent demands @ and asset supply - are discussed in Section 1.2.4.
1.2.2 Information Environment
The innovation of this study is to allow the information environment, as represented
by 5C , to evolve over time in response to exogenous shocks and in response to information
decisions made by past generations of investors. We show below that a straightforward
microfoundation leads to simple dynamics of information precision: 5C follows an AR(1)
process combined with a feedback effect from today’s fraction informed _C to tomorrow’s
precision, or
5C+1 = 0 5 + ^ 5 ( 5C − 0 5 ) + 1 5 _C + n 5 ,C+1. (1.5)
for constants 0 5 , ^ 5 and 1 5 , as well as a noise term n 5 ,C+1. We assume (for now) that the
information shocks n 5 ,C+1 and fundamental shocks "C+1 are independent. This allows us
to cleanly separate the effect of changing information precision from the effect of changing
fundamentals; in Section 1.4.4, we introduce correlation in the shocks. To be consistent
with the interpretation of 5C as a measure of signal precision in (1.3), we need to restrict
5C to values between 0 and 1. We therefore apply a mapping ΠD to the right side of this
equation, where ΠD maps the real line to a set D ⊆ [0, 1].5 We thus arrive at our model of
5In the simplest case, ΠD (G) = min(1,max(0, G)) projects G to [0, 1]. For some of our theoretical results





0 5 + 1 5 _C + ^ 5 ( 5C − 0 5 ) + n 5 ,C+1
)
, (1.6)
This specification provides the simplest model that captures persistent, stochastic time
variation in the information environment and, most importantly, feedback from the fraction
informed _C to the available information.
To generate the 5C dynamics in (1.5) and (1.6), we assume that the dividend innovation
"C+1 consists of a large number of i.i.d. pieces of information. This information can be
about local economic conditions that affect a firm’s profitability or the economy’s output,
technological innovation across different product lines, consumer demand, managerial tal-
ent, competitor performance, relevant industry and macro trends, and so on. Each unit
of information can be in one of two states: observable or unobservable. The state of be-
ing observable or unobservable is persistent. For example, informed investors may push a
company or government to disclose a certain piece of information, and once the company
or government agrees, it is likely to continue to disclose this information, thus making it
observable. However, at some point the disclosure policy may change, and previously dis-
closed information may become undisclosed, and thus unobservable. Observability does not
depend only on disclosure. For example, technological innovation may make certain char-
acteristics of an oil well observable, even if they were unobservable in the past. Similarly,
a company may build a canopy over its distribution facility rendering satellite imagery no
longer informative. In both of these examples, the change in observability is persistent.
We assume any observable unit of information has a q probability of being only privately
observable and a 1 − q probability of being publicly observable.
A profit maximizing, competitive information production sector can discover, at a per
unit cost 2%, previously unobservable units of information, and then reveal these to its
clients. Once a unit of information is discovered, the marginal cost of revealing it to investors
is zero. Furthermore, we assume that discovered units become observable. We refer to this
sector as the news producers, though in addition to financial journalists, it can also contain
stand-alone, sell-side, or buy-side research firms, ratings agencies, or bloggers on outlets
for now we keep the discussion general.
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like Seeking Alpha who are compensated for the number of views their posts receive. In
our model calibration, informed investors optimally choose to spend a portion 2" of their
cost of becoming informed 2 to purchase the information produced by the news sector.
Investors who purchase information from the news producers are legally obligated not to
share information they obtain from news outlets with one another; thus the only way to
obtain information is to buy it from the producers. The zero marginal cost condition and the
legal obligation not to disclose purchased information mirror the assumptions of Veldkamp
(2006), and provide a strong incentive to produce more information when more investors
demand it.
As we show in Appendix A.1, these assumptions yield the 5C process in (1.5). The AR
coefficient ^ 5 , which determines the degree of persistence of the information state, equals
one minus the sum of two probabilities: (1) the probability that a given unit of information
transitions from unobservable to observable, and (2) the probability that a unit transitions
from observable to unobservable. The coefficient 0 5 , which would be the steady-state level
of information precision in the absence of the feedback effect, 1 5 _C , equals the probability
of transitioning from unobservable to observable, conditional on a transition taking place.
Finally, we show in the appendix that 1 5 = 2"/2%, and therefore the feedback effect 1 5 _C
reflects the incentive of news producers to discover more information: 1 5 is positive and
increasing in the amount spent by investors to buy news, 2" ; it is decreasing in the cost of
producing a new unit of information, 2%; and the overall effect is increasing in the number
of informed _C .
1.2.3 Illustration of Dynamics
To illustrate the dynamics of the information state 5C and the implications for the equi-
librium asset price %C , we first consider an example. As detailed in subsequent sections, our
dynamic equilibrium includes market clearing and utility maximizing decisions by agents
in setting their demands and deciding whether to become informed, taking into account
feedback from the fraction informed to the information available. An example should help
explain where we are headed. Figure 1.3 plots an equilibrium path in our economy, sub-
ject to a particular set of information and dividend shocks. For this example, we assume
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information and dividend shocks are uncorrelated, and supply shocks (discussed in the next
section) are turned off. Each of the three series in the figure is subject to the same set of
shocks, but represents the equilbrium path across three different sets of parameter values.
The top panel of Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of 5C in (1.6) in blue with baseline
parameters 0 5 = 0.175, 1 5 = 0.384, and ^ 5 = 0.91 from the calibration in Appendix A.2.
The other model parameters are detailed in Table A.1. The red, dash-dotted line turns
off the feedback by setting 1 5 = 0. Early in the plotted history, the information state
experiences several consecutive positive shocks. Without feedback, it quickly mean-reverts
toward 0 5 = 0.175. With feedback, that is with an increase in _C+1 due to a positive
information shock n 5 ,C+1 feeding into a higher value of 5C+2, 5C remains elevated much longer.
(We discuss the behavior of _C as a function of 5C in Section 1.4.1.) The bottom panel shows
the consequences for the equilibrium price %C . During the protracted period of elevated
5C , the model with feedback produces substantially lower prices than the model without
feedback. (Dividends are identical in the two cases.) In the calibration we interpret each
period as a month, so the lower figure shows roughly a 5-year period of depressed prices
resulting entirely from information dynamics. Prices do not revert back to the high-price
regime until the information state experiences several consecutive negative shocks.
For comparison, the figures show a dashed black line corresponding to no feedback but
greater persistence, with ^ 5 = 0.98. As expected, greater persistence slows the mean-
reversion in 5C . But the price in this case is nearly identical to the case 1 5 = 0, ^ 5 = 0.91.
In other words, the effect of feedback is qualitatively different from ordinary persistence.
Indeed, we will see that in the model with feedback 5C is drawn toward a level of 0.88 as well
as to the point 0 5 = 0.175. Feedback endogenously introduces two regimes associated with
high and low levels of 5C . That several 5C shocks need to occur in rapid succession in order
to induce transitions from one regime to the other makes each regime in the feedback model
highly persistent. A transition from the low information (i.e. low 5C) regime to the high one
is accompanied by a large drop in price and, we will see later, an increase in volatility.
The vast majority of the asymmetric information literature (see the discussion in Section
1.1.1) assumes a constant 5C . In this case, the three equilibrium paths in Figure 1.3 would
be identical, since the only difference between the paths is in the behavior of 5C . Even if one
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Figure 1.3: Simulated paths under different model settings
Top: Information state 5C . Bottom: Price %C . Feedback in 5C creates a prolonged period of
depressed prices.
extends the standard models in the literature to the case of a stochastic and highly persistent
5C , but with no feedback, the difference in equilibrium price paths would be only of second
order (as is the difference between the dash-dotted red and dashed black lines in the bottom
panel of the figure). The introduction of feedback, from the number of informed to the
information state, leads to a first order difference in the behavior of prices (and volatilities
as we discuss later). And this large difference in prices occurs even in the absence of any
differences in fundamentals, as the dividend and supply shocks across the three equilibrium
paths are identical.
1.2.4 Investor Optimization Problem
We return to the model formulation. At the beginning of period C, a unit mass of new
(young) investors enter the market, each endowed with wealth ,C , known at time C. For an
investor who buys @ shares of the risky asset at price %C at the beginning of the period and
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sells the shares at the end of the period at price %C+1, terminal wealth is given by
,C+1 = '(,C − @%C ) + @(C+1 + %C+1)
= ',C + @(C+1 + %C+1 − '%C ), (1.7)
where ' > 1 is the gross return on a riskless asset. It will be convenient to define the per
period net profit from owning a single share of the stock as
cC+1 ≡ C+1 + %C+1 − '%C , (1.8)
in which case the budget constraint becomes ,C+1 = ',C + @cC+1. Agents who enter at time
C consume their wealth at C + 1 and leave the market. These agents set their demands for
shares of the risky asset at time C by solving




E[,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] −
W
2
var(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1)
I ]C ] , ] ∈ {,*}, (1.9)
where I*C = { 5C , _C , C , \C , %C ,,C } is the uninformed agents’ information set at time C, I C =
I*C ∪ {<C } is the informed agents’ information set, and W > 0 is a risk aversion parameter.
Similar objectives are used in Peress (2010), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), and
Mondria (2010), and can be interpreted as expressing a preference for early resolution of













with E(D) = − 1
W
log(−D), if ,C+1 is conditionally normal, as it will be in our equilibrium. We
could allow investors to condition on past values of variables in their information sets in
(1.9), but past information will be irrelevant, given our independence assumptions.
In addition to investor demands for shares of the risky asset, we need to specify the
supply. As in the OLG model of Allen et al. (2006), we assume that -C , the stochastic
part of the supply of the risky asset, is independent and identically distributed from one
period to the next. As explained in Allen et al. (2006), i.i.d. supply can be interpreted as
the result of trading by price-insensitive noise traders who reverse their trades at the end
of each period. New investors each period thus only clear a new exogenous supply shock.6
6Our model extends easily to allow persistent supply shocks, at the expense of adding an additional
state variable, which complicates our numerical examples. See Avdis (2016) for a model in which supply
persistence influences investors’ decisions to become informed.
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We assume each -C is normally distributed with mean zero and variance f2- . Furthermore,
we assume that there exists a positive net supply -̄ of the risky asset, and that this fixed
supply is constant over time.
1.2.5 Equilibrium
Given a function _ : [0, 1] ↦→ [0, 1], yielding the fraction informed _( 5C ), a market
equilibrium is defined by a price process %C and demands @C and @*C , depending on the price
and other time-C information I C and I*C , that clear the market,
_C@

C + (1 − _C )@*C = -̄ + -C , (1.10)
and for which @ ]C solve (1.9), ] ∈ {,*}, for all C.
Market clearing and investor optimality define a market equilibrium, given a function _
that determines the fraction of investors who are informed. Next we define what it means for
this fraction to be determined endogenously. As in our discussion of Figure 1.2, we suppose
that investors at the beginning of the period can choose to become informed at a cost 2 ,
incurred at the beginning of the period but after observing the current information state
5C . Investors’ decisions to become informed or remain uninformed thus define a mapping
from the information state to the fraction informed, which is precisely _. We will use the
following:
Definition 1 (Endogenous fraction informed). Given the 5C dynamics in (1.6), we call _
the endogenous fraction informed if it satisfies the following conditions for each 5 ∈ [0, 1]:
(i) _( 5 ) = 0 and E[ C − '2 | 5C = 5 ] < E[*C | 5C = 5 ]; or
(ii) 0 ≤ _( 5 ) ≤ 1 and E[ C − '2 | 5C = 5 ] = E[*C | 5C = 5 ]; or
(iii) _( 5 ) = 1 and E[ C − '2 | 5C = 5 ] > E[*C | 5C = 5 ].
Note the expectations in Definition 1 are taken prior to the agents receipt of their signals.
In case (ii), the fraction _( 5 ) is the point at which the marginal investor is indifferent between
becoming informed and remaining uninformed. Cases (i) and (iii) cover the possibility that
one choice dominates the other and is therefore selected by all investors.
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1.3 Model Solution
The main challenge in our model is to combine a time varying information environment
with agents’ rational expectations. In this section, we outline our model solution, leaving
the statements and proofs of our main results to the appendix. We first take an arbitrary
fixed fraction informed _( 5 ), for each information state 5 , and find a market equilibrium
consistent with that function _(·). The role of _(·) is to fully specify the 5C process in (1.5),
though we do not yet require that _(·) corresponds to optimizing behavior by agents in the
model. Then, from a market equilibrium, we give conditions for the fraction informed _(·)
to be optimal, in the sense that optimizing behavior by agents yields exactly the number
of informed that _(·) specifies. We then combine the results to give conditions for an
information equilibrium, in which conditions for a market equilibrium and an endogenous
fraction informed are jointly satisfied. The end result is a rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) in a model with a dynamic information environment; the solution for an REE in this
setting is an important technical contribution of this study.
1.3.1 Market Equilibrium
Proceeding with the first of these statements, we show that, for any choice of _, the
model admits a market equilibrium in which the price process takes the form
%C = 0C + 1C<C + 6\C − 2C-C + 3C , (1.11)
where 6 and 3 are constants, and 0C , 1C , 2C are functions of the information state 5C but do
not otherwise depend on C.
To characterize investor demands, we need to find the utility of terminal wealth. If prices
are given by (1.11), we can write terminal wealth ,C+1 in (1.7) as
,C+1 = ',C + @(1 + 3)C+1 + @(%C+1 − 3C+1 − '%C ) (1.12)
= ',C + @
[
(1 + 3)C+1 + 0C+1 + 1C+1<C+1 + 6\C+1 − 2C+1-C+1 − '%C
]
. (1.13)
Note that <C+1, \C+1 and -C+1 are independent of C+1, and of any time C information. With
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a view to solving (1.9), we evaluate the conditional mean of terminal wealth as
E[,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] = @
[
(1+3) (`+dC+\C+E[<C |I ]C ])+0( 5C+1)−'%C
]
+',C , ] ∈ {,*}. (1.14)
In the above, we write 0C from (1.11) as 0( 5 ) to make explicit its dependence on the state
variable, and discuss it further below. For the conditional variance, we use (1.12)–(1.13) to
write
var(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1) = @2(1 + 3)2var[C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] + @2var[%C+1 − 3C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] . (1.15)
The problem with this expression is that the var[%C+1 − 3C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] term depends on the
coefficients of the price function in (1.11) and these are not yet determined. To overcome
this difficulty, we introduce a conjectured variance function + ( 5 ), which allows us to rewrite
(1.15) as
var(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1) = @2(1 + 3)2
[
var(<C |I ]C ) + (1 − 5C )f2"
]
+ @2+ ( 5C+1). (1.16)
We are ultimately interested in a rational expectations equilibrium, which means that the
conjectured variance function must be “correct.” Using the dividend process in (1.1)–(1.3)
and the price function in (1.11), the correctness condition requires that
+ ( 5 ) = 1( 5 )2q 5 f2" + 62(1 − q) 5 f2" + 2( 5 )2f2- ∀ 5 , (1.17)
as can be seen by comparing the last term in (1.15) and (1.16). If (1.17) holds, then investors’
conjectures about how the variance of %C+1 − 3C+1 depends on 5C+1 are consistent with the
equilibrium price process. However, we initially allow investors to have an arbitrary, strictly
positive variance conjecture +, which is shared by all investors. In other words, we do not
initially assume that investors know the coefficient functions 1 and 2.
With arbitrary +, we do not have equality in (1.16). That is the true conditional
variance of wealth (on the left-hand side) is not equal to the conjectured variance of wealth
(on the right-hand side). Instead, we posit that investors solve their optimization problems
(1.9) as though (1.16) held. In other words, investors solve (1.9) but with the conditional
variance replaced by the right side of (1.16). A market equilibrium with conjectured variance
+ is then a price process and investor demand functions that clear the market and solve
(1.9) with this modification. Proposition 3 ensures the existence of such an equilibrium.
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This market equilibrium is not in general a rational expectations equilibrium because
the correctness condition in (1.17) does not hold. But we can think of agents in the model
as learning over time. Starting from an initial conjecture, investors set their demands and
clear the market at a price of the form in (1.11). They (or the next generation) then observe
the realized variance given by the right side of (1.17). They update their expectations by
setting + equal to this realized variance (which is fully specified for all 5 ), and the process
repeats. This in fact is how we solve our model numerically. A rational expectations market
equilibrium is characterized as a fixed point of this iterative process, and Proposition 4
gives modest parameter restrictions under which such a fixed point exists. The fixed point
determines 1( 5 ) and 2( 5 ), and these coefficients determine 0( 5 ) through market clearing (as
shown in Appendixes A.4.1 and A.4.2). Going forward, we use the term market equilibrium
to refer to a rational expectations market equilibrium.
1.3.2 Information Equilibrium
Propositions 3 and 4 show the existence of a market equilibrium with an exogenous _(·).
We now need to show that our notion of the endogenous fraction informed in Definition 1
is meaningful. Given a variance conjecture + ( 5 ) we need to find, for each 5 , a _( 5 ) that
makes investors indifferent between paying the cost 2 of becoming informed or staying
uninformed; if no such _ exists, we set _ equal to zero or one according to Definition 1.
Proposition 5 ensures the existence of an endogenous _. The + (·) function for which we
calculate an endogenous fraction informed will not, in general, be consistent with condition
(1.17).
We have argued that, given _, we can find a market equilibrium and in particular a correct
conjectured variance +; and given a variance conjecture +, we can find an endogenous _.
The remaining step combines these results to arrive simultaneously at a market equilibrium
and an endogenous _. The precise statement of our combined result is in Proposition 6. For
our numerical examples, we discretize the state space and approximate a + ( 5 ) consistent
with rational expectations and an endogenous fraction informed _( 5 ) as follows:
This iterative procedure generates an approximate solution + to (1.17) and yields solutions
to all the equilibrium quantities and price coefficients, except 0( 5 ). The last step of the
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discretize the state space 5 ∈ D via D = [0, 1/(= − 1), 2/(= − 1), . . . , 1];

























| | < Y;
solve for 0( 5 ) as the fixed point to (A.18);
Algorithm 1: Solution algorithm for the model.
algorithm solves for the discretized 0( 5 ) function. For more details see Section A.9 of the
Supplementary Appendix.
1.4 Analysis of the Model
Our model is motivated by the idea that as more investors become informed, more
information may become available. This type of feedback can arise at the onset of market
stress in response to heightened investor attention. In this section, we will show that this
dynamic can lead to periods of low and high volatility and high and low prices driven
purely by changes in the information state, with no change in fundamentals, as illustrated
in Figure 1.3. In other words, we can generate transitions similar to business cycles or even
financial crises through changes in the level of information, without necessarily the release
of negative information. In Section 1.4.4, we analyze the behavior of the model in the case
of correlated information and fundamentals shocks.
1.4.1 Dynamics of Information Precision
To provide insight into the model, we develop the numerical example of Figure 1.3.
A single period in our model is one month, and the model parameter values are given in
Table A.1. The details of the calibration are given in Appendix A.2. The solid line in
Figure 1.4 shows _ as a function of 5 . We calculate this curve by starting from a flat
variance conjecture + and iteratively updating + and _ as discussed in Section 1.3. This
iterative process converges very quickly in our numerical experiments.
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At low levels of information precision 5 , the figure shows a flat section where _( 5 ) = 0;
with little information available, no investor chooses to bear the cost of becoming informed.
Once 5 increases to just above 0.4, we have a positive fraction of investors informed, and
this fraction generally increases with the precision 5 .7
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Figure 1.4: Endogenous fraction informed as a function of 5
Note: The solid line shows the fraction informed _( 5C ) in information state 5C , and the
dashed line shows the mapping from _ to 5C+1 without exogenous shocks. Each circle shows
a point where 5C = 5C+1 when the shocks in (1.6) are zero, labeled with its ( 5 , _) value. The
figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
To interpret the dashed line in Figure 1.4, we shut off the exogenous shocks in the
evolution of 5C by setting n 5 ,C+1 ≡ 0 in (1.6). The dashed line then shows the mapping from
_ to the next value of 5 . That is, starting from any 5C = 5 on the horizontal axis, reading up
to the solid line then across to the dashed line and back down to the horizontal axis yields
5C+1. Points where the two lines cross are fixed-point combinations of ( 5 , _( 5 )) in a model
without exogenous shocks. In other words, the three circled points in the figure are cases
where 5C+1 = 5C when n 5 ,C+1 = 0.
Consider, for example, the circled point near 5 = 0.48, _( 5 ) = 0.071. Starting at that
7For some parameter values, at 5 near 1 we have a small decline in _( 5 ). The possibility of a decline
in _( 5 ) as 5 increases reflects the dual roles of information in a multiperiod model. Becoming informed
benefits an investor by reducing uncertainty about the end-of-period dividend. However, as more investors
become informed, the variance of the end-of-period asset price increases, so the net effect on the variance of
an investor’s end-of-period wealth is indeterminate.
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5 , the endogenous fraction informed _( 5 ) is precisely the value that keeps the information
state at 5 under the evolution in (1.6) without endogenous shocks. The model still has
feedback from _ to 5 (and 5 to _), but 5C remains fixed. The same argument applies to
the intersection near 5 = 0.88. In the lower left, the curves intersect throughout an interval
where _( 5 ) = 0, and we have a fixed point at (0 5 , 0) because the dynamics in (1.6) drive 5C
to 0 5 when _C = n 5 ,C+1 = 0.
If we keep n 5 ,C = 0 and start the evolution of 5C near 0.88, it will move toward 0.88;
and if we start the evolution near 0.175, 5C will move toward 0.175. In contrast, the point
5 = 0.48 is an unstable fixed point: starting to the left of this point will drive 5C to 0.175,
and starting to the right will drive 5C to 0.88. When we reintroduce the shocks n 5 ,C , we
therefore expect 5C to spend long periods near 0.175 and long periods near 0.88.
This behavior explains the pattern we saw in Figure 1.3. An initial set of positive shocks
increase 5C . With feedback dynamics, 5C stays near 0.88 for a long time: once the fraction
informed _( 5C ) is high, the demand for information keeps 5C high. Eventually, exogenous
negative shocks decrease 5C sufficiently that it moves toward 0.175. The effect of feedback is
therefore to endogenously create two regimes (corresponding to the two stable fixed points
in Figure 1.4). We have not yet explained why the high 5C regime is associated with low
prices and, as we will see, with high volatility. That explanation will come in Section 1.4.3.
Figure 1.5 provides additional information on the stochastic dynamics of 5C . The left
panel shows the steady-state distribution of 5C (indicated by the blue circles in the left panel
of the figure), calculated using a Markov chain representation.8 The distribution is bimodal,
showing that the economy spends the majority of its time in the vicinity of the two stable
fixed points from Figure 1.4, and confirming the presence of two regimes. If we fix _ at
its mean value of 0.0731, which effectively turns off the feedback effect, the steady-state
distribution (shown by red triangles) becomes unimodal — we no longer get two regimes.9
The right panel shows that the two regimes in the feedback model are highly persistent,
in the sense that the cumulative probability of transitioning from one to the other remains
low, even after many periods. The probability of transitioning within 240 periods is only
8See the Supplementary Appendix for details.
9The steady-state distribution of 5C in an economy when 1 5 = 0 is also unimodal, and centered at 0.175.
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Figure 1.5: Steady-state distribution and transition probabilities of 5C
Note: The left panel shows the equilibrium steady state distribution of 5C . The right panel
shows the low-to-high regime transition probability P[ 5C+8 > 0.5| 5C = .17] (solid line) and the
high-to-low regime transition probability P[ 5C+8 < 0.5| 5C = .88] (dashed line) as a function
of 8 (measured in months). The figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
about 6-8%.
1.4.2 Price Drops and Volatility Spikes
Figure 1.6 shows model quantities calculated using the parameters in Table A.1. The
first three panels show the price coefficient functions 0, 1, and 2 from (1.11). The lower
right-hand panel shows the expected net profit from owning one share of the stock. When
no investor is informed, no dividend information is reflected in the price, and 1 = 0. As
5 increases to the point where some investors become informed, 1 and 2 both increase,
which drive up the price variance.10 The increase in 2 reflects a higher compensation for
accommodating supply shocks and is attributable to higher price variance and a growing
informational disadvantage of the uninformed relative to the informed.
The upper left panel of Figure 1.6 shows that 0( 5 ) drops sharply as 5 increases. The left
panel of Figure 1.7 shows the resulting effect on the expected stock price %0 ≡ 0( 5 ) + 3̄.
The price response is dramatic: a small increase in 5 leads to a price drop of 10%. We will
10As 1 measures the sensitivity of the price to dividend information, the monotonicity of 1 parallels an
empirical finding in Brancati and Macchiavelli (2019) that prices become more information-sensitive when
information precision increases.
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Figure 1.6: Price coefficients and expected profit as functions of 5
Note: Equilibrium price coefficients 0( 5 ), 1( 5 ), and 2( 5 ) and the expected investment net
profit E[c] per period. The vertical, dashed green line shows the point at which _ becomes
positive. The figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
explain the price drop in Section 1.4.3, using the conditional variances of net profit c in the
right panel of the figure.
The price variance + ( 5 ) in (1.17), shown in the middle panel of Figure 1.7, increases
monotonically in 5 , together with 1( 5 ) and 2( 5 ). It follows that the price drop associated
with an increase in 5 is accompanied by a spike in volatility. Indeed, in the low- 5 region
where 1( 5 ) = 2( 5 ) = 0, + ( 5 ) in (1.17) is below 0.5; but for 5 near 0.88, + ( 5 ) exceeds
1.5, so the change in information regime produces more than a three-fold increase in price
variance.
It is customary to associate large declines in market values with the arrival of bad news.
Following a 10% decline (the price drop in Figure 1.7) in an individual stock price or the
overall market, one would expect media and expert accounts of what bit of bad news —
a product failure, a CEO scandal, a change in government policy — triggered the fall.
But in our setting it is simply more news — in the form of increased precision 5C — that
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Figure 1.7: Price and variances as functions of 5
Note: Equilibrium expected price %0 ≡ 0( 5 ) + 3̄ and conditional expected return variance
for informed, @

, and uninformed, @*

, as functions of information state 5 . The figure uses
parameter values from Table A.1.
drives investors, not necessarily good or bad news.11 In Section 1.4.4 we show that a negative
correlation between information shocks and shocks to fundamentals can significantly amplify
the price drop.
The potential for increased volatility from increased information has policy implications.
A regulatory change that leads to persistently higher information precision for informed in-
vestors is potentially destabilizing in times of market stress.12 Interestingly, in their analysis
of disclosure of the results of regulatory stress tests for banks, Goldstein and Leitner (2018)
conclude that disclosure is valuable only under adverse conditions. Our results do not con-
flict but rather reflect different considerations, as the objective in Goldstein and Leitner
(2018) is optimal risk sharing among banks, and the information disclosed separates weak
and strong banks.
11In a macro context, CESA-BIANCHI and FERNANDEZ-CORUGEDO (2018) find that an increase in
economic uncertainty results in a decrease in the risk premium, which is consistent with our results.
12The information disclosed about regulatory stress tests is disclosed publicly, but the design of scenarios
and the interpretation of the results are technical matters that are arguably accessible only to informed
investors who have acquired the necessary expertise.
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1.4.3 Decomposing Price and Volatility
The price drop in Figure 1.7 is driven by the drop in the 0() curve in Figure 1.6. In
Appendix A.4.2 we show that 0C can be decomposed into two components,
0C =
(1 + 3)`






where, cC+8 is the net profit from holding one share of the stock from C + 8 − 1 to C + 8, as in
(1.8), and EC denotes conditional expectation given 5C . From this expression, we see that
the 0C + 3C component of %C is the present value of all future expected dividend payments
minus a discount reflecting the expected present value of all future net profits.13 In the
context of the Campbell (1990) and Vuolteenaho (2002) return variance decomposition, the
second term in 0C represents the effect of a time-varying discount rate on the stock price.
To understand how a change in information precision 5C creates a price drop, we need to
understand the effect of 5C on the second term in 0C .
The stock’s expected net profit over a single period is given by14




























var(cC+1 |I /*C , 5C+1)
I /*C ] .
Equation (1.19) thus reflects the average return uncertainty faced by investors, weighted by
the fractions of informed and uninformed in the economy, and scaled by W-̄.
The right panel of Figure 1.7 shows @

(solid line) and @*

(dashed). The shape of these
curves reflects the tradeoff engendered by increased information precision. When 5 is low,
an increase in 5 decreases the expected variance of net profits for informed and uninformed
investors because more is known about next period’s dividend, the C+1 term in (1.8). As





E[C+8 |C ] from (1.1).
14This is shown in equation (A.27) of the appendix. This expression generalizes the corresponding
quantity derived from equation (A10) in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
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long as 5 is low enough so that _( 5 ) = 0 (to the left of the vertical, dashed line in the graphs)
this is the only effect, and higher information precision lowers uncertainty. However, past
the no-informed point, with 5 large enough that _( 5 ) > 0, the uncertainty of next period’s
net profit starts to increase, due to the increasing variance of %C+1 in the expression for cC+1
in (1.8). This effect outweighs the decrease in the variance of next period’s dividend, and
thus increases the conditional variances of the net profit. For high enough 5 the increased
information about next period’s dividend begins to dominate, and the expected conditional
variance begins to fall again. This pattern depends crucially on the dynamic structure of
our model: in a single-period setting, where investors care about the next dividend but not
future prices, more precise information always reduces investment uncertainty.




is inherited by EC [cC+1], as illustrated
in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1.6. Recall from our discussion of Figures 1.4 and 1.5
that 5C spends most of its time near 5 = 0.175 or near 5 = 0.88. From the bottom-right
panel of Figure 1.6, we see that EC [cC+1] is greater near 5 = 0.88 than it is near 5 = 0.175,
indicating an increase in the expected profit from holding the stock as we move from the
low-information regime to the high-information regime. This increase in expected profit is
associated with a decrease in the current price of the stock, and it contributes to the price
drop we see in Figure 1.7.
Notice, however, that the change in expected net profit across regimes is quite small, as
indicated by the vertical scale in the lower-right panel of Figure 1.6. How does a small change
in expected profit get amplified into a 10% price drop? The answer lies in the combination
of the price discount reflected in (1.18) and the persistence of the two 5C regimes.
We saw in the right panel of Figure 1.5 that transitions between 5C ≈ 0.175 and 5C ≈ 0.88
are rare. We observed the inequality EC [cC+1 | 5C = 0.88] > EC [cC+1 | 5C = 0.175] in Figure 1.6.
As a consequence of the persistence in regimes, we expect this inequality to extend to
EC [cC+8 | 5C = 0.88] > EC [cC+8 | 5C = 0.175], for large 8. The present value of such terms is
subtracted from the price %C through the 0C coefficient in (1.18). Thus, even a relatively
small single-period difference in expected profits around 5 = 0.175 and 5 = 0.88 is amplified
to a large change in the price because the 5C process spends long periods in each of the two
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regimes before moving towards the other.15
Are such infrequent regime transitions plausible? Barro (2009) estimates country level
crises occur with a 1.7% per year probability. Assuming independence across time, a given
country has a 29% (i.e., 1− (1− 0.017)20) probability of experiencing at least one crisis over
a 20-year period. As we saw in Figure 1.5, the probability of a low to high state transition
in our model is approximately 7% over a 20-year period. Our calibration therefore suggests
that one out of four country-level crises may be accompanied by the information-driven price
drop of our model. If crises are typically associated with positive shocks to 5C , the actual
ratio may be higher. We treat this correlated case next.
1.4.4 Correlated Information and Dividend Shocks
We have thus far kept the dividend shocks and information shocks independent of each
other. This separation has allowed us to isolate the impact of a more precise signal for
informed investors from the impact of specifically positive or negative signals. In practice,
events that fuel investor demand for greater information are often accompanied by adverse
effects on fundamentals. We therefore extend our model to allow negative correlation in
shocks to 5C and shocks to dividends. As expected, this correlation amplifies the resulting
price drop.
We introduce correlation by replacing the dividend innovation "C+1 in (1.2) with
"C+1 = <C + \C + nC+1 − n 5 ,C+1, (1.20)
where n 5 ,C+1 is the shock to 5C in (1.6). Our previous solution method goes through essentially
unchanged because of the form of the utility functions in (1.9). The conditional mean
and variance there are conditioned on 5C+1 and thus on n 5 ,C+1. See Section A.8 of the
Supplementary Appendix for details.16
Figure 1.8 illustrates the effect of correlation through impulse response functions. We
start with 5C at 0.4, a level from which it can move toward its high or low regimes with a single
15The same argument predicts a sharp decline in the 0() curve around the unstable fixed point near
5 = 0.48 in Figure 1.4. Starting to the right of 0.48, 5C will tend to move toward 0.88, whereas starting to
the left of 0.48, 5C will tend to move toward 0.175.
16The case of n 5 ,C+1 = n 5 1,C+1 + n 5 2,C+1 and "C+1 = <C + \C + nC+1 − ℎ × n 5 1,C+1 also leaves our solution
method unchanged, assuming the inner expectation and variance in (1.9) condition on n 5 1,C+1 and n 5 2,C+1.
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shock. The solid blue curves show the response to a pure dividend shock of nC+1 = −0.135.
This shock has no effect on 5C so, as expected, 5C mean reverts toward 0.175. In the lower
panel, the expected price given 5C drops because of the negative dividend shock, and then
gradually recovers.
For the dashed red curves, we set n 5 ,C+1 = 0.135; this is the size of a positive information
shock in Table A.1, which is why we chose this magnitude. Through (1.20), the dividend
shock is again −0.135, but now the shock affects both C+1 and 5C+1. In the top panel of
Figure 1.8, the red curve shows that following a positive shock, 5C is pulled toward 0.88. The
lower panel shows that the price drop is now much greater, because it reflects the combined
effect of higher 5C and a lower dividend.

























Figure 1.8: An example path under correlated shocks
Note: Response of 5C (top) and price (bottom) to a dividend shock without correlation
(blue) and with correlation (red).
At the onset of a crisis, we expect both a decline in fundamentals and, in response to
investor demand, an increase in information production. The contrast between the pure
dividend shock and the joint dividend-information shock in Figure 1.8 indicates that the
demand for information can significantly amplify a shock to fundamentals, leading to a
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deeper and more prolonged crisis. Our model suggests that when fundamentals shocks
happen in an already elevated information environment — had 5C been lower than 0.4 in the
simulation, the positive information shock would not have induced a transition to the high-
information regime — the effect of adverse fundamentals shocks can be greatly exacerbated.
For example, had the 2009 Greek budget deficit revision happened in a less media-heavy
climate than what prevailed in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the impact on
Greek (and other European sovereign) markets may have been much smaller.
1.5 Exploration of the Mechanism
This section further investigates the features of our model that drive its behavior. Sec-
tions 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 connect the price drop with the degree of information asymmetry
and the cost of information production. Section 1.5.3 contrasts our model with models of
strategic complementarity in information acquisition.
1.5.1 The Role of Time-Varying Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry plays an important role in generating price and volatility cycles
in our model. Large price drops occur when the economy transitions from low- to high-
information asymmetry states. Whether this can happen is dictated by q, the fraction
of knowable information that is private. Figure 1.9 compares equilibrium 0() curves for
different values of q; the case q = 0.35 is the one we have analyzed thus far.
When q = 0 and all knowable information is public, the economy is characterized by
no information asymmetry — the knowable information is equally known to all agents.
The 0() curve corresponding to this no-asymmetry case is the highest one (shown as a
solid line), indicating the smallest price discount relative to the present value of future
dividends. The 0() curve in this case is quite insensitive to 5C . The q = 1 case represents the
highest informational asymmetry possible in the model, and corresponds to the lowest 0()
curve, representing a large price discount needed to induce the informationally disadvantaged
uninformed agents to participate in risk sharing, regardless of the information state 5C .
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Only for intermediate values of q can the economy transition from low- to high-information
asymmetry states. Such regime shifts are accompanied by large price changes.

























Figure 1.9: 0() curves as functions of 5 for different values of q.
Note: The figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
The reason that prices in the cases q = 0 and q = 1 do not change much across different
values of 5 can be seen from Figure 1.10, which shows the steady-state distribution of 5 in
the different q models. Changing q changes the steady-state distribution because it changes
the endogenous _( 5C ). When q = 0, there are no informed investors since all knowable
information is public. With _ = 0 in (1.6), any positive n 5 ,C+1 shock quickly decays, pulling
5C back to its low-information fixed point of 0.175. This dynamic is seen in the unimodal


































































Steady state distribution as function of f for 3 φ 's
Figure 1.10: Steady-state distribution of 5C at different q’s
Steady-state distribution of 5C across different levels of q. The figure uses parameter values
from Table A.1. The solid circles indicate fixed points of the 5 → _∗ mapping.
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distribution, with the peak centered at 0 5 , when q = 0. Similarly, when q = 1, all knowable
information is private, and _( 5 ) is relatively large. Via the 1 5 term in the dynamics of
5C+1 in (1.6), a relatively high _ produces a steady state distribution that is unimodal at
5 = 1. Any negative n 5 ,C+1 quickly dissipates as 5 is pulled back to one. In these cases,
EC [cC+8 | 5C = 5 ] will be close to either EC [cC+8 | 5C = 0.175] or EC [cC+8 | 5C = 1] for any 5 , and 0C
in (1.18) is consequently insensitive to 5 .
For intermediate values of q (0.35 in our calibration), the equilibrium _ curve is in an
intermediate range, and the tendencies of 5C towards 0 5 and towards the high-information
fixed point are balanced. The steady state 5C distribution becomes bimodal as can be seen
in Figure 1.10. Therefore, a sequence of shocks can occasionally push the economy from one
information regime to the other. Yet both regimes are very persistent. As in Section 1.4.3,
this persistence amplifies differences in expected net profit EC [cC+1] at different values of 5
to produce large price changes.
This effect results from an increase in information asymmetry, rather than just from an
increase in information precision. When 5C is low, there is little information but also no
information asymmetry because all agents are uninformed. In this case, prices are high.
But as 5C increases, private information becomes more revealing and some investors start
to acquire it at a cost. The uninformed then find themselves at a growing informational
disadvantage and the price falls.
1.5.2 The Effects of Cheaper Information
Connecting the previous discussion of information asymmetry to our news production
sector from Section 1.2.2, we ask what happens in the economy when information gets easier
to produce. We can proxy for this by assuming that the per unit cost of news production
2% falls. Dropping the cost of news production 2%, while keeping the expenditure on news
producers 2" fixed, results in an increasing 1 5 (equation A.4 in the appendix shows that
1 5 = 2"/2%). That is, the feedback 1 5 _C from this period’s informed to next period’s
signal precision 5C+1 becomes larger. Figure 1.11 shows that cheaper information pushes
the economy towards the low-price-high-volatility regime. In fact, with a sufficiently low
cost of information production, i.e. a very high 1 5 , the entire weight of the steady-state
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distribution gravitates to the low-price-high-volatility state.17 In contrast, when information
production is expensive, there is no feedback, and the economy is always in the high price,
low volatility regime.
To analyze the effect of cheaper information on welfare, we look at the utility of the
uninformed * , which is the utility of all agents in equilibrium because it is always either
higher than that of the informed (when _ = 0) or equal to that of the informed.18 In the
left panel of Figure 1.12, we see that higher 1 5 (cheaper information production) increases
* ( 5 ) at each 5 . However, higher 1 5 also pushes probability mass into the high 5 region,
where * ( 5 ) is lower. When we take the expectation of * ( 5 ) over the steady-state distri-
bution of 5 , the net effect, shown in Figure 1.12, is to lower expected utility. In particular,
then, a lower cost of information production, i.e., a higher 1 5 , reduces welfare. As before,
this conclusion is a consequence of the degree of information asymmetry determined by
q. Greater information production is welfare-reducing when a substantial fraction of that
information remains private.
1.5.3 The Value of Becoming Informed
A key property of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) setting is that the value of becom-
ing informed decreases as the number of informed investors increases. Subsequent work has
investigated conditions in which the value of becoming informed increases as more investors
become informed. Sources of this type of strategic complementarity identified in the litera-
ture include high fixed costs and low marginal costs in information production (Veldkamp
(2006)); certain deviations from normally distributed uncertainty (Chamley (2007)); set-
tings in which investors learn about supply as well as cash flows (Ganguli and Yang (2009)
and Avdis (2016)); other settings with multiple sources of information (Manzano and Vives
(2011) and Goldstein and Yang (2015)); and settings in which information acquisition affects
cash flows (Dow et al. (2017). With few exceptions, these are static models, but they often
result in multiple equilibria, with different asset prices in different equilibria.
17The steady-state distributions of 5C with 1 5 = 0, 1 5 = 0.384, and 1 5 = 1.536 are very similar or identical
to the three distributions in Figure 1.10 at three values of q: increasing 1 5 shifts mass to the right.
18This would not be true if _ = 1, which doesn’t happen in our calibration.
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Figure 1.11: 0() curves at different 1 5 ’s
Note: The figure shows 0() curves as function of 5C across different media regimes. The
figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.































































Figure 1.12: Investor utility at different 1 5 ’s
Note: The left panel shows that * increases with 1 5 at each level of 5 . But the right panel
shows that expected utility decreases with 1 5 . This happens because increasing 1 5 shifts
the distribution of 5C to the right. The figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
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Figure 1.13: Value of information by _
Note: The curves show how the equilibrium value of becoming informed varies with the
fraction informed _( 5 ), at different levels of 5 . As more investors become informed, the
value of becoming informed decreases.
In our dynamic setting, large price changes occur within the model, rather than through
a change of equilibrium selection in a static model. But we will see that the contrast with
earlier work goes beyond this feature. In order to explore strategic complementarity, we
vary the cost 2 of becoming informed and recalculate the equilibrium. For each 2 , we get
a new _(·) function; we can fix a value of 5 and see how _( 5 ) varies with 2 . Because _( 5 )
is the equilibrium fraction informed, 2 is precisely the value of becoming informed when
5C = 5 .
Figure 1.13 shows the results of these calculations at three levels of 5 . The curves are
calculated by varying 2 and recomputing _( 5 ). But we read them in reverse, i.e. with _( 5 )
on the horizontal axis, to see how the equilibrium value of becoming informed varies with
the fraction informed _( 5 ). The curves are decreasing, indicating that the value of becoming
informed decreases as more investors become informed. In this respect, our model shows
the behavior in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and differs from the large class of subsequent
models that exhibit strategic complementarity in the value of becoming informed.
The underlying source of the feedback effect in our 5C dynamics (1.6), as developed
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through the microfoundation in Appendix A.1, is the response of a competitive informa-
tion production sector to increased demand when the marginal cost of transmitting already
discovered information is zero. A similar cost structure of information production is high-
lighted by Veldkamp (2006) as a source of strategic complementarity, so it is interesting to
contrast the implications of our models. The models have different objectives and differ in
many respects; but, most notably, in Veldkamp (2006) higher prices are associated with a
larger fraction of informed investors, whereas we saw in Section 1.4.2 that in our model an
increase in _C can precipitate a large price drop.
Complementarity in Veldkamp (2006) arises because the price of information in equilib-
rium is declining in the number of informed investors; with more informed investors, there
is the same amount of information, but at a lower per capita cost. In our case, the amount
paid by each investor for information is fixed at 2" ; therefore with more informed investors,
more information gets produced. We show in Section A.5.3 that each informed investor
optimally chooses to pay 2" in equilibrium. This difference leads to information cycles in
our model, and these are absent in Veldkamp (2006).
Another key feature driving the difference is the dual role of information in our dynamic
model discussed in Section 1.4.3: more precise information decreases dividend uncertainty
but can increase future price variance. The second effect is absent in Veldkamp (2006),
where investors earn dividends but do not earn capital gains from reselling their shares,
making them indifferent to price variance. With no dependence on the next period’s prices,
the analysis reduces to a sequence of single-period problems.
To see that end-of-period prices drive the difference in our conclusions we can work
backwards as follows. The price drop in our model is driven by the drop in 0( 5 ) in (1.18),










would instead decrease with 5 as the uncertainty in C+1 decreases,
eliminating the price drop we see with increasing 5 .
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1.6 Conclusions
We have developed a model of a financial market in a dynamic information environment
and shown that information dynamics can have a profound effect on prices. The model
combines exogenous shocks to the level of potentially available information, an endogenous
response by investors, and feedback from investor information choices to the information
environment through information production by a competitive research sector. The dynamic
structure of the model leads to a dual role for information, in which greater information
reduces uncertainty about the next dividend but may increase price variance.
We show that the equilibrium dynamics of our model, calibrated to market data, are
characterized by two regimes, one with high prices and low volatility, and one with low
prices and high volatility. A transition from the first regime to the second is reminiscent
of a financial crisis but with no change in fundamentals — the price drop is driven by
the dynamics of information and an increase in information asymmetry. In the case of
correlated information and fundamentals shocks, an increase in information production can
meaningfully increase the price impact of adverse dividend shocks.
Furthermore, we show that in our calibration, the effect of an increased feedback from
today’s informed to future information is welfare decreasing in the steady-state of the econ-
omy. This is true despite the fact that for any given level of the information state, more
feedback makes the current set of investors better off.
Our model points to an important role for information dynamics in financial crises. At
the onset of a crisis, growing investor demand for information met with increasing production
of non-public information can drive down prices and increase volatility. The effect can
be counteracted by making costly information public to reduce the asymmetry between
informed and uninformed investors.
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Chapter 2
Index-based Investing and Intraday Stock Dynamics
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the pattern of intraday stock dynamics is an important topic with various
practical applications. Portfolio managers executing large orders can reduce the transaction
costs by trading in the hours with abundant market liquidity; intraday traders can better
exploit price comovement of different stocks during the periods when correlation is high;
risk managers can reduce intraday risk by avoiding times with large price fluctuations. In
this chapter, we will show that the intraday patterns of US stocks have changed in impor-
tant ways since 2004. For example, we find in the recent decade, the trading volume and
correlation increase significantly near the market close; the betas of different stocks are dis-
persed in the morning, but generally move towards one throughout the day. These patterns
demonstrate the substantial implications from passive investment, and more specifically, the
index-based strategies.
In the recent decade, the growth of passive investment and index-based strategies have
drawn great attention from both industry and academia (Appel et al., 2016). The index-
based strategies tend to make investment decisions based on portfolio-level approaches in-
stead of selecting individual stocks in a discretionary way. For example, index-based strate-
gies include buying or selling all S&P 500 constituents according to their market capitaliza-
tion; investing in stocks with high or low beta; buying stocks in specific sectors, etc. These
strategies trade multiple stocks in a systematic manner, and make stocks more likely to
move in same directions. On the other hand, it has been widely noticed by financial press
that the index-based strategies from passive investors tend to concentrate their trading near
the market close (Strumpf (2015) and Driebusch et al. (2018)). This behavior can be ex-
plained by, among other reasons, minimizing the tracking errors of orders benchmarked to
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the closing price, efficiently buying or selling large number of stocks with market-on-close
orders, and reducing the inventory risk for redemption and creation settlement (see relevant
discussion in Cushing and Madhavan (2000), Foucault et al. (2005), and Wu (2019)).
In this chapter, we first use two empirical studies to provide evidence for the growth
of passive investment and the intraday trading pattern of index-based strategies. In the
first one, we find the stocks with high (resp. low) passive ownership have higher trading
volume near the market close (resp. open). In the second one, we show the trading volume
tends to drop dramatically near the market close after a stock is removed from the S&P
500 Index, thus less tracked by the index-based strategies. These findings suggest an active-
open, passive-close intraday trading profile, i.e., more discretionary (resp. index-based)
trading at the market open (resp. close). Such trading profile can have substantial impact
on the intraday patterns of stock dynamics. Accordingly, we propose four hypotheses that
motivate our subsequent studies. First, we expect the correlation between stocks to be low
at the market open, and high at the end of trading session. This is because the index-based
strategies tend to drive multiple stocks to move in same directions. Similarly, we expect the
betas of different stocks to be more dispersed in the morning, but move towards one near
the market close due to index-based orders. Next, the daily dispersion in trading volume
is supposed to be lower at the end of trading session, as the trading from institutional
investors, who execute most of the index-based strategies, is shown to be highly persistent
across days (Campbell et al., 2009). Finally, we expect the volatility to be higher at the
market open and close, but low during the day.
The impact of institutional and passive investment on stock trading, at both the intraday
and overnight level, has been a popular topic in recent years. Karolyi et al. (2012) and Koch
et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence showing that trading from ETFs and index funds
contributes to the commonality in daily trading volume. Heston et al. (2010) suggest that
institutional fund flows and trading algorithms can generate periodicity in intraday returns
and volumes. Subsequent work by Bogousslavsky (2016) and Gao et al. (2018) shows, both
theoretically and empirically, that delayed portfolio rebalancing from institutional investors
leads to positive correlation between the returns in the last and first half hours of adjacent
trading sessions. Our work complements and extends this line of research by revealing the
39
implication of passive investment from other important aspects in high-frequency setting,
including intraday correlation, beta, and volume dispersion. We show the intraday patterns
indeed changed substantially over years. In particular, the four hypotheses hold in our large
dataset, especially in the recent decade during which the passive investment has become
more prevalent.
To estimate intraday patterns, high-frequency data plays an indispensable role. With
the development of financial technologies, there are growing applications of high-frequency
data in various fields of finance. We list some examples below among many others in this
rich area. For intraday volatility, Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) analyze the intraday peri-
odicity in volatility and its impact on return dynamics; Andersen et al. (2001) test potential
pattern shift in intraday volatility with variance-ratio statistics. Some literature on volatil-
ity forecasting with high-frequency data and its applications can be found in Andersen et al.
(2003), Hansen et al. (2012), Stroud and Johannes (2014), and Liu et al. (2018). Intraday
trading volume is also widely studied. For example, Kappou et al. (2010) analyze how the
addition of a stock to an index impacts the trading volume and return on adjacent days;
Min et al. (2018) develop a time-varying liquidity model based on intraday trading volume
pattern and study its impact on optimal portfolio execution. Some recent work studies the
estimation of covariance with high-frequency data and demonstrates its benefit in portfolio
allocation. Boudt and Zhang (2015) show that an equal-risk portfolio constructed from
jump-robust intraday covariance estimation delivers higher return and lower risk than tra-
ditional equal-weight portfolio; Bibinger et al. (2019) reveal that intraday covariances follow
periodicity patterns, and increase strongly with the arrival of new information; Bollerslev
et al. (2019) show the factor-based covariance estimates can improve the performance of risk
minimization portfolio in the high-dimensional setting.
While high-frequency data can provide valuable information, the estimators based on
high-frequency data are often contaminated by two undesired issues, i.e., market microstruc-
ture noise and asynchronicity in price observations. Ait-Sahalia et al. (2005) show that as
sampling frequency decreases to zero, the return variance becomes fully induced by mi-
crostructure noise instead of the underlying price process. The well-known “Epps” effect
(Epps, 1979) states that the asynchronicity in price observations tends to attenuate the
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correlation between stocks. To handle these difficulties in high-frequency setting, there is
a vast literature on efficient high-frequency estimators. Consistent estimators for realized
variance in the presence of market microstructure noise include the multi-scale sub-sampling
method of Zhang et al. (2005) and Aït-Sahalia et al. (2011), the realized kernel estimator of
Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2008), and the pre-averaging approach of Jacod et al. (2009). For
realized covariance, estimators accounting for both microstructure noise and asynchronicity
include, among others, the quasi maximum likelihood estimator of Aït-Sahalia et al. (2010),
the multivariate realized kernel approach of Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2011), the two-scale
method of Zhang (2011), and the factor-based method in Bollerslev et al. (2019).
In this chapter we estimate and analyze the intraday patterns of S&P 500 constituents
with a large high-frequency dataset. The dataset consists of 1-second level trade data
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database for all S&P 500 constituents over 15 years
(2004 – 2018). This large sample, both cross-sectional and over time, allows us to obtain
robust and general patterns for S&P 500 constituents and examine how the patterns change
over years. Specifically, we estimate the intraday correlation, beta, volatility, and trading
volume for all stocks or stock pairs in the S&P 500 Index. This establishes a comprehensive
picture of various aspects of intraday stock dynamics. We employ the two-scale based
estimators developed in Zhang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2011), which are unbiased under
market microstructure noise and asynchronicity. Besides, the estimators make full use of
the large sample, thus avoid the information loss suffered by traditional estimators based
on sparse sampling. Furthermore, the nonparametric two-scale based estimators can be
efficiently implemented on a large group of stocks, which is essential for our study.
We find informative intraday patterns for S&P 500 stocks. For realized correlation, We
show it exhibits certain intraday patterns that evolve over time. First, in the recent decade,
the realized correlation starts low and increases in the morning, stays flat in the middle of
the day, and further increases near the market close. The magnitude of the intraday increase
in realized correlation is on average larger than 0.2, which is relatively substantial. Second,
in 2016 to 2018, the realized correlation for the stock pairs with low daily correlations starts
even lower at the market open, and increases rapidly throughout the entire trading session.
For example, in 2018, the average realized correlation for the stock pairs with bottom 1%
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daily correlations (1140 pairs) increases from −0.1 at the market open to 0.2 at the end of
trading session. Similar patterns are also observed for realized correlation between sector
pairs. On the other hand, we find the realized beta of different stocks are more dispersed
in the morning, but moves towards one near the market close. In 2018, the average realized
beta for the high-beta stocks (top 10% daily betas) decreases from 1.85 to 1.23 during the
day, while that for the low-beta stocks (bottom 10% daily betas) increases from 0.17 to
0.65. These patterns confirm our hypotheses on the implication of index-based strategies,
and reveal the substantial impact of the active-open, passive-close trading profile on various
aspects of intraday stock dynamics. As an additional theoretical support, we develop a
market impact model with single-stock and index-fund investors, and show the time-varying
liquidity provision indeed produces the observed intraday patterns of realized correlation
and beta.
Next, we find the intraday trading volume shows a U-shape pattern, with higher volume
near the market open and close. Furthermore, the U-shape pattern becomes more skewed
to the right in the recent decade, as the trading volume near the market close increases
significantly. In particular, the proportion of trading volume in the last half hour of trading
session increases from 15% in 2004 to 22% in 2018. Such shift in trading volume, as a
consequence of the growth of passive investing, has been widely noticed in recent research
(see, e.g., Min et al. (2018) and Wu (2019)). Moreover, we show the daily variation in
trading volume is high in the morning, but low at the end of trading session. This can be
attributed, in part, to the persistent trading from institutional investors who execute most
of the index-based strategies near the market close. Finally, we find the intraday realized
volatility shows a U-shape pattern skewed to the left, i.e., starts relatively high at the market
open and drops subsequently. Besides, we observe the realized volatility near the market
close further decreases after 2012, making the intraday curves flatter at the end. While the
intraday volatility and volume have been studied in the literature (see, e.g., Wood et al.
(1985) and Pagano et al. (2008)), our large dataset and estimators that are efficient under
market microstructure noise enable us to obtain robust intraday patterns and examine how
they evolve over time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we show the implication
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of index-based investment via two empirical studies, which motivate our estimation and
analysis of intraday stock dynamics. Section 2.3 establishes the estimators used in our high-
frequency setting. In Section 2.4, we describe the data and implementation details. We
provide the main estimation results of intraday patterns in Section 2.5, including realized
correlation, beta, volume, and volatility. In Section 2.6, we develop a theoretical market
impact model with time-varying liquidity provision. Section 4.6 concludes the study and
provides further discussions.
2.2 Implication of Index-based Investment on Intraday
Trading
In this section, we use two empirical studies to show the growth of index-based invest-
ment indeed impacts the intraday trading activities. We propose four hypotheses on the
intraday patterns of stock dynamics, which motivate our study with high-frequency data in
subsequent sections.
2.2.1 Evidence from Passive Fund Ownership
First, we demonstrate the growth of index-based investment strategies using the degree of
passive fund ownership of S&P 500 constituents. We calculate the passive and active mutual
fund ownership following the classification method in Appel et al. (2016)1. Specifically, a
fund is classified as either passive or active by searching for certain strings in its name that
identify index funds and the supplementary information on the index fund indicator from
CRSP. Figure 2.1 plots the equal-weight average of the fractions of shares owned by either
passive or active funds (left), as well as the ratio of shares owned by passive funds to the
total shares owned by both types of mutual funds2 (right). Note the passive and active
shares on the left do not sum to 1 as not all shares are owned by mutual funds. We see
the average proportion owned by passive mutual funds significantly increases in the recent
1A detailed description can also be found in Appendix A.3 of Glasserman et al. (2019).
2The patterns in Figure 2.1 match well with the results in Figure 2 of Glasserman et al. (2019); see also
Figure 2.8 in 2018 Investment Company Institute Fact Book.
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decade. Thus, we expect more trading from index-based strategies for stocks in the S&P
500 Index.






Passive and active share of total market
passive/market
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Passive share of total mutual fund
Figure 2.1: Fraction of shares owned by active and passive funds
Note: The left panel shows the fractions of shares owned by either active and passive
funds. The right panel shows the ratio of shares owned by passive fund to that owned by
mutual funds.
The growth of index-based investment strategies leads to substantial change in the in-
traday pattern of trading activities. To show this, we check how the intraday distribution
of trading volume differs across stocks with high and low passive ownership. We define the





where Volm83C is the trading volume in the interval, i.e., the number of shares traded, and
TotVolm83 denotes the total trading volume of stock 8 on day 3. The scaled trading volume
allows us to compare across different stocks, which can have very different shares outstanding
and trading volume.
We construct two bins of stocks with low and high passive ownership in each year as
follows. For each year, we select the stocks that are in the S&P 500 Index for the entire year.
We define their degree of passive ownership as the percent of shares outstanding held by
passive mutual funds (averaged over the four quarters). The two bins consist of the stocks
with degree of passive ownership below the fifth percentile and above the 95th percentile,
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respectively. Thus, each bin has approximately 24 stocks in a given year. The average
passive ownership for the two bins is reported in Table B.1 in Appendix C.2.3.
In Figure 2.2, we plot the scaled trading volume of the two bins in the first and last half
hours of the trading session, i.e, 9:30 – 10:00 and 15:30 – 16:00. The results are computed
as the equal weight average across the corresponding stocks and trading days in the given
year. By the left panel, we find the scaled trading volume at the market open is higher for
the low passive ownership bin than that for the high passive one since 2008. Moreover, the
gap keeps increasing after 2015, and reaches approximately two percentage points in 2018.
On the other hand, from the right panel, we see the scaled trading volume near the market
close increases significantly since 2008 for both bins, but the magnitude of increase is much
larger for the high passive one. In 2018, the scaled trading volume in the last half hour
is approximately three percentage points higher for the high passive ownership bin than
that for the low passive one. As stocks with low (resp. high) passive ownership are more
likely to be traded by active (resp. index-based) strategies, the results in Figure 2.2 suggest
an active-open, passive-close profile for intraday trading, i.e., there is more discretionary
trading in the morning, and the index-based strategies tend to concentrate their trading
near the market close.
The surge in trading volume near the market close, as a consequence of concentrated
trading from passive investors, has been widely noticed by financial press (see, e.g., Driebusch
et al. (2018) and Strumpf (2015)). The motivations for such behavior include, among others,
to minimize the tracking errors of orders benchmarked to the closing price, to efficiently
deploy capital to hundreds of underlying stocks using market-on-close order, and to reduce
the inventory risk for redemption and creation settlement (see e.g, Cushing and Madhavan
(2000), Foucault et al. (2005), and Wu (2019)). Besides, the active-open, passive-close
trading profile is also obtained in Min et al. (2018) using the intraday trading volume data
of S&P 500 constituents in 2017.
2.2.2 Evidence from Index Removal Effect
We have shown in the previous section that the trading from index-based strategies
drives up the trading volume near the market close. In this section, we provide consistent
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Figure 2.2: Scaled trading volume by passive ownership bins
Note: Scaled trading volume in 9:30 – 10:00 (left) and 15:30 – 16:00 (right) for the low and
high passive ownership bins.
evidence for such effect using an impact analysis for the stocks that are removed from the
S&P 500 Index. Specifically, we find that after a stock is removed from the index, thus less
tracked by index-based strategies, its scaled trading volume tends to drop dramatically near
the market close.
We select the stocks that are removed from the S&P 500 Index between 2011 and 2018,
during which the index-based strategies have become more prevalent. Moreover, to mitigate
the potential impact of delisting, we restrict to the stocks that have at least 60 days of
observations in the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database after removal. This leaves us with
54 stocks between 2011 and 2018. We then compute the average scaled trading volume for
these stocks in the 30 trading days before and after their removal.
The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows the intraday pattern of scaled trading volume before
(red) and after (blue) the removal, which is computed for each half hour interval with a
moving step of five minutes from 9:30 to 16:00. As shown in the left panel, the intraday
curve of scaled volume is almost unchanged after the removal, except for the last point
representing the time interval 15:30 – 16:00. This can be seen more clearly from the absolute
change in the right panel, where the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval of
the estimates. We see that after the removal from the S&P 500 Index, the scaled trading
volume significantly drops near market close. On average, the scaled trading volume in
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Figure 2.3: Impact on scaled volume by index removal
Note: The left panel shows the intraday scaled trading volume before and after removal.
The right panel shows the absolute change.
15:30 – 16:00 drops by 2.5 percentage points, which translates to a relative drop of more
than 11%. This decrease is offset by the increases in scaled trading volume before 14:00.
However, such increases are much smaller in magnitude and more scattered across the day.
After a stock is removed from the S&P 500 Index, it will be less traded by index-based
strategies. This analysis shows that the major impact of the removal is the drop in the
proportion of trading volume near the market close. Similar effect is also observed in the
literature from other perspectives. For example, Grynkiv and Russell (2015) use the data
from 2012 to 2015 and find that the increase in trading volume at the end of trading session
is more significant for S&P 500 constituents than for stocks in the less liquid exchange-
traded products (ETPs). These results provide consistent evidence for the conclusion that
index-based strategies tend to concentrate their trading at the end of trading session.
2.2.3 Hypothesis on Intraday Stock Patterns
From the two empirical studies, we see the growth of index-based strategies and their
trading activities substantially impact the intraday stock dynamics. However, unlike the
trading volume, the implication on other important aspects, e.g., correlation and beta,
remain less studied. In the rest of this chapter, we aim to explore these implications with a
large high-frequency dataset and efficient estimation methods.
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To begin with, we propose four hypotheses on the intraday patterns of stock dynamics
based on the active-open, passive-close trading profile. We expect the patterns described in
the hypotheses to be more significant in the recent decade, during which the index-based
strategies have become more prevalent.
First, we expect the correlation between different stocks to be lower in the morning,
but higher near the market close. This is because the index-based strategies tend to trade
multiple stocks in the same direction simultaneously, thus driving up the correlation at the
end of trading session. Some examples include buying all S&P 500 constituents and investing
in all stocks in target sectors. On the other hand, more discretionary trading from active
strategies in the morning tends to result in lower correlation, as active strategies focus more
on the specific shocks related to individual stocks. The above analysis leads to our following
hypothesis on the intraday pattern of correlation.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The intraday correlation is low at the market open and high near the
market close.
Next, we propose a hypothesis on the intraday pattern of beta, which measures the level
of systematic risk of individual stocks. With more index-based trading near the market
close, we expect the betas of different stocks to move towards one at the end of trading
session, as individual stock returns are more driven by index-level orders. By contrast, we
expect betas of different stocks to be more dispersed at the market open, as discretionary
trading captures the heterogeneity in their levels of systematic risk. This leads to our second
hypothesis as below.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The intraday betas of different stocks are more dispersed in the morn-
ing, but move towards one near the market close.
In addition, it has been empirically observed that the trading from institutional investors
is highly persistent across days (Campbell et al., 2009). As the index-based strategies
are mostly executed by institutional investors (via passive vehicles), we expect lower daily
volume dispersion near the market close, i.e., the corresponding trading volume is more
stable across days. On the other hand, the active strategies at the market open tend to
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focus more on the short-term price fluctuations and incoming news flows. This leads to
trading activities that vary much across days. Thus, we expect the daily volume dispersion
to be higher at the market open. To summarize, we have following hypothesis on daily
dispersion in trading volume.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The daily dispersion in trading volume is high at the market open and
low near the market close.
Finally, we propose a hypothesis on the intraday pattern of stock volatilities. As there
are more information acquisitions in the morning (e.g., reacting to overnight news flows),
we expect the volatility to be higher at the market open. The information acquisitions can
be driven by both active and index-based investors. For example, a good news about a
specific company may motivate the active investors to buy its stock, and a macro news that
benefits the overall equity market (e.g., a rate cut announcement) may trigger the index-
based strategies to buy the components of S&P 500 Index. On the other hand, we also
expect the volatility to increase near the market close, as there are more trading activities
from index-based strategies and the demand for inventory management.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The volatility is high at the market open and near the market close,
but low during the day.
In subsequent sections, we use a large high-frequency dataset to show the intraday
patterns discussed in the four hypotheses indeed hold for S&P 500 constituents, especially
in the recent decade. This reveals, from multiple aspects, the substantial implications of
index-based investment on intraday stock dynamics.
2.3 Estimation Methodologies in High-Frequency Setting
In this section, we introduce the estimation methods in our high-frequency setting.
Specifically, we define the estimators for realized variance, covariance, correlation, and beta.
The estimators account for both market microstructure noise and observation asynchronic-
ity, and can be efficiently implemented on our large dataset.
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2.3.1 Estimators for Realized Variance and Covariance
We first introduce the estimators for realized variance and covariance with high-frequency
data, which serve as an indispensable foundation for the estimation of realized correlation
and beta. We employ the Two-Scale Realized Variance (TSRV) and Two-Scale Realized
Covariance (TSRCV) estimators developed in Zhang et al. (2005), Aït-Sahalia et al. (2011),
and Zhang (2011). The two estimators are unbiased under market microstructure noise and
asynchronicity, and avoid information loss by using all price observations.
The TSRV estimator is established as follows. Suppose we estimate the realized variance
for stock . over a target time interval. We observe the log price .8 at a series of time points
8 = 0, 1 . . . , =. Here we consider a fixed grid of sampling intervals, e.g., every five seconds.
We select the last observation in each interval, or use the most recent one if there is no
observation in the current interval. This is analogous to the previous-tick interpolation
commonly used in high-frequency literature (see, e.g., Gençay et al. (2001)). As we focus
on the S&P 500 constituents in this study, the stocks considered are generally highly liquid
with frequent price observations.
The observed price .8 can be viewed as a sum of the true underlying price and the
market microstructure noise. This introduces an essential challenge for estimating realized
variance with high-frequency data. The most naive way to estimate realized variance is to
sum all the squared returns in the time interval, i.e., RV(=E) =
∑=−1
8=0 (.8+1 −.8)2. However, as
shown in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2005), this naive estimator is biased by market microstructure
noise, and the bias increases in the number of observations =. Thus, this estimator can be
severely contaminated when sampling frequency is high. The most straightforward remedy
for this is to sample sparsely. For instance, the estimator with observations sampled every 
steps can be constructed as RV(B?) =
∑=/−1
8=0 (.(8+1) −.8 )2. This sparse estimator is widely
employed in the literature, with the sampling interval chosen in an ad hoc way from 5 to
30 minutes (see, e.g., Gençay et al. (2002) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002)).
While the sparse estimator reduces bias, it inevitably leads to information loss. Such loss
can be significant when sampling frequency is high: if we sample every minute for 1-second
level price observations, we implicitly discard 59/60 of the original data as only the last
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observation of each minute is used. An explicit analysis of the naive and sparse estimators
can be found in Zhang et al. (2005).
To overcome the above dilemma, we estimate realized variance by the TSRV estimator
proposed in Zhang et al. (2005) and further developed in Aït-Sahalia et al. (2011). The TSRV
estimator circumvents the two challenges discussed above: it uses all price observations, but
yields an unbiased and consistent estimator of the underlying integrated volatility3. The
spirit of the TSRV estimator is to correct the bias by combining the returns from two time
scales, i.e., a fast and a slow one. For a time scale , define the following sum of squared
returns





Similar to the sparse estimator, the term [.,. ] ( ) is also based on -step returns. However,
it moves by one step each time and thus uses all the observations. This avoids any loss in
the price information. Then, the TSRV estimator with fast scale  and slow scale  is given
by
RV( , ) =
=
( − )=̄ 
(
[.,. ] ( ) − =̄ 
=̄
[.,. ] ( )
)
for  <  , (2.2)
where =̄ = (= −  + 1)/ and =̄ is defined similarly. Thus, the TSRV estimator is a linear
combination of the squared terms of two time scales. As a nonparametric estimator, it can
be efficiently implemented on a large set of stocks over a long period. This advantage is
essential for our study, which involves estimation for all S&P 500 constituents across 15
years. The realized volatility is simply computed as the square root of the TSRV estimator
in (2.2).
Next, we briefly introduce the TSRCV estimator for realized covariance. As we have
discussed, the estimation of covariance under high-frequency setting is biased due to asy-
chronicity and microstructure noise. To cope with these two challenges, we employ the
TSRCV estimator proposed in Zhang (2011), which can eliminate the two types of bias
simultaneously. The TSRCV estimator follows the same spirit of the TSRV estimator in
(2.2), i.e., correcting the bias by combining the returns from two time scales. Besides, sim-
3Aït-Sahalia et al. (2011) further show the bias-corrected and consistent properties of the TSRV estimator
hold even when microstructure noise exhibits time series dependence.
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ilar to the TSRV estimator, the TSRCV estimator is nonparametric and can be efficiently
implemented on a large set of stocks.
The TSRCV estimator is constructed as follows. Suppose we estimate the realized
covariance for two stocks - and . over a target time interval. We observe the log prices
-8 and .8 at a series of time points 8 = 0, 1, . . . , =. Same as for the TSRV estimator,
here we consider a fixed time grid and apply previous-tick interpolation to handle missing
observation. For a time scale , define the term [-,. ] ( ) as




(-8+ − -8) (.8+ − .8).
Then the TSRCV estimator is given by
RCV( , ) =
=
( − )=̄ 
(
[-,. ] ( ) − =̄ 
=̄
[-,. ] ( )
)
for  <  , (2.3)
where =̄ = (=−+1)/ and =̄ is defined similarly. The TSRCV estimator is unbiased under
both observation asynchronicity and market microstructure noise. More detailed analysis of
its properties can be found in Section 8 of Zhang (2011).
2.3.2 Estimators for Realized Correlation and Beta
In this section, we develop the estimators for realized correlation and beta, which are
based on the TSRV and TSRCV estimators in the previous section. Specifically, we develop
two methods to estimate realized correlation. The first one estimates the realized correlation
between stock pairs, while the second one estimates the portfolio-implied realized correlation
between two sets of stocks.
2.3.2.1 Pairwise Realized Correlation
The estimator for pairwise realized correlation is simply the high-frequency counterpart
of the traditional correlation, which is defined by
d-,. =





for stocks - and . . To estimate their realized correlation, we just plug in the high-frequency













where  and  denote the two time scales employed in the TSRV and TSRCV estimators.
2.3.2.2 Portfolio-implied Realized Correlation
Besides, we propose an estimator for the realized correlation between two mutually
exclusive sets of stocks. Unlike the pairwise estimator, the new estimator is based on the
realized variances of suitably constructed portfolios. Consider two mutually exclusive stock
sets  and . Denote by F8 > 0 the weight of stock 8 (e.g., market-capitalization). Note
that we do not require
∑
8 F8 = 1 as long as the weights are fixed. Define the average return




F′8, 9d8, 9 , (2.5)





where f8 denotes the standard deviation of the return of stock 8. Thus, d̄, in (2.5) is a
weighted average of the pairwise correlations d8, 9 for 8 ∈  and 9 ∈ . It puts more weights




We now propose the estimator for (2.5) under high-frequency setting. We construct three
portfolios using the stock weights F8: the first two include stocks in  and  respectively,
and the third one combines stocks from both  and . Then, the average correlation (2.5)






− RV( , )














Here RV( , )

, RV( , )

, and RV( , )
(
denote the realized variances of the three portfolios
respectively; RV( , )
8
denotes the realized variance of stock 8. They are estimated by the
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TSRV estimator with time scales  and  . Equation (2.6) defines the portfolio-implied
estimator for realized correlation between two sets of stocks. We document its explicit
derivation in Appendix B.1.
When  and  only contain one stock each, we can show by simple algebraic calculation
that the portfolio-implied estimator RCorr( , )
,
coincides with the pairwise estimator in
(2.4). However, when the two sets have multiple stocks, the portfolio-implied estimator
(2.6) significantly reduces the computational burden. In particular, if both sets have #
stocks, the portfolio-implied estimator only needs to estimate 2# + 3 realized variances,
while the average correlation based on the pairwise estimator needs to estimate #2 realized
covariances (for each pair) and 2# realized variances (for each stock).
2.3.2.3 Estimation of Realized Beta
Finally, we propose the estimator for realized beta under high-frequency setting. A
stock’s beta measures the level of systematic risk in its return. However, the study of
intraday beta with high-frequency data, to our best knowledge, is relatively rare.
Denote the market return by '",C . The traditional beta of stock 8 is estimated by
V8 =
Cov('8 , '" )
Var('" )
, (2.7)
where Cov('8 , '" ) is the covariance between individual and market returns; Var('" ) is
the variance of market return. In high-frequency setting, we estimate the realized beta by









where RCV( , )
",8
and RV( , )
"
denote the TSRCV and TSRV estimators with time scales 
and  . In this study, we use the S&P 500 ETF from SPDR (ticker SPY) to compute the
market return, as its high-frequency data are conveniently available in the Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database.
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2.4 Data and Implementation Details
2.4.1 Data
In this study, we use all the stocks in the S&P 500 Index from 2004 to 2018. The
universe is adjusted dynamically to reflect the quarterly rebalancing of the index. The
high-frequency data is obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) Daily Product database.
The database contains intraday transaction data (both trades and quotes) for all securities
listed on US equity exchanges since September 2003. The original data provided is in
millisecond level. In our study, we use the trade data and sample every five seconds. By
the previous-tick interpolation, we use the last price observation for each interval, or the
most recent observation if no trade happens in the interval. Accordingly, trade sizes are
summed within each five-second interval to measure the trade volume in the interval. Days
with only morning trading hours are discarded, including the days before Independence Day,
Thanksgiving, and Christmas.
We get other information on stocks from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and Compustat databases. This includes daily prices, market capitalization, and
sector information. The TAQ and CRSP databases are linked via the ticker and permno
code of stocks. We discard stocks with multiple share classes as well as preferred stocks.
Besides, we obtain fund holding data used in Section 2.2 from Thomson Reuters Mutual
Fund Holdings and mutual fund classification from CRSP.
Before estimation, we first identify and handle errors and outliers in the high-frequency
data by the following two filters. In the first one, we handle “bounce-backs” where price
moves by a large amount but then returns to almost the same level immediately. This
filter is also employed in previous literature on realized variance (see e.g., Aït-Sahalia et al.
(2011)). Denote three consecutive prices as ?1, ?2, and ?3 (each for a five second interval).
We regard ?2 as a “bounce-back” if both conditions below are satisfied
|A2 | =
ln ( ?2?1
) > 0.001 and |?3 − ?1 | < 0.001.
That is, the first five second return is larger than 0.1%, and the difference between the first
and last prices is smaller than 0.001.
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In the second filter, we handle those consecutive outliers which can not be captured by








We regard ?C as an outlier if ln ( ?C"C
) > 0.01,
i.e., if it is 1% away from the one-minute moving average. For the identified outliers, we
set their price levels using the most recent observation and set the corresponding trading
volume to be zero. Through experiments, we find the two filters identify fewer than 0.3%
of the observations as outliers in normal years, and fewer than 1% in 2008 and 2009. For
robustness checks, we find our results are not impacted when using other thresholds for the
two filters.
2.4.2 Implementation Details
In all our empirical studies, we set the length of estimation interval to be 30 minutes.
This choice of time interval balances two considerations. First, to estimate the intraday
patterns, we prefer short estimation interval to enhance granularity. Second, there need to
be enough observations in each time interval to obtain reliable estimates. We regard 30
minutes as a good balance between the two. With a length of 30 minutes, each interval
contains 360 price and volume observations sampled every five seconds. Besides, we apply a
moving step of five minutes to obtain smooth intraday patterns. Consequently, there are in
total 73 time intervals for each day, corresponding to 9:30 to 10:00, 9:35 to 10:05, . . . , and
15:30 to 16:00.
For all two-scale based estimators in Section 2.3, we set the fast and slow scales to be
 = 2 and  = 12.
As the prices are sampled every five seconds, the fast and slow scales correspond to the
returns over ten seconds and one minute respectively. It has been shown empirically that
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the two scale estimators are robust to the specific choice of time scales (Aït-Sahalia et al.,
2011).4
To obtain the intraday patterns, we average the estimates from individual stocks and
trading days in each year. Before computing the average, we winsorize the individual esti-
mates between their first and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact from outliers. Besides,
in very rare cases, the estimated realized variance can be negative and the realized correla-
tion can fall outside of [−1, 1]. Such anomalies are probably due to large price jumps. When
the estimated realized variance is negative, we replace it with the average of the estimates
in that day, and we truncate the realized correlation to [−1, 1]. The main results are not
impacted when we use different thresholds for winsorizing or discarding the anomalies from
the estimates entirely.
2.5 Empirical Results of Intraday Stock Patterns
In this section, we provide the empirical results of intraday stock patterns estimated from
our high-frequency data, including realized correlation, beta, trading volume, and volatility.
2.5.1 Intraday Realized Correlation Between Stock Pairs
In this section, we report the estimation results for intraday realized correlation between
stock pairs. While there has been some literature on the comovement in the trading volume
of different stocks (see, e.g., Karolyi et al. (2012), Koch et al. (2016), and Min et al. (2018)),
the intraday correlation of stock returns is much less studied. We shed light on this topic by
estimating realized correlation from a large high-frequency dataset with robust estimators.
Our results reveal that the intraday realized correlation indeed shows specific patterns that
change over years. The findings support our statement in hypothesis H1 on the implication
of index-based investment.
4As an additional robustness check, we select several examples and compare the estimated realized
variances by the TSRV method with that by the parametric MLE method in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2005).
The results match well in most cases. Note that the MLE method requires separate optimization in each
estimation. Thus it can not be practically implemented on our large dataset.
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The estimation proceeds as follows. Using the pairwise estimator (2.4), we estimate the
realized correlation for each stock pair in the S&P 500 Index. Then, the most convenient
way to obtain the general intraday pattern is to average across all stock pairs. However, the
correlation between two stocks can be very different across pairs. For example, correlation
may be positive or negative depending on the fundamental similarity of the two stocks.
Such variation can have substantial impact on the intraday realized correlation as well. To
capture the potential heterogeneity in realized correlation, we divide stock pairs into bins
based on the correlation of their daily returns, and compute the average realized correlation
for each bin separately.
We construct twelve bins of stock pairs as follows. For each year, we pick those stocks
that are in the S&P 500 Index for the entire year. This leaves us with a set of 475 stocks on
average in each year5. For each stock pair constructed from this set, we compute its daily
correlation using the daily returns of the two stocks in the year. We then divide the stock
pairs into different bins by the levels of their daily correlations, which can be regarded as
a measurement of the fundamental similarity between the two stocks. Denote by ?U the
U-th percentile of the daily correlations across all stock pairs in the given year. The first
three bins include stock pairs with daily correlations within [?0, ?1], (?1, ?5], and (?5, ?10],
respectively, i.e., the stock pairs with the bottom 10% daily correlations. The other nine bins
contain the stock pairs with daily correlations within (?10=, ?10(=+1) ] for = = 1, 2, ..., 9. As
most stocks in the S&P 500 Index are positively correlated, we use a more granular partition
via the first three bins for the stock pairs with low, potentially negative, daily correlations.
The average daily correlation for each bin is reported in Table B.3 in Appendix C.2.3.
For each pair bin denoted by  9 ( 9 = 1, 2, ..., 12), we compute its realized correlation in
time interval C as the equal weight average of all the stock pairs and trading days, i.e.,
RCorr 9C =
1










denotes the realized correlation between stocks 81 and 82 in time interval C
of day 3; | 9 | is the number of pairs in bin 9 and # is the number of trading days. Note
that even the smallest bin contains a large number of stock pairs. For example, with 475
5The numbers of such stocks for each year are reported in Table B.2 in Appendix C.2.3.
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stocks in a year, we would have in total 475 × 474/2 = 112, 575 stock pairs. Thus even the
smallest bin (below the first percentile) includes over 1,000 stock pairs, which translates to
more than 1, 000 × 250 = 250, 000 samples every year for a given time interval C. Such large
sample size improves the robustness of the estimated intraday pattern.
The results for intraday realized correlation of different bins are shown in Figure 2.4.
Each panel represents a given year between 2004 and 2018. The horizontal axis corresponds
to the trading hours in a day, where the first (resp. last) point represents the half hour time
interval 9:30 – 10:00 (resp. 15:30 – 16:00). For each year, we plot the estimated intraday
realized correlation for six selected bins: the first three bins for low-correlated pairs ([?0, ?1],
(?1, ?5], and (?5, ?10]), the bin with median correlation level ((?40, ?50]), and the two bins
for high-correlated pairs ((?80, ?90] and (?90, ?100]). The six bins with daily correlation from
high to low are represented by the red, purple, orange, green, cyan, and dark blue lines,
respectively. The results for other bins are qualitatively similar. The standard deviations
for the intraday curves are also estimated. They are generally very small thanks to the large
sample size. Indeed, the standard deviation for the estimates in Figure 2.4 is smaller than
0.006 in all cases6.
By Figure 2.4, we have two direct observations for the intraday realized correlation.
First, in most cases, the realized correlation is positive. This is not surprising as most
stocks in the S&P 500 Index are positively correlated. Besides, the relative ranking in daily
correlation is mostly preserved in realized correlation. That is, the bin with higher daily
correlation also has higher realized correlation in a given time interval.
We then take a closer look at the intraday pattern of realized correlation. Comparing
the intraday curves for different bins and over years, we can see the realized correlation
indeed demonstrates specific patterns that change over time. We summarize our findings in
the following three points.
First, in the period 2004 – 2007 (the first four panels), the intraday realized correlation
generally shows an M-shape pattern for all the six bins: it starts lowest at the market open
and increases to a peak around 11:00, stays flat around noon, further increases to the highest
6The estimates of standard deviations for these as well as other intraday curves in the chapter are
available from authors upon request.
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Figure 2.4: Intraday realized correlation for different stock pair bins
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level around 15:00, and finally drops near the market close.
Second, after 2009, the drop in realized correlation near the market close vanishes.
Instead, the realized correlation increases in the entire afternoon, and reaches the highest
level near the market close for all bins. The market open (9:30 to 10:00) still witnesses the
lowest level of realized correlation. The curve in the middle of the day (e.g., 11:00 to 14:00)
becomes flatter, indicating stable periods for realized correlation. This holds except for the
three low correlation bins in 2016 – 2018, which is further discussed below.
Finally, in recent years from 2016 to 2018, the intraday pattern for the low correlation
bins (green, cyan, and blue lines) becomes different from that in previous years as well as
that for the high correlation bins. For these three bins, their realized correlation at the
market open further decreases, even to the negative regime, which is not seen in previous
years. Besides, the middle part of their intraday curves become steeper, showing their
realized correlation increases rapidly during the day. This change is not seen in the intraday
pattern for the high correlation bins, which still stays flat during the middle of the day.
For all bins, the realized correlation reaches the highest level near the market close. This
suggests the stock prices are more likely to move in the same direction at the end of trading
session.
The above observations are illustrated more directly in Figure 2.5, where we plot the
intraday realized correlation for the stock pairs with the top 10% (left) and bottom 10%
(right) daily correlations. Each line in the panel represents the average over different years in
a given period (2004 – 2006, 2007 – 2010, 2011 – 2015, and 2016 – 2018). In 2004 – 2006, the
realized correlation for both high and low correlated pairs show an M-shape (purple lines).
After that, the realized correlation significantly increases near the market close. Moreover,
in 2016 – 2018, the realized correlation for the bottom 10% pairs starts below zero at the
market open, and monotonically increases during the day to above 0.2 at the end of trading
session (red line in the right panel).
The intraday patterns of realized correlation in the recent decade confirms our hypothesis
H1 in Section 2.2.3, i.e., correlation is low in the morning and high near the market close7.
7The difference between the first and last half hour intervals is statistically significant at 0.1% level.
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Realized correlation: top 10% pairs










Figure 2.5: Realized correlation for top and bottom stock pairs
Note: Realized correlation for the stock pairs with daily correlations above the 90th
percentile (left) and below the 10th percentile (right), averaged over the yearly results in
different periods.
This demonstrates the implication of the growth of index-based strategies and the active-
open, passive-close trading profile. In particular, more discretionary (resp. index-based)
trading tends to decrease (resp. increase) the correlation between different stocks at the
market open (resp. close). Besides this hypothesis, our estimation results reveal other
significant pattern shifts for intraday realized correlation in recent years, especially the even
lower starting level and monotonically increasing shape for the low correlated pairs.
In the recent work of Buccheri et al. (2020), they propose a score-driven model to esti-
mate the covariance dynamics under high-frequency setting. With a much smaller dataset
(transaction data of ten stocks in 2014), they show the opening hours are dominated by
idiosyncratic risk and a common market factor emerges in the afternoon. This result is con-
sistent with the intraday patterns we obtained for realized correlation. Moreover, in Section
2.6, we develop a market impact model with time-varying liquidity provision from different
types of investors, and use it to show the active-open, passive-close trading profile indeed
generates the intraday correlation pattern that is qualitatively similar to the one observed
in recent years. This provides additional theoretical support for our interpretation.
The intraday pattern of realized correlation has various applications, especially in in-
traday trading and portfolio execution. For example, if the traders want to exploit the low
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(resp. high) correlation in the intraday price movement of different stocks, they may set
up their positions around the market open (resp. market close). On the other hand, if the
portfolio managers prefer a period with stable correlation for order execution, the middle
of the day appears as a better choice. These applications, among others, can be topics for
future research.
2.5.2 Intraday Realized Correlation Between Sectors
In this section, we estimate the intraday realized correlation between different sectors.
While we can compute the average between-sector correlation using the pairwise correlations
of corresponding stocks, here we employ the portfolio-implied approach developed in Section
2.3.2.2. This allows us to estimate the realized correlation from the portfolio level that
incorporates different weights of stocks. We reveal that the intraday realized correlation
between sectors demonstrates similar patterns to that for stock pairs observed in Section
2.5.1.
We implement the portfolio-implied estimator in (2.6) as follows. As for pairwise corre-
lations, we choose the stocks that are in the S&P 500 Index for the entire year, and divide
them to eleven mutually exclusive sectors based on the first two digits of their GICS codes.
The mapping from GICS codes to sector names and the numbers of stocks in each sector are
summarized in Tables B.4 and B.5 in Appendix C.2.3. We exclude the real estate sector as
it is not formally included as a sector before 2016, and the number of stocks in this sector
is small in early years. We set the weight of each stock proportional to its average market
capitalization throughout the year. The sector and market capitalization data are obtained
from CRSP.
With ten remaining sectors, there are in total 45 sector pairs. For each year, we focus
on the sector pairs with high and low average daily correlations8. Specifically, we report
the estimation results for six sector pairs, three with the highest average daily correlation
and three with the lowest. The sector names for the six selected pairs in each year are
reported in Table B.6 in Appendix C.2.3. The results for between-sector intraday realized
8The average daily correlation between two sectors are simply computed as the average of the pairwise
daily return correlations between their constituents.
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correlation are shown in Figure 2.6. The six sector pairs, with average daily correlations
from high to low, are represented by the red, purple, orange, green, cyan, and dark blue
lines respectively. At first glance, we see the ranking of sector pairs is generally preserved in
intraday realized correlation: the three pairs with higher daily correlations also have higher
realized correlation than the other three for most of the time during the day.
A more interesting finding is revealed by comparing the intraday patterns in Figures 2.4
and 2.6. Recall Figure 2.4 plots the intraday realized correlation for stock pairs estimated
by the pairwise estimator (2.4). Thus the realized correlation in the two figures are very
different with respect to both the estimated object and the estimation method. Surprisingly,
however, we see the patterns in the two figures are similar, especially in the recent decade.
Thus the discussion in previous section regarding the shapes of intraday patterns generally
applies here. In the period 2004 – 2007, the intraday realized correlation demonstrates an
upward M-shape for most sector pairs. After 2009, the realized correlation starts low in the
morning, stays relatively flat in the middle of the day, and increases significantly near the
market close. Moreover, in 2016 to 2018, the realized correlation of the three low correlated
sector pairs starts negative at the market open and increases quickly during the day, which
is similar to the patterns of the three low correlation bins in Figure 2.4.
The consistent results for sector pairs highlight the generality and robustness of the
intraday correlation patterns observed in Figures 2.4 and 2.6. It demonstrates, from the
portfolio-level, the implication of the growth of index-based strategies and the active-open,
passive-close trading profile. Specifically, concentrated trading from index-based strategies
drives up the correlation between different sectors near the market close, while more discre-
tionary trading tends to lower the correlation in the morning. Such patterns have important
applications in sector-based intraday trading and portfolio execution, which are deferred to
future research.
2.5.3 Intraday Pattern of Realized Beta
In this section, we analyze the estimation results for intraday realized beta of S&P
500 constituents. We find that in recent years, the realized betas of different stocks start
dispersed at the market open, but generally move towards one near the market close. This
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Figure 2.6: Intraday realized correlation for sector pairs
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confirms our second hypothesis H2 in Section 2.2.3. The convergence pattern of realized
beta echos our results for realized correlation discussed in previous sections, and shows the
impact of the index-based strategies and the active-open, passive-close trading profile.
We estimate intraday realized beta using the estimator (2.8) as follows. Similar to the
study of pairwise realized correlation, we select the stocks that are in the S&P 500 Index for
the entire year, and divide stocks into bins based on their daily betas, which are computed
by (2.7) using daily returns. We construct eleven bins for each year. Denote by ?U the U-th
percentile of daily betas among all stocks. The first two bins include the stocks with daily
betas in [?0, ?5] and (?5, ?10], i.e., stocks with the bottom 10% daily betas. The other
nine bins consist of the stocks with daily betas in (?10=, ?10(=+1) ] for = = 1, 2, ..., 9. The
average daily beta for each bin is reported in Table B.7 in Appendix C.2.3. For each bin  9
( 9 = 1, 2, ..., 11), we estimate its realized beta over time interval C as
RBeta 9C =
1






where RBeta83C denotes the realized beta of stock 8 in time interval C of day 3; # and | 9 |
are the number of trading days and number of stocks in bin 9 , respectively. With 475
stocks in a year, the smallest bin would have 24 stocks, which translates to approximately
250 × 24 = 6, 000 samples every year for a given time interval C.
The estimation results of intraday realized beta are shown in Figure 2.7. For each
year, we plot the estimated results for six selected bins: the first three bins with low daily
betas ([?0, ?5], (?5, ?10], and (?10, ?20]), and the three with high daily betas ((?70, ?80],
(?80, ?90], and (?90, ?100]). The six bins with daily betas from high to low are represented
by the red, purple, orange, green, cyan, and dark blue lines, respectively. The horizontal
dashed black line denotes the level of beta equal to one. The standard deviations of the
estimated intraday curves in Figure 2.7 are below 0.015 in all cases, which are relatively
small compared with the estimated levels.
By Figure 2.7, we have the following observations of the intraday pattern of realized
beta. First, the ranking of daily beta across different bins is mostly preserved in the intraday
pattern: the bin with higher daily beta also has higher realized beta across the day. Next,
we see the intraday patterns of realized beta indeed show specific shapes that evolve over
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Figure 2.7: Intraday realized beta for different stock bins
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time. For the high beta bins (red, pink, and yellow lines), their intraday realized beta
exhibits a smirk pattern in 2004 – 2007, and a monotonically decreasing pattern in the
years after. For the low beta bins (green, cyan, and dark blue lines), their intraday realized
beta stays relatively flat before 2013, but significantly increases during the day in the years
after. Consequently, in the recent decade, we see the realized betas of different bins are
more dispersed in the morning, but generally move towards one near the market close.
This confirms our second hypothesis H2 in Section 2.2.3, and shows the implication of the
active-open, passive-close trading profile on intraday beta.
To demonstrate the changes in the intraday patterns more directly, we plot in Figure 2.8
the realized beta for the stocks with top (left) and bottom (right) 10% daily betas, averaged
over the years in four different periods. By Figure 2.8, we see significant changes in the
intraday patterns in recent years (2016 – 2018), as shown by the red lines in the two panels.
First, at the market open, the realized betas of the high beta and low beta stocks become
more dispersed than previous years, as shown by the even higher (resp. lower) red line in
the left (resp. right) panel. On the other hand, the magnitude of the intraday movement
is larger, i.e., the realized beta drops (resp. increases) more during the day for the high
(resp. low) beta stocks. Such changes are especially noticeable for the low beta stocks:
their average realized beta starts below 0.2 at the market open, but rises dramatically to
above 0.6 at the end of trading session.
As a consequence of above changes, we see a more significant convergence pattern of in-
traday realized beta in recent years. Specifically, the divergence in realized betas of different
stocks shrinks during the day. At the end of trading session, the realized betas of all bins
move towards one, suggesting the individual stock returns are more similar to the market
return. This can be attributed to the growth of index-based investment, and the active-
open, passive-close trading profile. In particular, more discretionary trading in the morning
make realized betas more dispersed across stocks, while more index-based strategies drive
realized betas towards one near the market close. In Section 2.6, we provide theoretical
support for such interpretation using a market impact model with time-varying liquidity
provision from single-stock and index-fund investors. The intraday pattern of realized beta
has potential applications for intraday trading strategies that exploit the levels of systematic
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Figure 2.8: Realized beta for stocks with top and bottom daily betas
Realized beta for the stocks with daily beta above the 90th percentile (left) and below the
10th percentile (right), averaged over the yearly results in different periods.
risk in stocks’ returns. For example, it may be better to execute strategies that hinge on the
heterogeneity in stocks’ systematic risk levels in the morning rather than in the afternoon.
2.5.4 Intraday Patterns of Trading Volume and Realized Volatility
In this section, we look into the intraday patterns of trading volume and realized volatil-
ity. First, we show in Figure 2.9 the intraday pattern of scaled trading volume defined in
(2.1). The results are computed as the equal weight average of all S&P 500 constituents
in a given year. The four panels plot the estimation results for 2004 – 2007, 2008 – 2010,
2011 – 2014, and 2015 – 2018 respectively. Comparing across the four panels, we see the
intraday pattern of scaled trading volume indeed changes over time. In 2004 – 2007, the
scaled trading volume demonstrates a symmetric U-shape pattern that is relatively stable
across years. The trading volume near the market close is quite close to that at the market
open. However, from 2008, the trading volume near the market close increases dramatically,
and the symmetric U-shape pattern becomes skewed to the right. This trend becomes more
significant in recent years, as the trading volume near the market close keeps increasing. In
2018, the final half hour 15:30 – 16:00 (the last point) consists of more than 20% of the total
trading volume in the day.
The change in the intraday pattern of trading volume can be seen more clearly from the
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Figure 2.9: Intraday scaled trading volume
left panel of Figure 2.10, where we fix four time intervals (9:30 – 10:00, 11:30 – 12:00, 13:30
– 14:00, 15:30 – 16:00) and plot the scaled trading volume across different years. By the
red line, we see the scaled trading volume in 15:30 – 16:00 increases significantly, especially
during 2007 to 2010 and after 2016. Such increase is offset by the drop in scaled trading
volume in the middle of the day, although the magnitude is much smaller. The results
observed here indicate the increase in end-of-day trading volume holds for our large stock
universe, thus generalize the finding in Figure 2.2 for the stocks with low and high passive
ownership. Such increase can be attributed, in part, to the growth of index-based strategies
and their concentrated trading near the market close. For instance, Cushing and Madhavan
(2000) and Foucault et al. (2005) point out the importance of closing price for institutional
investors, who execute most of the index-based strategies. The recent work in Wu (2019)
finds ETF flows make increased usage of market-on-close orders.
Next, motivated by hypothesis H3 in Section 2.2.3, we study the intraday pattern of
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Figure 2.10: Snapshots and daily dispersion of scaled volume
The left panel shows the scaled trading volume in four time intervals. The right panel
shows the intraday pattern of daily trading volume dispersion for five selected years.
daily dispersion in trading volume. For stock 8, its daily volume dispersion in time interval





Here AvgVolm8C and StdVolm8C denote the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding


















where # is the number of trading days for stock 8 (e.g., roughly 250 trading days in a
year). The normalization by AvgVolmC in the denominator of (2.9) allows us to average and
compare across stocks with very different trading volume levels.
We show the intraday pattern of daily volume dispersion for five selected years (2004,
2006, 2009, 2013, and 2018) in the right panel of Figure 2.10, which are computed as the
equal weight average of all the stocks in each year. The results for other years are qualita-
tively similar and available from authors upon request. We have the following observations
for the intraday pattern of daily volume dispersion. First, we see the daily volume disper-
sion demonstrates a similar intraday pattern in all the five years: starts high at the market
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open, drops and stays flat in the middle of the day, and further decreases near the market
close. This pattern suggests the trading volume is more volatile across days in the morning,
but much less near the market close. The standard deviations of the estimates in Figure
2.10 are smaller than 0.018 in all cases, and the difference between market open and close
is statistically significant at 0.1% level for all five years. It confirms our hypothesis H3 on
daily volume dispersion and shows the impact of the growth of index-based strategies and
the active-open, passive-close trading profile. Specifically, the trading from discretionary in-
vestors in the morning varies more across days, while the trading from index-based strategies
is more persistent.
Besides the general decreasing pattern of daily volume dispersion, more interesting re-
sults are revealed by comparing the intraday curves of the five different years. First, the
overall dispersion level in 2009 (purple) is the lowest among the five years. This is likely a
consequence of the financial crisis, during which trading volume was consistently high. More
importantly, we see the magnitude of the intraday drop from market open to close increases
significantly in 2013 and 2018 compared with that in previous years9. The increased drop is
mainly driven by the lower dispersion levels at the end of trading session. This shift can be
attributed to the prevalence of index-based strategies in the recent decade, and particularly,
their concentrated trading near market close.
We further support this interpretation by comparing the intraday pattern of daily volume
dispersion for the high and low passive ownership bins defined in Section 2.2.1, i.e., stocks
with passive ownership below the fifth percentile and above the 95th percentile each year.
The left and right panels of Figure 2.11 plot the average of yearly results for the two bins in
the first (2004 – 2010) and second periods (2011 – 2018), respectively. By the left panel, we
see the daily volume dispersion is quite close for the two bins in 2004 – 2010. However, in
2011 – 2018, the daily volume dispersion for high passive ownership bin becomes significantly
lower than that for the low passive one. The increased gap in daily volume dispersion can
be explained by the prevalence of passive mutual funds in the recent decade, which leads
to larger difference in the degree of passive ownership between the two bins. Indeed, the
9The increase in drop magnitude is also observed for other years after 2010.
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average difference in passive ownership between the two bins increases from 7% for the first
period to 20% for the second period, which can be computed from Table B.1.
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Figure 2.11: Daily volume dispersion by passive ownership bins
Daily volume dispersion of the low and high passive ownership bins, averaged over the first
period 2004 – 2010 (left) and the second period 2011 – 2018 (right) respectively.
Finally, we look into the intraday pattern of realized volatility, as we discussed in Hypoth-
esis 4. While the intraday volatility pattern has been widely studied in previous literature,
as far as we know, here we use a large dataset with all S&P 500 constituents over 15 years,
instead of limiting to the market index or a few selected stocks. The results are shown in
Figure 2.12, with each curve computed as the equal weight average of all stocks in a given
year. The results are similar when we compute the average using the market-cap weight.
We have following observations for the intraday pattern of realized volatility. First, the
intraday volatility shows a U-shape pattern skewed to the left: it starts relatively high in
the morning and decreases during the day. In the majority of years, the realized volatility
reaches the lowest level around noon, and slightly increases near the market close. Not
surprisingly, the financial crisis period (2008 and 2009) is associated with extremely high
realized volatility in the entire day, as seen from the magnitude of vertical axis in the upper-
right panel. The pattern observed here generally supports our hypothesis H4.
This U-shape pattern of intraday volatility is widely observed in the literature (see, e.g.,
Wood et al. (1985), Pagano et al. (2008), and Stroud and Johannes (2014)). In some of their
results, the spike in volatility near the market close is more significant than that seen in
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Figure 2.12. The mild difference in the intraday patterns can be potentially explained by the
different samples used in our and other studies: Figure 2.12 shows the equal-weight average
volatility of all S&P 500 constituents over each entire year, while other studies mainly focus
on the volatility of the market index or several stocks over a shorter horizon (e.g, a month).
Finally, we notice that the increase in realized volatility near the market close vanishes after
2013, i.e., the “tail” of the intraday curve tends to flatten in recent years. This may be
explained by the concentrated trading from index-based strategies at the end of trading
session.










































Figure 2.12: Intraday realized volatility (annualized)
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2.6 A Market Impact Model with Time-varying Liquidity
Provision
In this section, we provide additional theoretical support for the relation between the
growth of index-based strategies and the intraday patterns of stock dynamics. In particular,
we use a market impact model to show that the active-open, passive-close trading profile
indeed generates the intraday pattern of realized correlation and beta observed in Sections
2.5.1 and 2.5.3.
Suppose the market has # individual stocks, indexed by 8 = 1, 2, ..., #, and a fund con-
sisting of these stocks. The fund can be an ETF or a mutual index fund. The weight of each
stock in the fund is given by F8, which is assumed to be positive with
∑#
8=1 F8 = 1. For stock 8,
denote its actual price and investors’ reservation value by ?8 and A8, respectively. We use the
vector representations w = (F1, F2, ..., F# )>, r = (A1, A2, ..., A# )>, and p = (?1, ?2, ..., ?# )>.
There are both single-stock and index-fund investors in the market. The single-stock
investors buy or sell individual stocks in response to the change in the gap between the
actual price and the reservation value. Specifically, active investors will buy (resp. sell) k0
8,C
shares if the gap A8−?8 increases (resp. decreases) by one dollar in time interval C. This linear
assumption is often assumed in microstructure literature (Kyle, 1985), and can be justified
under the case of CARA utility investors and normally distributed beliefs. In contrast, the
index-fund investors only trade the fund based on its price and reservation value implied by
the stocks. They will buy (resp. sell) k 5C share of the fund if the gap w>r − w>p increases
(resp. decreases) by one dollar. Such index-based strategy trades stocks on a portfolio-level,
translating to wk 5 position change for each stock.
The parameters k0
8,C
and k 5C measure the liquidity provided by investors, which are
allowed to be time-varying during the day. This set-up is similar to the liquidity provision
model in Min et al. (2018). The trading from both types of investors impacts the stock prices.
For illustration purpose, we use a simple linear function to model the price impact. The
linear price impact model is widely used in microstructure literature (see, e.g., Huberman
and Stanzl (2004) and Alfonsi et al. (2012)). In particular, we assume every share bought
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(resp. sold) of stock 8 would increase (resp. decrease) its price by q8, which measures the
sensitivity of price to trading demand.
The market evolves as follows. In time interval C, a random shock Y8,C happens to the
reservation value of stock 8. Natural sources for the random shocks can be news flow or
unpredictable announcements that impact the stock valuation. We assume the shocks are
i.i.d. over different time intervals, but allow them to be correlated across stocks. This
captures the fact that different stocks may be driven by some common factors (e.g., news
for sectors). Denote the vector representation of the shocks by YC= (Y1,C , Y2,C , ..., Y# ,C )>.
After the random shocks, both types of investors trade the stocks (or index fund) based on
the new valuation. This leads to a new equilibrium price level that accounts for both the
shock in reservation value and the market impact from trading.
Denote the equilibrium price change by an #-dimensional vector ΔpC . Then, the change
in the gap between price and reservation value is equal to YC − ΔpC . The trading demand
comes from both single-stock and index-fund investors. First, single-stock investors will buy
Ψ0C (YC − ΔpC ) shares of each stock, where the matrix Ψ0C = diag#8=1(k08,C ). Next, index-fund








Ψ0C (YC − ΔpC ) + wk
5
C w
>(YC − ΔpC )
]
= ΔpC ,
where Φ = diag#8=1(q8) measures the market impact. From this linear equation, we can solve
ΔpC as
ΔpC = "CYC , (2.10)
which is proportional to the shock YC . The matrix "C is given by
"C = (# +ΦΓC )−1ΦΓC ,








The matrix ΓC measures the total market liquidity from both single-stock and index-fund
investors, which is allowed to be time-varying during the day. As the sum of two symmetric
and strictly positive-definite matrices, it is also symmetric and strictly positive-definite.





where ΣA is the covariance matrix of the random shocks YC in stocks’ reservation values.
When there are only single-stock investors, i.e., k 5C ≡ 0, it is easy to verify the matrix ΓC







In this case, the price change of a stock only depends on the shock to its own reservation
value. With deterministic liquidity parameters k0
8,C
, the correlation between price changes
equals to that between the corresponding random shocks. As we assume the distribution of
random shocks does not change over time, the pairwise correlation between Δ?8,C is constant
even if the liquidity parameters k0
8,C
are time-varying. However, this does not hold when
there are index-fund investors, as positive k 5C leads to non-zero off-diagonal entries in ΓC






We compute the beta of stock 8 using the price changes as
V8,C =
Cov(Δ?8,C ,Δ? 5C )
Var(Δ? 5C )
. (2.12)







We conduct following numerical experiment to show the impact of time-varying liquidity
provision on intraday stock dynamics. We model the intraday liquidity provision in line
with the active-open, passive-close pattern. We divide the trading hours of each day (9:30
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to 16:00) to 78 five-minute intervals, indexed by C = 1, 2, ..., 78. We assume the liquidity
parameters k0
8,C
and k 5C vary parametrically as










C=1 VC = 1 and constants k̄
0
8
and k̄ 5 . The time-varying parameters UC and
VC determine the liquidity profile of single-stock and index-fund investors throughout the
day. For illustration purpose, we consider following simplified liquidity profile:
UC =

0.0256, for C = 1, 2, ..., 6
0.0105, for C = 7, 8, ..., 72
0.0256, for C = 73, 74, ..., 78
and VC =

0.0075, for C = 1, 2, ..., 72
0.0769, for C = 73, 74, ..., 78
.
That is, the liquidity from single-stock investors is higher at the market open (9:30 – 10:00)
and near the market close (15:30 – 16:00), while the liquidity from index-fund investors
concentrates near the market close (15:30 – 16:00). Thus, there is more discretionary trading
in the morning, and the end of trading session is dominated by index-based strategies. This
liquidity profile is qualitatively analogous to the result in Min et al. (2018) (Figure 2 therein),
which is calibrated from the intraday trading volume data of S&P 500 constituents in 2017.
We assume the market has # = 478 stocks, which is the number of stocks that are in
the S&P 500 Index throughout the entire 2018. The index fund is benchmarked to the
average price of the stocks, i.e., w = (1/478, 1/478, . . . , 1/478)>. For illustration purpose, we
assume the random shocks to stocks’ reservation values have standard deviation of 1, and
are correlated between the stocks following the daily return correlation matrix in 2018. We
set the liquidity and market impact parameters as k̄0
8
= 10, k̄ 5 = 843.5, and q8 = 0.9 for
8 = 1, 2, . . . , 478. Thus, the index-fund investors provide on average k̄ 5 /(k̄ 5 +∑8 k̄08 ) = 15%
of total market liquidity, which is consistent with the passive ownership degree in Figure 2.1.
Besides, these parameters imply that, if there are only single-stock investors, the equilibrium
price will increase by 0.9 dollar for every dollar increase in the reservation value.
Similar to previous studies in this chapter, we employ half-hour intervals with a moving
step of five minutes to estimate the intraday curves for correlation and beta. For each
half an hour, we compute the average correlation in ΔpC and stock beta V8,C over the six
5-minute intervals, which can be explicitly obtained from (2.11) and (2.12). Denote by ?2U
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the U-th percentile for the pairwise correlations between the random shocks YC , i.e., daily
return correlation in our study. We focus on the intraday correlation pattern for three bins
of stock pairs, which have underlying correlations (between corresponding random shocks)
below ?25, between [?245, ?255], and above ?295 respectively. They correspond to the stock
pairs with high, median, and low correlations. Besides, denote by ?1U the U-th percentile of
the average stock beta V̄8 given in (2.13), we study the intraday beta pattern for the stocks
with V̄8 below ?15 and above ?
1
95, i.e., the low and high-beta stocks of the bottom and top
5%.
Figure 2.13 plots the intraday patterns of pairwise correlation in ΔpC (left) and the stock
beta VC ,8 (right). By the left panel, we see the correlations indeed change substantially
during the day, as a consequence of the index-fund investors and time-varying liquidation
provision. At the market open, the correlations are lower for all three bins, and are closer
to the underlying levels when there is no index-fund investor. This shows the implication of
more discretionary trading from single-stock investors in the morning. On the other hand,
the correlation for all bins increase near the market close. The effect is large, and even more
significant for the low correlation bin, which increases from around 0 in the morning to
above 0.2 at the end of trading session. This increase can be explained by the concentrated
trading from the index-fund investors, which drives stocks to move in the same direction
via index-based orders. Besides, by two panels on the right, we see the intraday beta starts
relatively high (resp. low) for the high- (resp. low-) beta stocks, but drops (resp. increases)
during the trading session. This generates the convergence pattern of intraday realized beta
observed in Section 2.5.3.
The intraday patterns in Figure 2.13, which are solved explicitly from the model, are
in line with the observations for realized correlation and beta in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.3,
especially in the recent decade: The realized correlation starts low at the market open, stays
relatively flat in the middle of the day, and increases significantly near the market close;
the realized beta starts dispersed in the morning, but generally moves towards one near
the market close. This theoretical study confirms the time-varying liquidity provision, in
particular, the active-open, passive-close trading profile, indeed contributes to the observed
intraday patterns of realized correlation and beta.
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Figure 2.13: Model-implied realized correlation and beta
The left panel plots the model-implied intraday correlation for three pair bins. The right
panels plot the intraday beta for high- (upper) and low- (lower) beta stocks.
2.7 Conclusion
The rapid growth of passive investment and index-based strategies has drawn much
attention in the recent years. In this study, we demonstrate its implication on various
aspects of intraday stock dynamics. In particular, we estimate intraday correlation, beta,
volatility, and trading volume with a large high-frequency dataset, i.e., 1-second level trade
data for all S&P 500 constituents from 2004 to 2018. We find the intraday patterns indeed
change over time. In the recent decade, the realized correlation starts low in the morning
and increases near the market close; the realized betas of different stocks start dispersed
and generally move towards one at the end of trading session. Besides, we find the trading
volume is more volatile across days in the morning than that in the afternoon. These
patterns confirm our hypotheses on the implication of index-based strategies, which have
become more prevalent in the recent decade.
With the development of financial technologies, high-frequency data has been widely
used in various fields of finance. However, estimators under high-frequency setting are often
biased by market microstructure noise and observation asynchronicity. Besides, large-scale
application of high-frequency data is inevitably hindered by heavy computational burden.
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Due to these reasons, most previous studies use a limited dataset (e.g., several stocks or
indices over a short period) or employ ad hoc estimators that do not take market noise and
asynchronicity into account. In this study, we overcome these challenges with estimators
that can be efficiently implemented on large set of stocks and account for both market
microstructure noise and observation asynchronicity. Furthermore, the size of the dataset
allow us to obtain the general intraday patterns of US stocks and examine how they evolve
over time.
The estimation of intraday patterns have various practical applications, including trad-
ing strategies, portfolio execution, and risk management. Besides, the intraday patterns
facilitate the development of market impact and liquidity provision models that incorporate
stylish and realistic features of intraday stock dynamics, e.g., time-varying correlation be-
tween stocks. Moreover, with the richness of the dataset, the cross-sectional dimension of
the intraday estimates can be leveraged to study the determinants of intraday returns across
stocks. Another interesting direction is to examine the intraday patterns for other markets,
especially those emerging markets where institutional investors play a less important role.
These potential directions can be explored in future research.
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Chapter 3
Structural Estimation of Intertemporal Externalities on ICU Admission
Decisions
3.1 Introduction
In managing service systems, one often has to consider the short term and long term
implications of each decision. This is particularly relevant when the system is operated
in a resource constrained environment. Indeed, managers often need to carefully balance
between providing immediate access to service in order to address considerations such as
minimizing waiting time versus the impact such actions may have on the ability to provide
service to future customers. In this work, we study how hospitals balance this trade-off
between short-term versus long-term considerations when making Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
admission decisions and how this behavior impacts various system performance metrics.
The tension between the short-term and long-term considerations is particularly relevant
in health care settings which are often resource constrained and where timely access can have
substantial clinical implications. We study this balancing act in the case of ICUs where
one could think of the short-term horizon as the next two to six hours versus the longer-
term horizon of the next 24 hours. ICUs are specialized inpatient units which provide the
highest level of care for the most critically ill patients. They are expensive medical resources,
comprising a large portion of operating costs, with the cost of patient care being several times
higher than regular wards (see, e.g., Coopersmith et al. (2012); Halpern and Pastores (2015)).
Additionally, ICUs often operate at high occupancy levels (see e.g., Halpern and Pastores
(2010, 2015)). Consequently, the ICU is often identified as a critical process bottleneck; ICU
congestion can have serious repercussions on patient flow and patient outcomes (see, e.g.,
Kc and Terwiesch (2012); Allon et al. (2013); Kim et al. (2015); Chan et al. (2016)). All
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these factors make ICU beds a key resource in a hospital that must be managed effectively.
In this work, we study ICU admissions for patients admitted to the hospital from the
emergency department (ED) in a large hospital network. When a patient arrives in the ED,
an ED physician will stabilize the patient and assess the patient’s needs. If the patient may
require ICU admission, an intensivist is called for a consultation. The ultimate decision
regarding the patient’s disposition requires the coordination of many people including the
ED physician, the intensivist, and hospital administrators, as well as various aspects of
the hospital system response which could include temporizing actions or adding additional
resources (e.g. floating nurses). For conciseness, throughout this manuscript, we will refer
to this composite decision maker – comprised of complex interactions of clinicians and the
system response – as the ‘system’ or the ‘hospital’. When considering the admission of
patients to the ICU, the system must balance the benefit of providing ICU care to the
current ED patient versus the potentially negative impact of increased ICU occupancy level
as a result of the admission.
As the ICU provides the highest level of care among all hospital units, swift admission
generally benefits the patient. However, the admitted patient will occupy an ICU bed, which
may restrict access to ICU care for future, perhaps more severe, patients. The system might
also take other actions in response to the increased ICU occupancy which might affect the
admission of the current patient. For example, the system might increase efforts to sta-
bilize less severe patients to prepare for the increasing needs for ICU beds. Additionally,
the system might obtain additional resources such as nursing staff in order to prepare for
the increasing occupancy in the ICU, which might also slow down the admission of cur-
rent patients. In other words, the system’s admission response not only impacts current
patients, but also changes the system state which affects future patients. This trade-off
introduces intertemporal externalities on the ICU admission decisions, i.e., both current
and future ‘payoffs’1 matter. While there are undoubtedly many factors which influence the
ICU admission decision, our goal in this manuscript is to develop an understanding of how
1Throughout the manuscript, we will use the economic term ‘payoff’ to capture clinical, operational, and
(possibly) financial impacts of each decision. This term is not intended to imply there are explicit financial
payoffs associated with each decision.
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much variation in how hospitals react to ICU congestion could, in part, be explained by
intertemporal externalities.
A priori, it is not clear how forward thinking the system is when making ICU admission
decisions as there are supporting arguments for responding early as well as late. On one
hand, the system’s primary goal is to provide the best care for the patient. Thus, if ICU care
will benefit the patient, the system should admit the patient as long as there is an available
bed in the ICU. This would suggest that the system behaves in a manner which does not
respond much in advance to the increasing ICU occupancy. On the other hand, there is
empirical evidence indicating that the system may reduce the likelihood of ICU admissions
in order to ‘save’ ICU capacity for future, potentially sicker, patients, or take other actions
in advance to prepare for the higher needs of ICU beds in the future. Such behavior is
particularly noticeable when the ICU occupancy is high – i.e., when the remaining capacity
and resources for future patients is limited. When the ICU is congested, the system is
less likely to admit ED patients across all severity levels (Kim et al., 2015), and patients
tend to board longer in the ED before being admitted to the ICU (Chan et al., 2016).
These empirical findings suggest that the hospital might indeed take into consideration the
ability to service future patients and the efforts needed to obtain additional resources in
preparation for future admissions. Thus, at least to some extent, the system behaves in a
manner that is consistent with forward-thinking and accounts for the long-term when making
ICU admission decisions. Given the complexity of the admission process and the various
constraints in the system, the system might not be fully aware of how much forward-thinking
there is in the admission process. This study will shed light on this debate by utilizing data
on which hospital unit patients are admitted to in order to empirically measure the degree of
forward-thinking behavior embedded in the system’s ICU admission decisions. While there
are undoubtedly many factors which influence the flow of patients, we focus primarily on
isolating the impact of one of these factors – the degree of forward-thinking behavior.
The degree of the system’s forward-thinking behavior is very challenging to empirically
quantify directly. First, to the best of our knowledge, there is limited data on the decision-
making process itself. Rather, we utilize observational data on the final decision and some
system information which could (or could not) influence the decision without explicit in-
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formation into the decision-making process. Some crude measures can be constructed from
system statistics regarding how the system reacts to ICU occupancy in their admission de-
cisions. For example, if we see a larger drop in admission probability or a greater increase
in ED boarding time (i.e. the time spent waiting in the ED once an admission decision has
been made) as the ICU becomes congested, this would suggest the system is more active in
saving ICU beds or obtaining additional resources for future patients and thus consider the
long-term when making decisions. However, such crude measures have several drawbacks.
First, the hospital’s reaction to ICU occupancy is also affected by various other factors,
such as the ED and ICU capacities, the composition of the entire patient cohort treated at
the hospital, as well as the arrival rate and average length-of-stay (LOS) of patients. Thus,
while such measures can provide some evidence of the hospital’s internalization of the short
versus longer term, they cannot do so in an accurate and straightforward way. It is also
difficult to use these measures to compare behavior across hospitals, as hospitals may differ
dramatically in their sizes, workloads, resources, and patient cohorts. More importantly,
these indirect measures do not allow us to conduct counterfactual studies to analyze the
impact of the forward looking behavior on various hospital performance metrics and patient
outcomes.
To handle these difficulties, we take a structural estimation approach to measure the
degree to which the system is forward-thinking from observed data and quantify the impact
of such behavior on key system performance metrics. In particular, we leverage a new econo-
metric approach on a large retrospective data set to estimate the inter-temporal discount
factor in a dynamic discrete choice model for ICU admission decisions. In this model, the
hospital may consider the longer-term system dynamics and performance and take relevant
actions in advance in order to maximize their expected accumulative utility. Their actions
impact the current period utility, but also affect future utility through the transitions of the
system states. The discount factor denotes the relative weight of the next period’s utility in
the hospital’s objective function, and, thus, determines how they balance current and future
payoffs when making admission decisions. We want to emphasize that our interpretation
of the discount factor in the model includes the following forward-thinking behaviors that
may slow down admissions when ICU occupancy is high: 1) actively saving beds for fu-
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ture patients; 2) stabilizing less severe patients in the ED; 3) obtaining additional resources
for ICU admission. We consider all of these possible behaviors as forward or longer-term
thinking which are captured by the discount factor in the model. We acknowledge that the
system might not be fully aware of their forward-thinking behavior or be able to choose the
level of forward-thinking given the complexity of the admission process and various con-
straints it faces. In other words, the discount factor in our setting should be interpreted
as the ‘perceived discount factor’ that describes the observed behaviors of hospitals. For
conciseness and consistency with the rest of the literature, we use the term ‘discount factor’
and ‘perceived discount factor’ interchangeably throughout the chapter. A larger perceived
discount factor implies that the system is more forward-thinking, while a smaller perceived
discount factor implies they are less forward-thinking, and care more about the short-term.
We estimate the perceived discount factor and the costs associated with the system’s
actions jointly from the data. This is in stark contrast to the majority of empirical studies
with dynamic models in the literature which assume the discount factor to be known and
then estimate the cost parameters (see, e.g., Rust (1987), Bajari et al. (2007), and Mehta
et al. (2017)). Moreover, the discount factor is generally set at a large level that is close to 1
– e.g., 0.90 or even 0.99. In other words, these works make an implicit assumption that the
agent is relatively forward-looking. However, this assumption lacks empirical support and
formal justifications. More importantly, the discount factors in dynamic models can vary
dramatically depending on the context of the problem, or as a consequence of the behavioral
variation of the decision makers. In the context of ICU admissions, using a prespecified
perceived discount factor can be inappropriate, as there are conflicting arguments for both
the immediate and longer-term aspects of the hospital’s behaviors. The near versus long
term behavior captured by the discount factor may vary across hospitals as well. To address
these issues, we identify the discount factor from observed data instead of anchoring our
analysis with an assumed, fixed perceived discount factor. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to identify the discount factor in the healthcare setting.
The dynamic model cannot be identified from choice data without further restriction
(see e.g., Manski (1993), Rust (1994), Magnac and Thesmar (2002)), which is a primary
reason that most empirical studies assume a known discount factor. The non-identification of
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dynamic models stems from the existence of observationally equivalent structures: multiple
combinations of discount factors and costs can lead to the same choice probabilities for
all states, making the discount factor and costs not jointly identifiable (Rust, 1994). We
circumvent this difficulty by adapting the new econometric approach developed by Komarova
et al. (2018) and relaxing an assumption on the action set in each period. We note that,
much like other econometric methodologies, including the instrumental variable approach,
applying the theoretical result in Komarova et al. (2018) to any empirical setting is not
straightforward in practice. We need to appropriately adapt their result to our setting and
show that our dynamic discrete choice model can be identified given the variation in our
data, i.e., the discount factor and costs can be jointly estimated. Estimating the discount
factor remains a challenging problem in the literature – it has only been done in two other
recently published manuscripts in very different settings than ours (e.g. De Groote and
Verboven (2019); Ching and Osborne (2020))). In both cases, they had to leverage special
features in the data based on their respective empirical settings to achieve identification.
With the estimated structural model, we quantify the impact of the degree to which
each hospital balances the short-term versus long-term considerations on key performance
metrics of the ICU. This behavior can have a multifaceted impact on patient and system
outcomes. A larger discount factor (longer-term focused behavior) can reduce ICU conges-
tion by saving beds in advance, but this may also lead to longer boarding times for ED
patients. Through counterfactual analyses, we explore the potential impact on hospital flow
and patient outcomes if it were possible to increase the hospital’s discount factor only.
From a broader perspective, our study builds an understanding of how human servers
make decisions in a resource limited environment. We focus on the particular aspect of how
servers internalize the trade-off between near versus longer term considerations. Our model
can be viewed as a finite buffer queueing system. ED patients are admitted to the ICU or
medical-surgical ward according to the hospital’s decisions. Consequently, the transition of
the system state is determined by random arrivals and departures as well as the behaviors of
the hospital. In standard queueing systems, customers enter service immediately as long as
there are available servers. However, in our setting, there are limited clear and/or objective
criteria for which patients to admit to the ICU, as well as when to admit them. These
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decisions inevitably depend on a patient’s severity level and the system state (e.g. the
availability of a bed), but also hinge on the behaviors of the hospital. In this work, we
focus on how the hospital internalizes the intertemporal externalities on ICU admissions.
This introduces a behavioral perspective to the queueing system which we will see has a
substantial impact on system dynamics. Our main contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We build a new dynamic structural model of the system’s ICU admission decisions that
incorporates both consideration of the current patients as well as the decision’s impact
on the system’s capacity to serve future patients. The structural model accounts
for the observed patient severity level, unobserved patient characteristics that are
only available to the hospital, random arrivals and departures, as well as the system
capacity constraints. We measure the hospital’s degree of near versus longer-term
looking behavior by the discount factor in the model.
• We adapt a new methodological approach from the econometrics literature and we
demonstrate that we can jointly estimate the discount factor and cost parameters
in our data setting. We estimate the structural model with an extensive data set
consisting of more than 300,000 hospitalizations from 21 Kaiser Permanente hospitals.
We find there is large heterogeneity in the estimated discount factors across hospitals
– i.e., some account more for the near-term, while others consider more longer-term
impacts. In contrast to the standard approach in the literature, in the context of ICU
admission decisions, it is inappropriate to assume a prespecified level for the discount
factor without empirical support.
• With our estimated structural model, we perform counterfactual studies to evaluate
the impact of the hospital’s behavior on ICU performance metrics. We first consider
operational interventions – adding one ICU bed or decreasing the external arrivals to
ICU. These interventions naturally reduce ICU congestion, but can have substantial
financial ramifications for a hospital. Next, we consider a behavioral intervention of
increasing the discount factor from its current estimated level to 0.9 – i.e., changing
the hospital’s behavior so they use longer-term discounting. We show that for some
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hospitals, the behavioral change of increasing the discount factor can lead to reductions
in ICU congestion that are comparable to the costly act of adding one ICU bed or
decreasing ICU external arrivals by 5%. We also discuss practical ways for increasing
discount factor and propose a simple heuristic policy that can achieve most of the
benefits. These analyses highlight the importance of understanding the behavior of
the hospital in ICU capacity management.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We conclude this section with a brief
literature review. Section 3.2 describes the setting and data. Section 3.3 provides descriptive
evidence for the discounting behaviors of hospitals in their ICU admission decisions. Section
3.4 develops the main structural model to measure the degree of near versus longer term
looking behavior of the system, and establishes the identification results and algorithmic
approach for estimation. Section 3.5 provides the estimation results. Section 3.6 conducts
counterfactual studies and proposes a heuristic policy for admission decisions. Section 4.6
concludes this chapter and discusses future research directions.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Our work is related to four main streams of literature: (1) empirical healthcare opera-
tions management, particularly those related to ICU decisions; (2) structural estimation in
operations management; (3) behavioral operations; and (4) econometrics tools for identifying
dynamic models.
There has been a growing literature in the field of empirical healthcare management that
examines patient flow in hospitals. A number of works study ICU and non-ICU admission
decisions as we do in this work. For instance, Shmueli et al. (2003); Edbrooke et al. (2011)
and Kim et al. (2015) study the impact of ICU admissions on patient outcomes including
mortality, hospital length of stay (LOS), readmission rate, and patient transfers to higher
levels of care. Patients who are not admitted to the unit of choice are typically rerouted to
alternative units or even different levels of care. Song et al. (2019) and Dong et al. (2018)
study off-placement of patients when bed availability in the primary unit is limited. Such
off-placement has important clinical and operational implications as it can result in longer
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LOS. Dong et al. (2018) find that by carefully coordinating admissions within the internal
hospital network, ED boarding can be reduced. Indeed, patients waiting for access to care is
highly undesirable. Chan et al. (2016) find that delays in ICU admission can increase ICU
LOS, which, in turn, can create more congestion in an already busy unit. In the ED, another
consequence of long waits is an increase in the likelihood of patients leaving without being
seen (Batt et al., 2019). In contrast to this body of work which primarily focuses on the
impact of admission decisions and waiting on outcomes, we focus on measuring the degree
of forward-looking behavior in admission decisions and quantify its impact on hospitals and
patients.
Clearly, bed availability, or conversely congestion, has substantial impacts on access to
care and whether a patient is admitted, is rerouted, or waits. Indeed, there is substantial
evidence the congestion influences patient flow. For instance, it can impact who is admitted
to the ICU (Kim et al., 2015) and when patients are discharged (Kc and Terwiesch, 2012).
These works demonstrate that clinicians may alter their actions based on congestion, po-
tentially to the detriment of patient outcomes. There is evidence this impact of congestion
on clinical behaviors also arises in the ED. Batt and Terwiesch (2016) find that when the
ED becomes congested, certain test are initiated at triage in hopes of improving flow in the
congested department.
Our work is also closely related to the literature on structural estimation in operations
management. Structural models have been widely used in different fields of operations
management including supply chains (Bray et al., 2019) and, more closely related to our
work, service operations (Li et al., 2014). Akşin et al. (2013) take the structural estimation
approach to study caller abandonment behaviors in a call center. Subsequent work including
Akşin et al. (2016) and Yu et al. (2016) study the impact of delay announcement in call
centers. The element of human customers and human servers often introduces interesting
dynamics. For instance, Lu et al. (2013) find that observed queue lengths impact the
purchasing behavior of customers in a super market setting. Emadi and Staats (2019) find
that the attrition of agents at a management firm appears to be insensitive to salary.
Structural models have also been used specifically in the healthcare operations man-
agement literature. Olivares et al. (2008) use a newsvendor model to study how a hospital
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balances the costs of reserving too much versus too little operating room capacity for cardiac
surgery cases. In a different operating room setting, Rath and Rajaram (2018) use a choice
model to estimate costs associated with operating room scheduling of anesthesiologists. Our
work contributes to the application of structural estimation in healthcare operations man-
agement, but in the ICU setting. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate
a dynamic structural model in healthcare operations.
The third stream of relevant literature is behavioral operations management and, par-
ticularly, its application in healthcare. There is evidence that the behaviors of physicians,
staffs, or patients can have substantial impact. Green et al. (2013) studies nurse absen-
teeism and finds nurses exhibit aversion to higher levels of anticipated workload, leading to
endogenous absenteeism rates that must be considered in nurse staffing. Song et al. (2015)
compare the ED wait time between a system with dedicated queues versus a pooled queue.
They find the wait time decreases when de-pooling and suggest that such a phenomenon
has a behavioral explanation where physicians feel an increased ownership of patient wait
time when faced with a dedicated queue. Ibanez et al. (2017) examines how radiologists
view scans given their complete discretion to determine the order to complete tasks. This
discretion can lead to inefficiencies in completing tasks. In a setting very similar to ours,
Kim et al. (2019) studies the ICU admission decision from a behavioral perspective. They
propose a behavioral model and use controlled experiments to understand whether and how
physicians are impacted by occupancy when making admission decisions. They identify a
number of factors, such as the availability of information, which can bias physician decisions.
While we also look at the ICU admission decision, we focus on the behavior of the hospital
and take a structural estimation approach to estimate the discount factor from data.
Finally, from the methodological aspect, our work is related to the literature on iden-
tification and estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. The dynamic discrete choice
model we use resembles the work in the econometrics community pioneered by Rust (1987).
Our study extends this line of literature by applying the dynamic discrete choice model in
the ICU context to study the hospital’s admission decisions. Furthermore, we estimate the
discount factor and cost parameters jointly from empirical data. The identification of the
discount factor is generally a very hard problem for dynamic models (Magnac and Thes-
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mar, 2002). We rely on recent developments in Komarova et al. (2018) that establishes
joint identification of discount factor and payoff parameters for dynamic choice models with
linear structure. The adaption of this abstract methodology to our healthcare setting is
not straightforward; it requires extending Komarova et al. (2018) to our setting with a
state-dependent action space and verifying the exclusion criteria is satisfied by our model.
3.2 Setting and Data
We utilize a large data set from 21 Kaiser Permanente Northern California (KPNC)
hospitals. The data contains over 312,306 hospitalizations over the period of two years. All
patients are covered by KPNC insurance and received care at one of the KPNC hospitals.
The hospitals cover a large geographic area and intra-hospital transfers are quite rare. As
such, we will generally study each hospital separately.
Each observation in our data corresponds to a single hospitalization. For each hospital-
ization, we have patient level information such as age, gender, admitting hospital, admitting
diagnosis, and three severity scores. The severity scores include a measure of the patient’s
chronic disease burden (COPS2), an acuity score (LAPS2), and a predicted in-hospital mor-
tality risk score (CHMR). The LAPS2 score is the main severity measure we use in the
analysis. It is assigned at hospital admission and measures the clinical severity of a patient
based on labs and vital signs taken in the last 72 hours prior to admission – including any
that may have been taken in the ED; a score of 110 is generally considered to capture a
critically ill patient. More details about these scores can be found in Escobar et al. (2012)
and Escobar et al. (2013). In addition to the patient level information, we also observe the
admission and discharge time for each unit each patient stayed in during the hospitalization,
as well as the type of care the unit provides – i.e., ICU, transitional care unit (TCU), general
medical-surgical ward, operating room (OR), or the postanesthesia care unit (PAR). It is
important to note that while we are able to see the full trajectory of each patient, including
the ultimate decision outcome, the data does not include direct information on the decision
making process. Additionally, while we have a rich dataset that includes detailed patient
data, we do not have data on other factors that may influence the decision such as (i) nurse
92
staffing availability, (ii) ED patient census, (iii) diversion policies, (iv) specific physician
coverage policies, and (v) the possibility to flex capacity.
We utilize the data from all hospitalizations to compute the maximum occupancy and
real-time occupancy level of the ICU in each hospital. The maximum ICU occupancy varies
from 7 to 36 beds across hospitals, and the average occupancy level varies from 34% to
76%. Among all ICU admissions, 63% are admitted via the ED to a medical service; 10%
are admitted through a non-ED unit to a medical service; 10% are admitted via the ED to
a surgical service, and 17% are admitted through a non-ED unit to a surgical service (i.e.,
these patients are scheduled surgeries).
Our study focuses on how the hospital internalizes the intertemporal externalities in ICU
admissions. Since non-ED patients are more likely to be scheduled arrivals and because there
are often fixed care protocols for surgical patients, our study is most relevant for patients
admitted to a medical service via the ED. The ICU admission decision for these patients
is made as follows. After a patient is stabilized in the ED, the ED physician provides an
initial assessment about whether the patient needs to be admitted to the hospital. If the
ED physician believes the patient needs to go to the ICU, an intensivist will be called to the
ED for a consultation. While the intensivist makes the ultimate decision about whether and
when the patient is admitted to the ICU, it is important to emphasize that the decision is
determined by a system including various physicians, administrators, and possibly, patient
family members, as well as the types of alternative interventions available (e.g. flexing
capacity).
Next, we describe the data selection process for our study cohort. We start from a total of
312,306 hospitalizations. We restrict our study to the hospitalizations admitted to a medical
service via the ED, which comprises the largest proportion of admitted patients (> 60%).
Note that for patients who are admitted via the ED, they appear in our data set as soon as
the admission decision has been made; as such, we do not have information about patients
discharged home from the ED nor patients for whom a disposition decision has not yet been
made. We drop 12 hospitalizations with unknown gender and 9,128 (4.8%) hospitalizations
for patients who experience hospital transfers or transports outside of KPNC. As we explain
in more detail in Section Section 3.4, our study focuses on three possible decisions for each
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patient in each decision epoch: keep the patient waiting in the ED, admit the patient to the
ICU, or admit the patient to a non-ICU unit (e.g. the ward TCU). We drop 3,066 (1.7%)
hospitalizations where the patient was admitted to other units – e.g., OR or PAR, from the
ED. Finally, we drop 1,675 (1%) hospitalizations with ED waiting time longer than 12 hours
as these episodes can be considered outliers (the average waiting time is shorter than two
hours).
Because our data spans over two years, some hospitals might adjusted their ICU capac-
ities during the sample period. As a result, we restrict our study cohort to the periods of
each hospital with stable ICU capacity and occupancy. We follow three steps to select the
sample. First, we discard the first and last month of data for all hospitals. Second, for
several hospitals, we drop the period at either end of the sample where the ICU occupancy
dramatically fluctuates or significantly differs from the more stable period in the middle.
Finally, for hospital 21, we find that its ICU capacity experienced a substantial increase
during the sample period (from 13 to 16). As a result, we split it into two parts, i.e., before
and after the capacity change, and treat them as two hospitals in the estimation. We refer
to 22 hospitals in our study cohort from here on. The number of days and hospitalizations
for each hospital in the final study cohort are summarized in Table C.3 in Appendix C.2.3.
In total, we drop 11,268 (6.4%) hospitalizations that are outside the stable periods.
The final study cohort consists of 164,167 hospitalizations. Out of them, 19,683 (12.0%)
are admitted to the ICU, and the remaining admitted to a non-ICU unit. In Table 3.1, we
summarize the patient characteristics of the final study cohort (left) and the subset which
are admitted to the ICU (right). As expected, the admitted cohort has higher average
severity scores than the complete cohort.
3.3 Descriptive Evidence for Discounting Behaviors
In this section, we provide descriptive evidence directly from the data on the discounting
behaviors of hospitals with respect to the short versus longer term considerations. The
results provide motivations for the decision model which describes this behavior in the next
section.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Patient characteristics of final study cohort and the subset
of patients who are admitted to the ICU.
Final study cohort: #=164,167 ICU admission cohort: #=19,683
Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD
LAPS2 0.00 294.00 74.11 70.00 37.47 LAPS2 0.00 294.00 105.03 102.00 45.98
COPS2 0.00 306.00 44.97 28.00 43.09 COPS2 0.00 276.00 48.67 30.00 47.27
CHMR 0.00 0.99 0.04 0.02 0.08 CHMR 0.00 0.99 0.10 0.04 0.15
Male 0.53 Male 0.48
Age (years) 18.00 113.00 67.27 70.00 17.59 Age 18.00 111.00 64.52 67.00 17.48
EDWait (hours) 0.02 12.00 1.30 0.88 1.41 EDWait 0.02 11.98 1.36 0.90 1.45
Note. LAPS2, COPS2, and CHMR are severity of illness scores. EDWait corresponds to the ED boarding time.
At a high level, one can think of the discounting behavior as how far into the future
the hospital considers when making decisions. A hospital with a low degree of discounting
behavior likely focuses primarily on the implications of the admission decision on the current
patient and may consider system dynamics over a shorter horizon of two to six hours. On
the other hand, a hospital with more a longer-term focus is concerned with the current
patient as well as the impact any decision will have on the ability to treat patients who may
arrive later, for example, within the next 24 hours. This discounting behavior can manifest
itself by how much the hospital alters its admission decisions based on congestion. While the
hospital may not be fully aware of its potential change in behavior due to congestion, we aim
to understand the perceived discounting behavior that can be elicited from the admission
decisions of patients.
Figure 3.1: Probability of ICU admission by ICU occupancy levels (selected hospitals)








































In Figure 3.1, we show the ICU admission probability with respect to ICU occupancy
level in three representative hospitals. The shaded area denotes the 95% level confidence
interval. From the figure, we can see the ICU admission probability generally drops as ICU
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occupancy increases. Moreover, the decrease happens well before the ICU is full. This
provides descriptive evidence for the discounting behaviors, i.e., hospitals indeed take into
account the ability to service future patients when making ICU admission decisions for
current patient. These patterns cannot be explained by standard queueing systems.
We observe that hospitals can behave very differently in response to ICU congestion.
For example, the ICU admission probability in Hospital 11 (right panel) starts to drop at
low ICU occupancy levels, while this change happens at relatively high ICU occupancy
levels in Hospitals 9 and 10 (left and middle panels). We find similar results through a
comprehensive multinomial logit model in Appendix C.1. The observed variation suggests
hospitals may have very different degrees of how much they internalize the intertemporal
externalities. In order to quantify this behavior, we propose a structural model for ICU
admission decisions in the next section. More importantly, the structural model allows us to
conduct counterfactual analyses to quantify the impact of the forward looking behavior on
key system performance metrics, which is not possible via descriptive statistics and reduced
form analysis.
3.4 Structural Estimation
In this section, we first introduce the structural model which describes the ICU admission
process within a hospital. Next, we explain the identification of the discount factor and
describe the estimation procedure.
3.4.1 Dynamic Discrete Choice Model
In our structural model, we consider the admission decision at the level of the hospital.
We model the ICU admission decision using a dynamic discrete choice model. There are
three key features of the model: 1) in each period, the hospital considers three options for
each patient: admitting the patient to the ICU, admitting the patient to a non-ICU unit
(e.g., the ward), or keeping the patient waiting in the ED; 2) the decision depends on both
patient severity and the current system status; 3) finally, the model allows for the hospital
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to consider the future and to make dynamic decisions. We provide detailed descriptions of
the model below.
We divide the focal patient cohort into two classes: the low and high severity class,
represented by subscripts ; and ℎ, respectively. We define the two classes based on the
patient’s LAPS2 score, which has been shown to be an effective measure of illness severity
(Escobar et al., 2013). We assume that the ED has capacities &; and &ℎ for the low and
high classes, respectively. Note that in our model a patient arrival in the ED corresponds
to when the decision to admit the patient to the hospital has been made (i.e. we only
capture ED boarding patients), so the ED capacities can be regarded as capturing the
limited boarding space in the ED. We defer the discussion about how various parameters
in the model, including &; and &ℎ, are estimated from the data to Section 3.4.3. The two
classes of patients arrive in the ED every period according to the following distribution.
For 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}, let 8,C be the number of class 8 patients arriving to the ED in time period
C. 8,C follows a truncated Poisson distribution with rate _&,8. While in theory 8,C can
be unbounded, we truncate it at the maximum number of patients arriving at ED in each
period (denoted by "8) observed in our data. This limits the state space of the model and
helps to keep the estimation computationally feasible.
In addition to our focal patient cohort, there are other patients who can occupy ICU
beds. C denotes the number of surgical and non-ED medical patients arriving in the ICU
in period C, referred to as the external arrivals. C is distributed according to a Poisson
distribution with arrival rate _ .
In each period, each ICU patient – from the ED or externally – departs from the ICU
with probability ` . Thus, C , the number of patients departing from ICU in each period,
follows a binomial distribution. The total number of beds in the ICU is . We assume
the ward units in the hospital have ample capacity. This helps with the computational
complexity of our model; moreover, the ward is generally much less congested than the ICU.
Indeed, the proportion of periods where the ward occupancy exceeds 95% of its capacity
(median capacity of 95 beds) is less than 0.8%, and the proportion of periods with full ward
occupancy is less than 0.05% (an order of magnitude less often than the ICU which has a
median capacity of 16 beds). The system flow is depicted in Figure 3.2.
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At the beginning of period C, the system state is given by a three dimensional vector,







is the number of class 8 patients in the ED, 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}, and =C is the number of
patients in the ICU. By the capacity constraints, =
8,C
≤ &8 for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ} and =C ≤ . For
each patient in the ED, the hospital determines one of the following three decisions: admit
to ICU, admit to non-ICU units, or keep them waiting in the ED. Since the patients are
treated as identical in terms of their observables within each class, the hospital’s action can
be described by the following four dimensional vector
3C = (0;,C , A;,C , 0ℎ,C , Aℎ,C ),
where 08,C and A8,C denote the numbers of patients admitted to ICU and non-ICU units of
class 8, 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}, respectively. Due to the capacity constraint in the ICU, the admissible
action set for system state BC is
Π(BC ) =
{
(0;,C , A;,C , 0ℎ,C , Aℎ,C ) : 0;,C + A;,C ≤ =;,C , 0ℎ,C + Aℎ,C ≤ =






Π(BC ) specifies the following set of constraints: The first two constraints state that the sum
of admitted patients (ICU and non-ICU units) must be smaller than or equal to the total
number of patients currently in the ED. The last constraint requires that the total number of
patients admitted to ICU must be smaller than or equal to the current number of available
beds in the ICU.
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In each period, a cost 2(BC , 3C ) associated with state BC and action 3C is incurred. We
note that these costs represent the hospital’s assessment of the ‘costs’, or disutility, incurred
for each state-action pair. They may capture clinical costs, operational costs, financial
costs, etc. These costs are not necessarily consistent with each individual stakeholder’s
assessment (e.g. patient, ED physician, ICU physician, hospital administrator, etc.) of
the costs associated with each state-action pair; they can also capture various system-level
constraints. We assume admitting a patient to the ICU has zero costs for both classes of
patients. This assumption is a reasonable approximation for the following reasons. First,
ICUs have very high fixed operating costs, therefore, the marginal cost of admitting one
patient is very small for either class of patients (Roberts et al., 1999; Kahn et al., 2008). For
example, the extremely high set-up cost for specialized equipment such as ventilators and
monitors in the ICU can be regarded as sunk costs, which do not affect the hospital’s ICU
admission decision. Additionally, hospitals tend to staff their ICU beds based on fixed nurse-
to-bed ratios and rarely adjust staffing levels based on occupancy and severity of patients.
Finally, ICU patients are the most severe type in a hospital. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that the hospital’s primary concern is to prioritize patient outcomes, and the
immediate cost of ICU admission is negligible in comparison. In other words, the hospital’s
primary goal is to minimize undesirable patient outcomes due to lack of ICU care. As such,
we assume zero admission costs for both classes of patients. This implies that all other costs
are assessed relative to ICU admission. As we discuss in Section 3.4.2, the assumption of
zero ICU admission cost is crucial for the identification of the discount factor in the dynamic
discrete choice model.
We assume that admitting each low (high) severity patient to non-ICU units incurs a
non-ICU routing cost 2A ,; (2A ,ℎ), while keeping each low (high) severity patient waiting in
the ED incurs a waiting cost 2F,; (2F,ℎ). These cost parameters represent the average non-
ICU admission or waiting cost across patients within each class. We restrict the waiting
costs for both classes to be positive, i.e., 2F,;, 2F,ℎ > 0. This is a reasonable assumption
since longer ED boarding has been shown to be associated with increased mortality risk
and hospital LOS (Singer et al., 2011). Thus, on average, keeping patients in the ED is
more likely to lead to negative outcomes compared with admitting them to ICU. As we
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assume ICU admission incurs zero costs for both classes, the average waiting costs 2F,; and
2F,ℎ should both be positive as longer waiting time is less desirable than immediate ICU
admission. On the other hand, we do not restrict the sign of the non-ICU admission costs
2A ,; and 2A ,ℎ. Patients who are not critically ill can often receive sufficient care in the ward,
so admitting them to the ward is not necessarily worse than admitting them to the ICU.
Therefore, the average cost of non-ICU admission, compared with ICU admission, can be
positive or negative. We note the relative differences in costs across the low versus high
severity patients captures the tradeoff between admitting (or delaying) the high versus low
severity patients. Finally, there are no costs associated with external arrival patients in our
model. The majority (> 70%) of the external arrivals to the ICU are surgical patients (63%
of which are scheduled surgeries) for whom ICU beds are often reserved in advance; thus,
our model focuses on the costs associated with the patients for whom there are less clear
protocols – those admitted to a medical service via the ED.
Given the system state, BC , and the action, 3C , the total per period cost is given by,
2(BC , 3C ) = 2A ,;A;,C + 2F,;
(
=;,C − 0;,C − A;,C
)
+ 2A ,ℎAℎ,C + 2F,ℎ
(
=ℎ,C − 0ℎ,C − Aℎ,C
)
, (3.2)
which is the sum of non-ICU admission and waiting costs for the two classes of patients.
Then, the hospital’s per period utility can be written as,
* (BC , 3C , YC ) = −2(BC , 3C ) + YC (3C ), (3.3)
where YC (3C ) is the idiosyncratic utility component associated with action 3C , which is ob-
served by the hospital when making the decision, but not the researcher. The additively
separable form (3.3) is similar to the assumption in Rust (1987) and numerous works in the
structural estimation of dynamic discrete choice literature.
At the beginning of period C, the hospital observes the system state, BC and the idiosyn-
cratic utility component, YC , then they choose the optimal action 3C that solves following










The discount factor V ∈ (0, 1) captures the trade-off between current and future utility,
which is the focus of our study. The expectation is taken over both the random component
YC and the transitions of the system – i.e., the arrivals and departures of patients in each
period. In addition, note that the expectation in (3.4) is conditional on both BC and YC , as
the random component is observable to the hospital before making decision in period C. We
define the value function as the objective in (3.4) given the optimal action sequence, i.e.,





V 9−C* (B 9 , 3 9 , Y 9) |BC , YC
}
. (3.5)
As noted earlier, the costs in the structural model capture many aspects that influence
hospital’s decisions, including, but not limited to, patient outcomes, financial costs, and
operational constraints. The optimization problem here is intended to model hospital’s
decision making and its relationship to the observed flows of patients. Thus, it does not
require a precise definition of what the costs are capturing. The implicit assumption is that
the hospital is acting “rationally” by taking the optimal action that is consistent with the
fixed costs and discount factor in the model. In other words, the assumption imposed by the
model is the structure of the hospital’s objective only. As the ”true” objective of the hospital
is unknown, the costs and discount factor can be perceived as behavioral parameters that
capture how the hospital is balancing between near-term versus long-term costs.
After the hospital chooses an action in period C, the system state evolves as follows. The
number of ED patients of class 8 becomes =
8,C
− 08,C − A8,C , and the number of patients in the
ICU is =C +0;,C +0ℎ,C . We define an “intermediary” state i(BC , 3C ) after the action 3C is taken,
which is given by
i(BC , 3C ) =
(
=;,C − 0;,C − A;,C , =

ℎ,C − 0ℎ,C − Aℎ,C , =

C + 0;,C + 0ℎ,C
)
, (3.6)
and describes the impact of action 3C on the system.
The system then evolves according to the following two steps. First, 8,C new patients
of class 8 arrive to the ED, and C patients arrive to the ICU through non-ED channels–i.e.,
the external arrivals. If the ED or ICU is full, new arrivals cannot be accepted. Thus, the
total accepted ED and ICU arrivals are given by
0228,C = max
{






C ,  − (=C + 0;,C + 0ℎ,C )
}
,
respectively. Second, C patients leave the system as they complete their service in the ICU.
This completes the system transition for period C.
The system state at the beginning of period C + 1 is:








8,C − 08,C − A8,C + 0228,C and =C+1 = =C + 0;,C + 0ℎ,C + 022C − C . (3.7)
It is clear from the above description that the transition of BC is Markovian, and its distribu-
tion only depends on BC and 3C , but not YC . The timeline of system transition is summarized
in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Timeline of system evolution: depiction of how the state evolves within a single
time-slot.
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Both the current period’s utility and how a specific action changes the system state,
which in turn can impact future payoffs, may influence the hospital’s decision. Thus, the
hospital chooses the action that maximizes
3C = arg max
3∈Π(BC )
(−2(BC , 3) + YC (3) + VE[+ (BC+1, YC+1)]),
where the function + (B, Y) is defined in (3.5). The last term in the right-hand side is the
expectation of the future value function after the current action is taken. Thus, the optimal
value function + (BC , YC ) solves the following Bellman’s equation
+ (BC , YC ) = max
3∈Π(BC )
(−2(BC , 3) + YC (3) + VE[+ (BC+1, YC+1)]),
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where the expectation is taken over both the system transition to BC+1 and the random
component YC+1.
The above Bellman’s equation is hard to evaluate due to the infinite state space associ-
ated with YC . Thus, we simplify the model by making the same conditional independence
assumption (CI) as in Rust (1987).
Assumption 1 (CI). The transition probabilities of the controlled process (BC , YC ) can be
factored as
Pr(BC+1, YC+1 |BC , YC , 3C ) = @(YC+1 |BC+1)6(BC+1 |i(BC , 3C )), (3.8)
where i(BC , 3C ) denotes the intermediate state (3.6) after action 3C is taken; the transition
probability 6(BC+1 |i(BC , 3C )) captures the random arrivals and departures shown by (3.7).
Assumption (CI) states that BC+1 is sufficient to determine the distribution of YC+1. In other
words, the random component {YC } is superimposed on the state process {BC }. Finally, we
assume that the random component YC is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and follows type I extreme value distribution for each action 3 ∈ Π(BC ). Thus, the state BC
impacts the distribution of YC only through the number of admissible actions. As shown
in Rust (1987), this assumption leads to a closed-form expression of the conditional choice
probability for action 3C given state BC , as denoted by 5 (3C |BC ).
Proposition 1. With the above set-up, the conditional choice probability for action 3C given
state BC has the following closed-form representation:
5 (3C |BC ) =
exp
(




− 2(BC , 3) + V+̃ (i(BC , 3))
) , (3.9)






+ (B′, Y′) 6(B′ |B)@(Y′ |B′)3Y′. (3.10)
The explicit expression for 6(B′ |B), i.e. the transition probability to state B′ given B (the
system state after the action is taken but before the random arrivals and departures take











− 2 (B′, 3 ′) + V+̃ (i(B′, 3 ′))
) 6(B′ |B). (3.11)
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In the above proposition, we drop the dependence on model parameters to simplify the
notation. As in most dynamic discrete choice models, the choice probability (3.9) has a
closed-form logit representation and the value function +̃ (B) solves the functional equation
(3.11). By (3.10), the new value function +̃ (B) represents the expected future utility given
B, which represents the current state after the action has been taken. In the proposition
below, we show it is monotonically non-increasing in the number of ICU patients.








) ′ for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ} and (= ) ≤ (= ) ′, we have
+̃ (B) ≥ +̃ (B′).
That is, for any given number of ED patients, the function +̃ (B) is monotonically non-
increasing in the number of ICU patients.
Proof: See Appendix C.4. 2
This proposition shows that the intertemporal externalities indeed exist for the ICU
admission decisions: As the hospital admits more patients, thereby increasing the ICU
occupancy, the future expected utility decreases. In turn, this can result in a decrease in
the likelihood of ICU admission as the ICU occupancy increases. Thus, the hospital must
consider both current and future utilities when making ICU admission decisions.
3.4.2 Identification of Discount Factor
In this section, we discuss why identification is challenging and how our model is em-
pirically identified from observed data. We first develop the general identification result
for our model using recent developments in the econometric literature. Then, we use two
simple examples to illustrate how some aspects of our model can be directly identified from
observed choice probabilities.
In this study, we identify the discount factor and cost parameters jointly from observed
data. Although the choice probability has a closed-form expression (3.9) in the dynamic
choice model, it is not possible to identify the discount factor and costs parameters jointly
without further restriction on the dynamic model (see, e.g. Lemma 3.3 in Rust (1994) or
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Proposition 2 in Magnac and Thesmar (2002)). Thus, most empirical studies assume the
discount factor is known, and then estimate the cost parameters. However, the prespecified
discount factors usually lack empirical support and economic justifications. Indeed, the
implied discount rate can vary substantially across different settings (Frederick et al., 2002).
In our study, identifying the discount factor from observed data is crucial to understanding
how much hospitals react to the intertemporal externalities of the ICU admission decisions.
The reason that the discount factor and cost parameters cannot be jointly identified in
general is because there exists observationally equivalent structures – i.e., different combi-
nations of discount factor and cost parameters – that lead to the same choice probabilities
for all states and actions. Thus, an agent’s actions can be rationalized for different choices
of discount factor. For example, in the ICU admission context, if we observe the hospital
admits patients “aggressively” (e.g. with high probability), this may be because either the
hospital is focused on the near-term – i.e., a small V – or the waiting and non-ICU admission
costs are large – i.e., high 2F and 2A . Without further restriction on model primitives (e.g.,
cost and utility), we cannot differentiate between such cases to identify the true discount
factor.
There have been positive identification results for the discount factor in dynamic models.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) suggests that exclusion restriction can be used to identify the
discount factor. The exclusion restriction they use is that there exists some state and
action pairs for which the single period utilities are identical, but the future period utilities
differ. This idea is further elaborated and applied in some empirical contexts (Dubé et al.
(2014), Wang (2014), and Ching and Osborne (2017)). However, the exclusion restriction is
abstract and hard to verify in practice (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002; Abbring and Daljord,
2019). Thus, despite this abstract methodology, there are only two recent papers which
estimated the discount factor empirically. Both focus on special cases and provide important
contributions in demonstrating identification in those settings. This is a common approach
for other theoretical econometric methodologies (e.g. instrumental variables), which require
careful application in each specific setting to appropriately achieve identification.
To identify the discount factor in our parametric model, we leverage the recent identi-
fication results developed in Komarova et al. (2018). They prove the identification for the
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discount factor using an empirical model that is linear in the cost parameters conditional
on the discount factor. In particular, they construct a one-dimensional criterion function
that can be used for identification as well as estimation, which exploits the conditional lin-
ear structure and reduces the nonlinear problem to a one-dimensional grid search for the
discount factor. For this approach to work in our setting, we must appropriately adapt it.
The main identification results of Komarova et al. (2018) proceed as follows. They
consider an empirical model with linear structure. The choice and transition probabilities
are nonparametrically identified. For a given value of the discount factor, they first construct
estimates for the cost parameters following the standard two-step estimation procedure
pioneered by Hotz and Miller (1993). The estimator minimizes the distance between the
value functions observed from data and those directly implied by the empirical model. Then,
they reduce the identification problem to a one-dimensional search for V ∈ (0, 1): If there
is a unique value of V, together with the corresponding cost estimates, that minimizes the
distance objective function, then the model can be identified under some rank condition.
This criterion also provides a natural way to estimate the model with observed data.
We now show how the identification results in Komarova et al. (2018) are applied in our
setting. First, by construction, our model satisfies the basic assumptions in Komarova et al.
(2018), i.e., additive separability of utility, conditional independence of transition and finite
state space. Additionally, by (3.2) and (3.3), it is also clear that the deterministic part of the
per-period utility (i.e., −2(BC , 3C )) is linear in the cost parameters 2F,;, 2A ,;, 2F,ℎ, and 2A ,ℎ.
Thus, the linear-in-parameter assumption is also satisfied in our setting. More details of the
assumptions in Komarova et al. (2018) and how they apply to our setting are included in
Appendix C.2.2. We define the base action as admitting every ED patient whenever there
are ICU beds available. As we assume ICU admission costs are zero for both classes of
patients, the base action brings zero cost for all states as long as it is admissible. Thus, we
can apply Theorem 1 of Komarova et al. (2018) in our setting to identify the discount factor
and cost parameters jointly in our dynamic model.
We note that Komarova et al. (2018) assumes the same admissible action set for all
states while our setting has state dependent action sets. This creates additional challenges
in the identification of the discount factor as the denominator for the choice probability in
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(3.9) is also state-dependent. Thus, even if we could verify all the abstract assumptions in
Komarova et al. (2018), for the identification of the discount factor to be achieved in our
setting, a direct application is still not possible. However, we note that given each state, the
admissible action set can be fully determined by (3.1). Thus, we can verify the derivation
leading to Theorem 1 in Komarova et al. (2018) still applies to our setting, where we plug
in the admissible action set for each state according to (3.1). Additionally, in next section,
we use two simple examples to show how the state-dependence property of the admissible
action set can be handled by constructing proper state-action pairs that identify certain
aspects of our model.
We can construct a one-dimensional criterion similar to the one in Komarova et al.
(2018) based on the maximum likelihood estimator, which is asymptotically equivalent to
the estimator employed in Komarova et al. (2018): For each candidate V, we estimate the
cost parameters that maximize the choice likelihood. Then we conduct a one-dimensional
search over V ∈ (0, 1). The model can be identified if there is a unique V (together with
the cost estimates) that maximizes the likelihood, and that the rank condition in Theorem
1 of Komarova et al. (2018) is satisfied. Using data from 22 hospitals, we find the optimal
discount factor that maximizes the likelihood function is unique in all circumstances. More-
over, in most cases, the likelihood function monotonically decreases as the discount factor
moves away from the optimal level, which further strengthens the identification of the dis-
count factor. More details of the algorithmic approach can be found in the next section.
We provide some illustrative examples of the likelihood versus discount factor in Figure C.1
of Appendix C.2.3. We also show by simulation that the rank condition is satisfied. The
results suggest that the discount factor and cost parameters can be jointly identified in our
empirical model.
3.4.2.1 Two Illustrative Examples for Identification
In this section, we use two simple examples to illustrate how some aspects of our dy-
namic model can be directly identified from observed choice probabilities. While the formal
identification results rely on the one-dimensional criterion established above, the two exam-
ples below provide some insights about how the observed choice probabilities can be used
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for identification. Taking log on both sides of the choice probability (3.9), we have
ln 5 (3C |BC ) = −2(BC , 3C ) + V+̃ (i(BC , 3C )) −  (BC ), (3.12)
where function  (B) is given by






−2(B, 3) + V+̃ (i(B, 3)
) .
We see the log choice probability can be decomposed to three terms in (3.12): the first term
−2(BC , 3C ) is the negative of the per-period cost, which directly depends on the cost param-
eters; the second term V+̃ (i(BC , 3C )) is related to the discount factor and value function,
which captures the impact of the decision on future utility via the change of system state;
the last term  (BC ) is a function of system state BC , but it does not depend on the decision
3C . Note the discount factor and cost parameters are implicitly captured in +̃ (·) and  (·).
As shown by (3.12), the discount factor and cost parameters are captured in the choice
probabilities in a complicated way. However, we will illustrate that certain aspects of the
model can be directly identified by constructing appropriate state and action pairs. We
provide two examples below. In the first example, we show the non-ICU admission cost dif-
ference, i.e., 2A ,ℎ−2A ,;, can be identified by cancelling out the second and third terms related
to V+̃ (·) and  (·) in (3.12). In the second example, we show certain linear combinations of
V+̃ (·) can be identified by removing the first and third terms related to 2(BC , 3C ) and  (·) in
(3.12). The proofs are provided in Appendix C.5.
Lemma 1. Denote two states B1 = (1, 0, 0) and B2 = (0, 1, 0). That is, there is one patient
in the ED from the low and high severity class in B1 and B2, respectively, and no patient in
the ICU. Then the difference in non-ICU admission costs can be identified as











where Pr(0 |B1), Pr(A |B2), Pr(0 |B1), and Pr(A |B2) denote the probabilities of admitting the
patient to ICU and non-ICU units under the two states, respectively.
This result can be interpreted as follows. The ratio of non-ICU to ICU admission prob-
abilities, i.e., ln (Pr(A |B8)/Pr(0 |B8)) for 8 = 1, 2, is negatively related to the relative cost of
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admitting the patient to non-ICU unit compared with admitting to the ICU. As the ICU
admission cost is assumed to be zero for both patient classes, higher non-ICU to ICU ad-
mission ratio implies a smaller non-ICU admission cost. Thus, the difference in the log
ratios can be used to identify the difference in non-ICU admission costs of the two classes of
patients. A larger difference on the right-hand side of (C.19) suggests the patients from the
high severity class are less likely to be admitted to non-ICU unit compared with those from
the low severity class, which implies a larger difference in their non-ICU admission costs.
Lemma 2. Consider two states with B1 = (0, 1, 1) and B2 = (0, 1, 0). That is, there is one
patient in the ICU in the first state, and one high severity patient in the ED in both states.
Let +̃: = +̃ ((0, 0, :)) denote the value function of the state with : patients in the ICU and
no patients in the ED. Then we have
V
[













where Pr(0 |B1), Pr(A |B2), Pr(0 |B1), and Pr(A |B2) denote the probabilities of admitting the high
severity patient to ICU and non-ICU units under the two states, respectively.
The left-hand side of (C.22) is a linear combination of value functions multiplied by the
discount factor V. Specifically, +̃2 − +̃1 (resp. +̃1 − +̃0) measures the impact on the future
payoff from admitting one more patient to ICU when the ICU currently has one (resp.zero)
patient. Thus, the left-hand side of (C.22) actually measures the change in the impact on
the future payoff when adding one more patient to the ICU in its current state. Accordingly,
it can be identified by the change in log ratios of ICU and non-ICU admission probabilities
as the ICU state moves from B1 to B2, which have one and zero patients respectively.
3.4.3 Algorithmic Approach
We now document the details for how the dynamic discrete choice model is estimated
from data. We employ the nested fixed-point algorithm in Rust (1987) to estimate the
cost parameters (conditioning on discount factor) by maximizing the likelihood of observed
choices. As shown in the literature (e.g., Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and
Miessi Sanches et al. (2016)), the ordinary least-squares estimator, as employed in Komarova
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et al. (2018) to minimize the Euclidean norm of the value function, is asymptotically equiv-
alent to the maximum likelihood estimator used by us. In particular, given the model can
be identified, the set of parameters that leads to the unique maximum likelihood function
of observed choices also produces a zero Euclidean norm in Komarova et al. (2018) in the
asymptotic limit. Thus, given our model can be identified from observed data, the max-
imum likelihood based criterion is asymptotically equivalent to the ordinary least-squares
estimator in Komarova et al. (2018) (see e.g., Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and
Miessi Sanches et al. (2016)). We also verify the full rank condition of matrix  in Komarova
et al. (2018) holds by simulation with the estimated parameters2.
First, the arrival and departure rates, as well as the ED and ICU capacities, are estimated
directly from data – outside of the structural model. We estimate the ED arrival rates _&,8
and maximum arrival number "8 for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ} using the average and maximum number of
arrivals to the ED for the two classes in each period. We estimate the ICU external arrival
rate _ using the average number of patients admitted to ICU in each time slot who are not
included in our low and high severity ED groups. The departure probability ` is estimated
as the ratio of total number of departures to the total periods of ICU stay across all ICU
patients. The ICU capacity  is set to be the maximum number of patients in the ICU
observed from data. It includes both medical and surgical, emergency and elective patients,
to reflect the true maximum ICU occupancy. We also tested other choices of  to show the
robustness of our estimation results.
Note that our data captures the number of patients admitted to the hospital from the
ED, but does not include any patients who are discharged from the ED (e.g. to home or
to a skilled nursing facility), but who inevitably utilize ED resources. Thus, it is difficult
to accurately determine the maximum number of admitted patients allowable in the ED,
i.e. the ED capacity in our model. Given this challenge, we set ED capacities &8 using the
2With the estimated parameters, we compute the choice probabilities of each state and action by Propo-
sition 1. Then, we approximate the conditional expectations in Tables A and B of Komarova et al. (2018) by
simulation for each state and action. For each conditional expectation involved, we use 100 simulation trials
with each run having the same number of periods as in the data plus an additional three-month warm up
period. Finally, we compute the matrix B(V0) in Theorem 1 of Komarova et al. (2018) with the simulated
values for its components and verify it has full rank for all hospitals in our study.
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following heuristic:





where "&8 is the maximum number of patients in the ED observed in the data; "8 is the
maximum number of arrivals in each period; and b·c denotes the floor function. We introduce
the square root term
√
"8 as a “safety buffer” to ensure we have ample ED capacity to
avoid balking upon arrival to the ED, as patients are rarely turned away from the hospital
at this stage. For appropriately loaded queueing systems, it is well known that stochastic
fluctuations of the queue length are on the order of the square root of the average offered load
(see e.g., Halfin and Whitt (1981)). In our setting, we could approximate the average offered
load by the arrival rates _&,8 since the ED waiting time is generally very short. We take a
more conservative approach and use the square root of the maximum number of arrivals "8
as the “safety buffer”. We verify by simulation that the ED rarely reaches its full capacity
(3.15) in our structural model; thus, while the ED has a finite capacity, patients rarely balk.
We also find that the choice probabilities are very robust to alternative specifications of
the ED capacity, which is not the case when varying the ICU capacity . This suggests
that our structural model primarily captures the interplay between ICU congestion and
the importance the hospital places on intertemporal externalities when making admission
decisions.
The remaining parameters – the discount factor, waiting and non-ICU admission costs
for the two classes, i.e., \ = {V, 2A ,;, 2A ,ℎ, 2F,;, 2F,ℎ} – are estimated within the structural
model using the observed states and actions. Given the observed state and action sequences
{BC , 3C } for C = 1, 2, ..., ) , the likelihood for a fixed set of parameters, \, is given by
; 5 (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) |\) =
)∏
C=1
5 (3C |BC , \)6(BC+1 |i(BC , 3C )), (3.16)
where 5 (3C |BC , \) denotes the choice probability in (3.9) given parameter \. The state tran-
sition probability 6(BC+1 |i(BC , 3C )) is explicitly given in the Appendix C.2.1. The likelihood
; 5 can be decomposed into two parts:
; 5 (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) |\) = ;3 (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) |\) · ;B (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) ),
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where ;3 is the part of ; 5 associated with the choice probabilities, given by
;3 (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) |\) =
)∏
C=1
5 (3C |BC , \), (3.17)
and ;B is the part of ; 5 from the state transition, i.e.,
;B (B1, ..., B) , 31, ..., 3) |\) =
)∏
C=1
6(BC+1 |i(BC , 3C )).
We see that the structural parameter \ is only involved in the likelihood function ;3 for the
choice probabilities, but not the likelihood function ;B for the state transitions, which only
depends on the arrival and departure rates.
Our estimation approach is based on the nested fixed point algorithm in Rust (1987).
The estimation procedure consists of two loops: The “inner” loop computes the function
+̃ for a fixed \, and the “outer” loop searches for the value of \ that maximizes the log-
likelihood ln ; 5 in (3.16). Since the partial likelihood ;3 in (3.17) is the only part in ; 5
that involves \, maximizing the full log-likelihood is equivalent to finding the value of \
that maximizes ln ;3. In the “inner” loop, the unknown function +̃ is computed by value
iteration on the functional equation (3.11). In the “outer” loop, we use a gradient descent
algorithm to find the optimal parameter \. To reduce the computational burden, we restrict
the potential values of the discount factor to a discrete grid V = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}. While
coarse, this discrete grid is granular enough to measure how the hospital internalizes the
intertemporal externalities, and enables us to determine whether they are more cognizant of
the near versus longer-term when making decisions. To summarize, for each candidate value
of V, we estimate the cost parameters {2A ,; , 2A ,ℎ, 2F,;, 2F,ℎ} that maximizes the log-likelihood
ln ;3. Then, we choose the discount factor and its associated cost estimates that lead to the
largest likelihood among all candidate V.




where I(\̂) is the Fisher’s information matrix
I(\̂) = E
[
m ln ;3 (\̂)
m\̂
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To examine the proportion of variation explained by our structural model, we compute the
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared as




where ;=D;; is the “null” likelihood from a multinomial logistic regression model with only
an intercept term and hospital fixed-effects, i.e., the action probabilities do not depend on
system states (See Appendix C.1 for details of the null model).
3.5 Estimation Results
We present the estimation results from the structural model in this section. Before we
discuss the detailed results, we first describe how we apply the structural model to the
data in our study setting and provide some preliminary findings using the system summary
statistics calculated from the data and the parameters estimated outside the structural
model.
We define each period to be a two hour time interval. This granularity provides a
reasonable amount of time for transferring the patient from one unit to the next after the
admission request is issued. We discuss this choice of time interval in Appendix C.3.
Recall that only 12% of all ED patients are admitted to the ICU; there are some patients
(e.g. those with very low LAPS2 scores) who are likely to be admitted to non-ICU units
(e.g., ward) regardless of ICU bed availability. Thus, in order to understand the impact
of intertemporal externalities on the ICU admission decision, we must identify a group of
high severity patients with sufficiently high likelihood of ICU admission. Additionally, we
require enough observations in the high severity class to effectively estimate the non-ICU
admission and waiting costs, 2A ,ℎ and 2F,ℎ, as well as to be able to identify the discount
factor. We partition the ED patients into two classes by their LAPS2 score, as it has the
highest correlation with the ICU admission decision among all severity scores. We define
the low severity class as patients with LAPS2 score in the range of [0, 113], corresponding
to those below the 85th percentile of the LAPS2 score distribution, and the high severity
class as patients with LAPS2 score in the range (113, 294], corresponding to those above
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the 85th percentile. We note that this means any medical patient admitted via the ED is
included in our structural model as either a low or high severity patient. While we expect
the ICU admission rate for low severity patients to be lower, some of these patients will
be admitted to the ICU possibly due to factors that are unobservable in the data, thereby
introducing intertemporal externalities on the system. Indeed, we find that while 8% of low
severity patients are admitted to the ICU (compared to 34% of high severity patients), they
contribute more (58%) to the total number of medical patients admitted from ED than the
high severity class (42%). This highlights the importance of including the costs of both
severity classes in our model, instead of just the high severity class. If we ignored the low
severity patients, we would significantly underestimate the impact of the ICU admission
decision on future patients.
Recall that our structural model considers the admission decisions observed at each
hospital. Within each hospital, multiple physicians and administrators cover the ED and
ICU over the study period. Due to limitations in data availability, we only know the hospital
where the decision is made, but have no information on any individuals or specific system
constraints which potentially impact the decision. Thus, we can only estimate our model
at the hospital level even though there may be many different factors and systems involved
in the decision making process in practice. Therefore, the estimation results will reflect the
‘average’ behavior within each hospital. We note that the hospital level result will tend
to underestimate the actual variation in the systems’ behaviors, as it ignores the potential
heterogeneity among systems (e.g. night versus day, weekday versus weekend, ability to flex
beds, etc.) within the same hospital. Thus, if we see large heterogeneity across hospitals,
this would imply there is likely even larger heterogeneity when considering different system
level factors, which we do not observe in the data.
In Table 3.2, we provide the system summary statistics of each hospital, including the
ED and ICU capacities, average ICU occupancy, arrival and departure rates, and overall
ICU admission probabilities for two patient classes. The ICU admission probability is the
proportion of ED patients who are eventually admitted to the ICU regardless of their waiting
time. As we already restrict our final study cohort to the patients whose next unit is either
the ICU or ward (including the TCU if the hospital has one), the admission probability can
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be computed by #*/(#* +#=>=* ), where #* (#=>=* ) denotes the total number
of patients that are admitted to ICU (non-ICU units). All the statistics in Table 3.2 are
estimated directly from data outside of the structural model.
Table 3.2: System summary statistics by hospital
Hosp &; &ℎ  ICUOccu _&,; _&,ℎ _ ` Pr(0;) Pr(0ℎ)
1 11 5 21 0.67 1.230 0.221 0.252 0.035 0.12 0.41
2 14 7 26 0.76 1.429 0.227 0.268 0.026 0.11 0.36
3 8 4 12 0.49 0.859 0.146 0.101 0.030 0.05 0.22
4 13 7 31 0.71 1.529 0.327 0.519 0.031 0.05 0.29
5 7 3 11 0.65 0.633 0.098 0.108 0.030 0.11 0.41
6 9 5 21 0.58 1.123 0.208 0.278 0.036 0.08 0.36
7 7 4 11 0.71 0.583 0.111 0.188 0.030 0.05 0.18
8 10 6 16 0.67 0.868 0.185 0.158 0.033 0.14 0.40
9 15 5 22 0.71 1.807 0.264 0.354 0.036 0.07 0.31
10 8 4 12 0.52 0.714 0.092 0.228 0.048 0.06 0.28
11 6 4 7 0.55 0.284 0.045 0.056 0.029 0.12 0.46
12 12 6 24 0.69 1.256 0.173 0.299 0.026 0.06 0.33
13 9 4 16 0.50 0.817 0.182 0.110 0.028 0.07 0.30
14 11 6 36 0.72 1.332 0.257 0.493 0.026 0.07 0.33
15 8 4 16 0.43 0.897 0.111 0.114 0.031 0.07 0.31
16 8 4 13 0.44 0.752 0.133 0.108 0.033 0.06 0.26
17 7 4 9 0.62 0.418 0.099 0.066 0.024 0.09 0.32
18 9 6 32 0.58 0.796 0.122 0.557 0.034 0.06 0.26
19 8 4 25 0.46 0.966 0.170 0.196 0.031 0.10 0.37
20 8 4 11 0.34 0.545 0.087 0.065 0.035 0.07 0.29
21 8 4 13 0.68 0.451 0.076 0.139 0.025 0.10 0.44
22 8 4 16 0.62 0.422 0.090 0.182 0.028 0.15 0.45
System summary statistics for each hospital: &8 for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ} is the ED capacity for the two classes
of patients;  is the ICU capacity; ICUOccu is the average ICU occupancy level; _&,8 for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}
is the ED arrival rate; _ is the external arrival rate to ICU; ` is the ICU departure rate; Pr(08)
for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ} is the overall admission probability for the ED patients.
We note the following observations from Table 3.2. First, the ICUs in the hospitals are
generally congested. The average ICU occupancy in most hospitals is higher than 50%. For
some, this number is even higher than 70%. Second, the ICU admission probability for the
high severity class is above 30% for most hospitals, and is usually three or four times larger
than that for the low severity class. This implies the costs parameters of the two classes
should be very different, which is indeed captured in our structural model. Finally, we see
the hospitals have very different sizes, work loads, and admission behaviors. For example,
large hospitals have more than 30 beds in their ICU, while small hospitals have fewer than
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10. Additionally, the ICU admission probabilities can be very different across hospitals even
for the same severity class. With such large heterogeneity in the system statistics, hospitals
may also behave very differently when they make admission decisions. We will quantify this
heterogeneity with empirical evidence from our structural model.
3.5.1 Intertemporal Externalities
3.5.1.1 Main Estimation Results
In this section, we provide the estimation results of our structural model, i.e., the esti-
mated discount factor and costs. Before estimating the model for each hospital separately,
we first show the estimation results for all hospitals combined. That is, we estimate one set
of parameters that maximizes the sum of log-likelihood from all hospitals. The results are
summarized in the table below.
Table 3.3: Estimation results of structural model: All hospitals combined (# = 154, 140
hospital-periods)
Discount factor Low Severity High Severity
V̂ 2̂F,; 2̂A ,; 2̂F,ℎ 2̂A ,ℎ '
2
0.3∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −1.950∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
The estimated discount factor is V̂ = 0.3, and is significantly different from adjacent
levels 0.2 and 0.4 at the 0.1% level. The estimated waiting costs 2̂F,; and 2̂F,ℎ are both
significantly positive, while the non-ICU admission costs 2̂A ,; and 2̂A ,ℎ are both significantly
negative. The McFadden’s pseudo '2 from the structural model is 0.14, which is comparable
to the level ('2 = 0.16) from the comprehensive multinomial logit regression in Table C.1.
At first glance, the estimated V̂ is quite surprising. In most of the empirical literature,
the discount factor is assumed to be relatively large, e.g., 0.90 or 0.95. However, we see here
the estimated V̂ is much smaller than these levels. This provides additional evidence that
the level of discount factor may vary dramatically in different empirical settings (Frederick
et al. (2002)). Thus, it is crucial to identify the discount factor using real data instead of
assuming a pre-specified value. In our model, the relatively small value of V̂ implies the
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hospitals are not very forward-looking when making ICU admission decisions. Given each
period in our model is a two hour interval, the result suggests that the hospitals barely
consider the impact of their decisions on the system beyond the next six hours (after three
2-hour periods, 0.33 ≈ 0.03). With 12-hour shifts at KPNC, this suggests that while the
hospitals indeed account for the future when making decisions, they mostly internalize the
impact of their decisions on the system state within their own shifts and/or slightly into the
immediately following shift.
Unlike the waiting costs, which are constrained to be non-negative, the non-ICU ad-
mission costs are negative and significant for both the low and high severity classes. The
negative non-ICU admission costs suggest that it is more desirable to admit a large fraction
of patients to the ward. Indeed, this seems reasonable for low severity patients for whom
ICU care is expensive, and (likely) unnecessary. This turns out to also be the case for some
of the patients in the high severity group, which includes all patients with a LAPS2 score
higher than the 85th percentile. This is also supported by the observed admission proba-
bility Pr(0ℎ) in Table 3.2: The admission probability for the high severity class is less than
50% in all hospitals, which means that the majority of these patients are admitted to the
ward.
Finally, both the waiting and non-ICU admission costs are significantly higher for the
high severity class than for the low severity class. As expected, it is more costly (financially,
operationally, and clinically) for the high severity patients to wait in the ED, i.e., 2̂F,ℎ >
2̂F,; > 0, and the low severity class on average benefits more from being admitted to the
ward, i.e., 2̂A ,; < 2̂A ,ℎ < 0. The apparent differences in cost parameters highlights the
importance of differentiating between the two severity classes.
The estimated V̂ = 0.3 represents the average behavior across all hospitals; however, it
does not provide information about potential differences across hospitals. If all hospitals
behave quite similarly when internalizing the intertemporal externalities on admission de-
cisions, most of them should have a discount factor close to the average level 0.3. On the
other hand, if there is large heterogeneity in the discount factors, e.g., some hospitals with
V̂ = 0.9 and some with V̂ = 0.1, this would imply that some hospitals are quite concerned
with the longer-term while others focus more on the near-term. To address this question, we
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estimate the structural parameters \ = {V, 2A ,;, 2A ,ℎ, 2F,;, 2F,ℎ} for each hospital individually.
The results are summarized in Table 3.4. We also plot the estimated discount factors and
costs in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Comparison of estimated discount factors and costs across the 22 individual
hospitals.












































Note: The left panel shows the estimated discount factor, the middle and right panels show the estimated
waiting and non-ICU admission costs, respectively, for the low (blue solid line) and high (red dotted line)
severity patients.
We see substantial heterogeneity in the estimated discount factors across hospitals. In
particular, we have 13 out of 22 hospitals with relatively small estimated discount factors
V̂ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, five with medium discount factors V̂ ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, and the other four
with relatively large discount factors V̂ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. All V̂ estimates are significantly
different from adjacent levels at the 0.1% level. Thus, ICU admission dynamics are very
different across hospitals: Some of them have relatively small, near-term discount factors –
focusing primarily on the individual patient in front of them – while others have relatively
large, longer-term discount factors – accounting for the impact of their current decisions on
the ability to treat other patients later. Such heterogeneity in the discount factor reflects
the behavioral variation across hospitals.
As we have discussed before, there is much debate on how much hospitals internalize
the intertemporal externalities when making admission decisions, and supporting evidence
exists for both near versus longer term aspects of their behaviors. On one hand, physicians
are trained to provide timely and appropriate care to their patients. On the other hand,
hospitals need to manage the occupancy level in the often congested ICU to reserve enough
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of structural model by individual hospital
Discount Factor Low Severity High Severity
Hosp Num. of periods V̂ 2̂F,; 2̂A ,; 2̂F,ℎ 2̂A ,ℎ '2
1 8,016 0.3∗∗∗ 0.015 −1.490∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗ 0.20
(0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.048) (0.043)
2 6,012 0.5∗∗∗ 0.001 −1.465∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.010) (0.017) (0.024) (0.047) (0.051)
3 8,016 0.1∗∗∗ 0.124∗ −2.558∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ −1.185∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.019) (0.051) (0.040) (0.128) (0.065)
4 8,016 0.4∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ −2.307∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ −0.798∗∗∗ 0.21
(0.010) (0.024) (0.029) (0.046) (0.039)
5 6,924 0.1∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.023) (0.046) (0.037) (0.107) (0.072)
6 8,016 0.2∗∗∗ 0.077∗ −1.904∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ −0.531∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.014) (0.030) (0.027) (0.063) (0.046)
7 6,948 0.9∗∗∗ 1.755∗∗∗ −2.687∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ −1.453∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.016) (0.047) (0.075) (0.093) (0.095)
8 7,848 0.1∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ −1.446∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.020) (0.034) (0.026) (0.062) (0.048)
9 6,180 0.5∗∗∗ 0.000 −1.745∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ −0.707∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.009) (0.017) (0.025) (0.048) (0.048)
10 7,320 0.1∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ −2.339∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.027) (0.067) (0.046) (0.160) (0.081)
11 8,016 0.9∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ −1.774∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ −0.104 0.08
(0.017) (0.036) (0.064) (0.088) (0.106)
12 4,668 0.6∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ −2.121∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.052) (0.068)
13 8,016 0.1∗∗∗ 0.044 −2.229∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.018) (0.043) (0.035) (0.088) (0.052)
14 8,016 0.3∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ −1.951∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ −0.662∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.012) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.042)
15 6,912 0.1∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ −2.155∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗∗ −0.762∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.033) (0.074) (0.042) (0.195) (0.075)
16 8,016 0.1∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ −2.319∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ −1.005∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.020) (0.050) (0.039) (0.108) (0.063)
17 6,588 0.9∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ −2.065∗∗∗ 1.530∗∗∗ −0.660∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.021) (0.049) (0.067) (0.077) (0.085)
18 8,016 0.4∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ −2.358∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ −1.005∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.013) (0.033) (0.039) (0.099) (0.070)
19 6,576 0.1∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ −1.809∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.029) (0.057) (0.035) (0.126) (0.058)
20 8,004 0.3∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗ −2.260∗∗∗ 1.335∗∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.017) (0.041) (0.042) (0.115) (0.078)
21 4,008 0.7∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ −2.002∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ −0.240∗ 0.13
(0.012) (0.030) (0.064) (0.071) (0.111)
22 4,008 0.3∗∗∗ 0.000 −1.513∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ −0.175 0.11
(0.025) (0.047) (0.051) (0.116) (0.099)
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. The second column
reports the number of periods (two-hour snapshots) in each hospital, and the last column provides the
McFadden’s pseudo '2.
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capacity for future, perhaps more severe patients. Moreover, effectively accounting for the
future can be difficult as members of the hospitals (e.g. physicians and administrators) are
rarely trained to think about the complex system dynamics that arise in hospitals. Our
findings show that both immediate and future considerations can influence the hospital’s
behavior, and the overall effect can vary substantially across hospitals. This finding reveals
an important behavioral perspective of the decision-making process for ICU admission and
provides additional explanation for observed practice variation, which has received much
attention from medical professionals in recent literature (Westert et al., 2018; Corallo et al.,
2014). Indeed, a number of studies suggest that identifying the patients that will benefit
from ICU care is highly subjective and depends on a physician’s own training and experience
(Fisher et al. (2004), Mullan (2004), O’Connor et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2012)); our work
suggests that some of the variation observed in practice may also be due to variations in
how hospitals internalize intertemporal externalities.
The pattern of estimated non-ICU admission and waiting costs in Table 3.4 are very
similar to that for all hospitals combined. Most of the waiting costs are significant and
positive, including 17 out of 22 estimates for 2̂F,; and all estimates for 2̂F,ℎ. The non-ICU
admission costs are all significant and negative, except for 2̂A ,ℎ of Hospital 11 and 22. In most
cases, the non-ICU admission and waiting costs for high severity class are significantly higher
than those for low severity class. The costs estimates vary substantially across hospitals.
Recall these parameters represent the average costs measured relative to the ICU admission
decision in each hospital. Such variation suggests that there is large heterogeneity across
hospitals in their medical resources and the degree of severity of their patient population.
Using the estimated discount factors and cost parameters, we can show our structural
model is able to capture the relationship between ICU admission probability and ICU occu-
pancy observed in Figure 3.1. As an illustrative example, we consider a representative ED
state with =
;,C
= b&;/2c and =ℎ,C = 1, i.e., several low severity class patients and one high
severity patient3. We focus on the ICU admission probability for the high severity class
patient, who is more likely to be admitted to the ICU. We compute the reduction in her




admission probability as the ICU occupancy moves from half full to almost full; that is,
AdmDrop = Pr
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) . (3.20)
We find the ICU state has a substantial impact on the ICU admission decision. As summa-
rized in Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.3, on average, the hospitals see a 11% relative drop in
the ICU admission probability as the ICU becomes almost full. Such drop can be as large as
17% for some hospitals. We also find the relative drop and estimated V̂ are highly correlated.
Their correlation is 0.557, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, hospitals
with larger discount factors are indeed more sensitive to the ICU occupancy level when
admitting patients to the ICU. This relationship confirms that the discount factors in our
structural model capture how the hospitals balance near versus longer term considerations
in ICU admission decisions.
3.5.1.2 Goodness-of-Fit for Structural Model
While the structural model can help bring behavioral insights into the hospitals’ deci-
sions, it is important to check whether the estimated model fits the data well. In this section,
we show our structural model provides good estimates to both the hospitals’ decisions and
the system states.
First, we compare the explanatory power for the hospitals’ decisions, as measured by the
McFadden’s pseudo '2 in (3.18), from our structural model with that from the reduced-form
multinomial logistic regression model in Appendix C.1. The results are shown in Figure 3.5.
Our structural model has comparable or higher McFadden’s pseudo '2 to the comprehensive
multinomial logistic model for most hospitals. The average McFadden’s pseudo '2 in the
structural model is also close to the combined hospital multinomial logistic model (0.14
versus 0.16). The '2 values are not very high in both models. This is not too surprising as
the hospitals consider many factors that are not recorded in the data when making admission
decisions; that is, the decisions appear very “noisy” in the data. We note that the multinomial
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of McFadden’s pseudo '2 from structural and multinomial models




















Note: The red dotted and blue solid lines report the McFadden’s pseudo '2 for each hospital from the
structural model and the multinomial model, respectively.
model contains most variables one could expect to influence admission decisions, including
patient’s characteristics (gender, age, and three severity scores), system states (ED and ICU
occupancy, departures in previous period, and average ICU severity level), as well as various
dummies for seasonality fixed effects (time of day, day of week, and month of the sample).
On the other hand, our structural model is quite parsimonious with only five free parameters
(discount factor and costs parameters), but is still able to explain similar (or more) variation
in the data. Thus, our structural model appears to have reasonable explanatory power in
capturing the hospitals’ decisions. Of course, we acknowledge that there is still quite a bit
of variation that our data cannot capture (e.g. perhaps due to availability of system-level
interventions to increase capacity or stabilize and treat patients outside of the ICU.
With a small number of parameters, overfitting is unlikely to be an issue for our structural
model. To further address goodness-of-fit, we divide the sample to first and second halves
for each hospital. We then estimate the structure model with all hospitals combined using
the first half sample, and do out-of-sample prediction on the second half sample. The
McFadden’s pseudo '2 from the out-of-sample prediction is very similar to the in-sample
estimation (0.14 vs 0.13). Moreover, it is close to the level estimated from the full sample
(0.14) in Table 3.3.
Next, we show by simulation that our structural model produces system statistics close
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to those observed in the data. As the arrival and departure rates are directly calibrated
from data, we expect the average number of arrivals and departures in each period of
our structural model to be close to that observed in the data. Therefore, we focus on
other important system statistics including the average ICU occupancy, overall proportion
admitted to the ICU (i.e., #*/(#* + #=>=* )), as well as the ED waiting times of
each patient class. The statistics estimated from our structural model are averaged over
100 simulation runs. Each run contains the same number of periods as in the data plus
an additional three-month warm up period to allow the system to reach steady-state. The
warm up period is dropped when computing the system statistics. The comparison of the
system statistics is shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of system statistics from structural model and real data



















Wait time (low class)





Wait time (high class)
Note: The figure compares the system statistics simulated from the structural model (y-coordinate) and
observed from the real data (x-coordinate).
In each panel, each point represents a hospital in our study; its x-coordinate (y-coordinate)
corresponds to the observed (simulated) value of the system statistic. We plot the 45-degree
line in each panel, which represents a perfect fit. As we can see, most points fall close to the
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identity line, implying that our estimated structural model produces system statistics that
are close to the observed data. Although our structural model is trained to fit the choice
probabilities of the hospital’s actions, it also leads to system dynamics that fit a number of
observed metrics very well. This further supports its effectiveness in modeling the admission
process for ED patients.
3.5.1.3 Heterogeneity in Discount Factors
We have seen in the previous section there is large heterogeneity in the discount factors
across hospitals, i.e., some hospitals appear to be relatively focused on the near-term in
making admission decisions, while others appear to consider more longer-term dynamics.
Such heterogeneity in the perceived discout factor is important for understanding system-
level admission decisions. There are many potential reasons for this heterogeneity, such as
the different physicians and administrators in the hospital as well as system-level factors
(e.g. the ability to flex capacity and/or the amount of demand from other sources) which
differentially influence the occupancy challenges at each hospital. In this section, we look
into the heterogeneity in discount factors in more depth. We identify possible reasons that
explain the heterogeneity, and examine how the heterogeneity impacts system performance.
We start by computing the correlations between the estimated discount factors and other
system statistics across the 22 hospitals. The results are shown in Table 3.5. We show the
correlations between V̂ and the observed ICU departure rate ` , average ICU occupancy
level, average ED waiting time EDWait8 for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}, and the increase in waiting time for
admitted patients due to ICU congestion, i.e., ΔEDWait_Adm8. This increase is defined as
the difference between average ED waiting time of patients admitted to the ICU when the
occupancy level is below the 70th percentile versus when it is above the 95th percentile.
It is not obvious ex-ante in which direction ICU congestion impacts the hospitals’ ad-
mission behaviors. On one hand, when the ICU is busy, hospitals have to be more judicious
when making bed allocation decisions as access issues could substantially jeopardize quality
of care, which suggests they should be more forward-looking when making decisions. For
example, if the hospital expects the ICU will be highly congested, they may choose to save
some ICU beds for future (potentially sicker) patients by delaying the admission of current
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Table 3.5: Correlations between estimated discount factor, V̂, and system statistics from
data





−0.428∗ 0.445∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.581∗∗ 0.475∗ 0.566∗∗
∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01 and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. Correlations between estimated discount factor and the
observed ICU departure rate (` ), ICU occupancy (ICUOccu), average ED waiting time (EDWait8),
and increase in ED waiting time for admitted patients under ICU congestion (ΔEDWait_Adm8).
ED patients. On the other hand, busier ICUs also tends to have more external arrivals,
such as non-ED surgical patients. This introduces increased competing demand for ICU
beds from external arrivals, which may reduce the hospital’s motivation or ability to save
ICU beds for future ED patients (the cohort for which our model captures) as the beds will
likely be utilized by external arrivals. Our results suggest that, on average, the first effect
dominates the second: hospitals with lower ICU departure rates or higher ICU occupancy
levels tend to have larger discount factors and these hospitals tend to be more congested.
One possible explanation is that the majority of the external arrivals (> 70%) are surgical
patients whose ICU beds are often reserved in advance to accommodate their post-surgery
recovery, so hospitals may not necessarily account for the competing demand from external
arrivals when making ICU admission decisions.
We also find that the discount factors are positively correlated with the average ED
waiting time of both classes. This makes sense as hospitals who account more for the
longer-term are more likely to save beds for future patients, thereby increasing the waiting
time of some ED patients.
The discount factors are also positively correlated with the increase in ED waiting time
for admitted patients when the ICU is congested. This is not surprising because hospitals
with longer-term discounting behaviors tend to be more sensitive to ICU congestion when
making admission decisions and are more likely to delay patients when the unit is congested.
These results are consistent with the relationship between V̂ and the relative admission
probability drop (3.20) discussed at the end of Section 3.5.1.1. These results lend further
support that our structural model is able to capture the intertemporal externalities on
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admission decisions.
3.5.1.4 Robustness Check: Estimation with Stratified Sample
In the above estimation, we assume the model parameters are constant for the entire
sample. To address potential seasonality issues, we also estimate the structural model with
stratified sample based on flu vs non-flu seasons, as well as day and night periods. The flu
season ranges from November to March, and the non-flu season includes the rest. The day
periods include the twelve hours from 7AM to 7PM. We re-estimate the ED arrival rates
_&,; and _&,ℎ, external ICU arrival rate _ , and ICU departure rate ` for each stratified
sample. The ED and ICU capacities &;, &ℎ, and  are set as those for the full sample in
Table 3.2.
We first estimate the structural model for all hospitals combined with the stratified
samples. The results are shown in Table 3.6. We can see the estimated parameters are close
to those estimated by the full sample in Table 3.3. In particular, the estimated discount
factor is 0.4 for the flu season and 0.2 for the non-flu season, which are close to V̂ = 0.3 of
the full sample. Additionally, the discount factor is estimated to be 0.4 for the day sample,
which is also close to that of the full sample. The discount factor is estimated to be lower
(V̂ = 0.1) for the night sample. This can be explained as the night time has much lower
arrival and departure rates, as well as fewer staffs than the day time. Thus the hospitals
may be more near-term focused and admit patients more quickly compared with the day
time.
We then estimate the structural model for each hospital separately with the stratified
data. We find the heterogeneity in discount factors estimated from the stratified data
is consistent with that from the full sample given in Table 3.4. In particular, the across-
hospital correlations between the estimated V̂ from stratified and full sample are significantly
positive, which are given in Table 3.7. Importantly, the the main, high level takeaway
from the structural model is robust to accounting for these potential temporal variations:
1) hospitals on average are not very forward-looking when making decisions; 2) there is
substantial heterogeneity in the discount factors across hospitals.
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Table 3.6: Estimation of structural model with stratified data: All hospitals combined
Size Discount factor Low Severity High Severity
# V̂ 2̂F,; 2̂A ,; 2̂F,ℎ 2̂A ,ℎ '
2
Flu 60,031 0.4∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −1.936∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ −0.674∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.019)
Non-flu 108,737 0.2∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ −1.960∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ −0.670∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023) (0.016)
Day 84,372 0.4∗∗∗ 0.001 −2.006∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ −0.655∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018)
Night 84,396 0.1∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −1.875∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ −0.684∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.024) (0.016)
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
Table 3.7: Correlation between V̂ from stratified
and full sample
Sample Flu Non-flu Day Night
Correlation 0.87∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.46∗
∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
3.6 Counterfactual Simulations
One of the most important advantages of using the structural estimation approach is the
ability to conduct counterfactual studies via simulation. This allows us to evaluate the effect
of different policies or interventions that cannot be directly observed in the data or through
reduced-form regression analyses, which – at best – only provides local treatment effects.
We consider operational and behavioral counterfactual studies. The counterfactual results
can provide insights into the impact from various interventions on medical and economic
outcomes and system performance metrics.
In the first operational counterfactual, we measure the impact of adding one bed in ICU
while assuming the hospitals’ behaviors remain unchanged. That is, we increase the ICU
capacity by one in each hospital, and use the estimated structural model (discount factors
and costs parameters) to predict the hospitals’ decisions. This enables us to quantify the
change in system statistics from adding one bed in ICU. Note that for small hospitals,
adding a single ICU bed can increase capacity by up to 14%, which is a large enough change
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that it is unreasonable to expect that the local, marginal effects captured by a reduced form
regression analysis are sufficient to make projections on how this extra bed will impact the
performance measures of interest. While increasing ICU capacity naturally reduces ICU
congestion, such a change requires substantial capital investments (e.g. up to $1.1 million
per year estimated from the $4302 daily expense in Franzini et al. (2011)). In the second
operational study, we keep the ICU capacity unchanged and decrease external arrivals to the
ICU by 5% or 10%. As more than 60% of external arrivals to ICU are surgical patients, a
decrease in external arrival rates implies fewer surgical cases performed by the hospital. This
can be very costly to implement, as surgical cases can contribute up to a half of hospitals’
revenue (McDermott et al., 2017). Thus a 10% decrease in external arrival rates would
translate to 5% loss in hospital’s total revenue, which can be crucial as many hospitals in
US are financially strained.
In the last counterfactual study, we focus on a behavioral change. We keep the ICU
capacity and external arrival rate unchanged and consider the hypothetical situation where
the hospital is made to incorporate longer-term impacts of their decisions when making
their admission decisions. In particular, we quantify the impact on system statistics as the
hospitals increase their discount factors from the current estimated levels to V = 0.9 without
introducing any change in the medical resources and system workloads. We measure such
impact relative to that from adding an ICU bed or decreasing external arrival rate.
Finally, while increasing the discount factor seems abstract in practice, we discuss po-
tential ways for hospitals to implement such change. Moreover, we show the benefit of
increasing discount factor can be largely obtained by a simple heuristic policy that mimics
the actions from the structural model.
In all the counterfactual studies, the statistics are computed from the average of 100
simulation runs. Each run has the same number of periods as in the data plus a three-
month warm up period. The system statistics we are interested in are related to the impact
of high ICU congestion. In particular, we consider the probability of high ICU congestion,











i.e, the proportion of periods with only one or no empty bed(s) in the ICU. High ICU
congestion is known to be associated with worse medical outcomes such as higher mortality,
longer hospital length-of-stay, and higher risk from postoperative complications (Gattinoni
et al. (2004), Hugonnet et al. (2007), and Gabler et al. (2013)); this may be due, for example,
to reduced likelihood of ICU admission (Kim et al., 2015) or increased likelihood of demand-
driven discharges (Kc and Terwiesch, 2012).
We also examine the probability of the ICU being full. This impacts the likelihood of
external arrivals balking upon arrival because there are no ICU beds available.









We estimate the absolute and relative impact of each intervention on the probability
of high ICU congestion and the probability of external arrivals balking. Recall that each
period in our structural model corresponds to a two hour interval. We provide a conservative
estimate for the number of ICU patients who spend their ICU stay under highly congested
states by
Pats HighCgstn = Pr(HighCgstn) × 365 × 12 × ` × ( − 1).
The first three components provide an estimate for the total number of high congestion
periods in a year. We divide this by the average LOS of each patient, 1/` periods, to
estimate the number of patients each bed can serve during the high congestion periods in a
year. Since there is at most one bed available during the high congestion periods, putting
everything together gives an estimate for the number of patients that are exposed to high
congestion periods. Using a similar argument, the number of external arrivals who balk is
estimated by
Pats Balk = Pr(Balk|External Arrival) × 365 × 12 × _ , (3.23)
where _ is the external arrival rate in each period.
3.6.1 Adding One ICU Bed
We start by studying the impact of adding one more bed in ICU. In particular, we focus
on the impact on ICU congestion when keeping the arrival and service rates fixed. Due to
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the size of the ICUs in our study, the addition of one bed has very limited impact on the
average ICU occupancy level. The results are shown in Table 3.9. We see adding one bed in
the ICU indeed leads to substantial reductions in ICU congestion. The relative drops in high
ICU congestion and balking probabilities are greater than 30% in most cases. While not
reported here, the standard deviations computed from simulation confirm all the differences
are statistically significant at the 1% level. For some hospitals, such reduction translates
to 20 fewer days and 50 fewer patients exposed to high ICU congestion, as well as 10 more
external arrivals admitted in each year. As the patients who require ICU care are usually
very unstable, the observed effects have the potential to lead to large improvements for their
medical outcomes.
Next, we look into how the benefit of adding one bed in ICU varies across hospitals. Table
3.8 reports the correlations of the three measures (ΔDays HighCgstn, ΔPats HighCgstn, and
ΔPats Balking in Table 3.9) with the average ICU occupancy levels and estimated discount
factors across 22 hospitals. All three effect measures are positively correlated with both the
ICU occupancy levels and discount factors. This relationship also holds when we perform
a simple linear regression for the three effect measures with both estimated discount factor
and average ICU occupancy level as independent variables. The results suggest the benefit
from adding one ICU bed is more significant for ICUs with higher occupancy and/or for
hospitals that are more longer-term looking.
Table 3.8: Correlations between impact of one bed on ICU congestion and ICU occupancy
or V̂
ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
ICUOccu 0.354 0.737∗∗ 0.732∗∗
V̂ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.520∗ 0.602∗∗
Note: ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
3.6.2 Decreasing External Arrivals to the ICU
We next study the impact of decreasing the external arrival rate to the ICU. We keep the
ICU capacity unchanged and decrease the external arrival rate _ by 5% and 10%. Then
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Table 3.9: Counterfactual estimates of impact when adding one bed in ICU
Hosp V̂ ΔPr(HighCgstn) Relative ΔPr(Balk) Relative ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
(in % points) ΔPr(HighCgstn) (in % points) ΔPr(Balk) (in # days) (in # patients) (in # patients)
1 0.3 1.72 0.35 0.61 0.39 6.27 52.26 6.73
2 0.5 1.86 0.25 0.72 0.27 6.78 52.78 8.43
3 0.1 1.66 0.54 0.48 0.56 6.06 23.82 2.11
4 0.4 1.16 0.31 0.38 0.31 4.22 47.08 8.63
5 0.1 5.13 0.38 1.87 0.39 18.74 68.04 8.84
6 0.2 0.75 0.42 0.20 0.37 2.73 23.77 2.42
7 0.9 6.36 0.35 2.57 0.38 23.23 84.04 21.20
8 0.1 2.99 0.38 1.14 0.42 10.90 64.88 7.92
9 0.5 2.36 0.32 0.88 0.35 8.60 78.61 13.57
10 0.1 2.25 0.53 0.76 0.60 8.23 51.80 7.56
11 0.9 7.39 0.49 2.70 0.54 26.98 56.65 6.61
12 0.6 1.66 0.30 0.59 0.31 6.06 43.17 7.67
13 0.1 0.64 0.51 0.20 0.57 2.34 11.65 0.95
14 0.3 0.65 0.24 0.24 0.28 2.36 25.90 5.26
15 0.1 0.23 0.60 0.06 0.61 0.85 4.77 0.30
16 0.1 0.69 0.56 0.20 0.56 2.52 12.07 0.95
17 0.9 5.90 0.40 2.28 0.45 21.54 50.58 6.60
18 0.4 0.18 0.44 0.05 0.42 0.65 8.24 1.16
19 0.1 0.02 0.41 0.01 0.56 0.08 0.75 0.09
20 0.3 0.26 0.63 0.05 0.52 0.94 3.91 0.15
21 0.7 4.55 0.40 1.97 0.47 16.61 59.02 11.97
22 0.3 2.26 0.39 0.95 0.46 8.27 42.31 7.59
Note: Counterfactual simulation result from adding one ICU bed: The third and fourth columns report the absolute and relative drops in high congestion
probability in (3.21); the fifth and sixth columns report the absolute and relative drops in balking probability in (3.22). The last three columns report
the equivalent numbers of days and patients affected in a year.
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we use counterfactual simulation to estimate the reductions in the probabilities of high ICU
congestion (3.21) and balking (3.22).
The estimation results on ICU congestion reduction from decreasing _ are reported
in Table 3.10 (5% decrease). The results for a 10% decrease are included in Table C.5 of
Appendix C.2.3. Decreasing external arrival rates can significantly reduce ICU congestion.
The average relative drop in high ICU congestion probability is 19% for when _ decreases
by 5%, and 34% when _ decreases by 10%. For some hospitals, such reduction translates to
10 fewer days and 50 fewer patients exposed to high ICU congestion per year. The reduction
in numbers of external arrivals who balk is also substantial: a 5% (resp. 10%) decrease in
external arrival rate can lead to 10 (resp. 20) fewer patients who cannot be admitted due
to full ICU. This reduction is due to both a smaller _ that reduces the total number of
external arrivals as well as a lower balking probability Pr(Balk|External Arrival) as the ICU
is less congested.
3.6.3 Increasing the Discount Factor
The operational interventions discussed above can significantly reduce congestion, but
are very costly to implement and may lead to substantial financial strain. We now consider
the potential impact of modifying the hospital’s behavior. As discussed earlier, hospitals
are typically not trained to manage their patients with a system-level view; our estimation
results suggest they tend to be more near-term focused when making ICU admission deci-
sions. That said, we found that some hospitals were more forward looking. Hence, we wish
to estimate what might happen if the hospitals were provided with the right support and
information to enable them to account more for the longer-term when making admissions
decisions. While it might not be possible to alter the discount factor of all hospitals, this
experiment provides some insight into what might be possible if the discount factor could
be nudged higher as well as what could happen if the hospitals had more sophisticated
strategies to deal with congestion. Additionally, we will also discuss some practical ways to
potentially achieve these savings.
The specific counterfactual which we consider is to keep the ICU capacity and external
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Table 3.10: Counterfactual estimates of impact when _ decreases by 5%
Hosp V̂ ΔPr(HighCgstn) Relative ΔPr(Balk) Relative ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
(in % points) ΔPr(HighCgstn) (in % points) ΔPr(Balk) (in # days) (in # patients) (in # patients)
1 0.3 0.79 0.16 0.32 0.20 2.90 24.15 4.19
2 0.5 1.02 0.14 0.34 0.13 3.72 28.96 5.27
3 0.1 0.70 0.23 0.21 0.24 2.55 10.02 1.07
4 0.4 1.06 0.29 0.35 0.29 3.88 43.28 8.94
5 0.1 1.29 0.10 0.57 0.12 4.71 17.11 3.71
6 0.2 0.38 0.21 0.12 0.23 1.38 12.07 1.76
7 0.9 2.59 0.14 1.09 0.16 9.47 34.24 11.30
8 0.1 0.96 0.12 0.36 0.13 3.52 20.95 3.30
9 0.5 1.54 0.21 0.58 0.23 5.61 51.25 10.44
10 0.1 0.88 0.21 0.28 0.22 3.22 20.30 3.25
11 0.9 1.71 0.11 0.72 0.15 6.23 13.08 2.29
12 0.6 1.16 0.21 0.43 0.22 4.25 30.24 6.59
13 0.1 0.27 0.22 0.07 0.21 1.00 4.98 0.42
14 0.3 0.93 0.35 0.32 0.36 3.40 37.44 7.52
15 0.1 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.50 0.03
16 0.1 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.20 0.87 4.14 0.41
17 0.9 1.21 0.08 0.69 0.14 4.41 10.35 2.64
18 0.4 0.17 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.62 7.79 1.40
19 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.17 0.05
20 0.3 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.03
21 0.7 1.40 0.12 0.82 0.19 5.09 18.10 6.01
22 0.3 1.43 0.24 0.69 0.33 5.22 26.72 6.02
Note: Counterfactual simulation result from decreasing external arrival rates _ by 5%: The third and fourth columns report the absolute and relative
drops in high congestion probability in (3.21); the fifth and sixth columns report the absolute and relative drops in balking probability in (3.22). The last
three columns report the equivalent numbers of days and patients affected in a year.
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arrival unchanged, and increase the discount factors from the current estimated levels to
0.9. Practically, this corresponds to the hospital caring about the decision costs and system
states over the next one to two days (0.912 ≈ 0.28), rather than the next six hours, which
was the average behavior implied by Table 3.3. Note that for some hospitals, the estimated
V̂ is already 0.9, so this counterfactual has no impact on their system dynamics.
We summarize the impact of increasing V on ICU congestion in Table 3.12. We see
increasing V alone can have substantial effect on reducing ICU congestion. For some hospi-
tals, the relative drops in the probability of high ICU congestion and balking are more than
20% as the hospital shifts towards longer-term discounting. This translates to significant
improvement in terms of the frequency of high ICU congestion as well balking of external
arrivals.
To facilitate comparisons, in Table 3.11, we summarize the reductions in ICU congestion
for Hospitals 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 14 from different types of interventions: increasing V̂ to 0.9,
adding one ICU bed, and decreasing the external arrival rate by 5% and 10%. We notice
that for these hospitals, the impact of increasing V can be comparable to adding one ICU bed
or decreasing external arrivals by 5 – 10%. This highlights the importance of understanding
how the hospitals internalize the intertemporal externalities on ICU admission decisions,
and reveals a potential approach for hospitals to reduce ICU congestion, i.e., providing their
hospitals more tools and skills to manage and react to congestion.
Table 3.11: Comparison of effects from different counterfactual interventions (select hospi-
tals)
Hosp ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
V̂ ↑  ↑ _ ↓ _ ↓↓ V̂ ↑  ↑ _ ↓ _ ↓↓ V̂ ↑  ↑ _ ↓ _ ↓↓
1 3.85 6.27 2.90 4.93 32.12 52.26 24.15 41.11 4.67 6.73 4.19 6.37
2 5.79 6.78 3.72 7.90 45.04 52.78 28.96 61.43 7.59 8.42 5.27 11.13
5 6.21 18.74 4.71 8.06 22.56 68.04 17.11 29.28 3.38 8.88 3.71 5.78
8 6.27 10.90 3.52 6.57 37.32 64.88 20.95 39.08 5.15 7.94 3.30 5.98
9 5.50 8.60 5.61 10.02 50.25 78.61 51.25 91.62 8.91 13.56 10.44 17.29
14 1.56 2.36 3.40 5.33 17.11 25.90 37.44 58.57 3.02 5.27 7.52 11.58
Note: Reductions in days of high ICU congestion (ΔDays HighCgstn), patients with highly congested ICU stay (ΔPats
HighCgstn), and external arrival patients who balk (ΔPats Balk) from four types of interventions: the V̂ ↑ denotes
increasing V̂ from estimated level to 0.9;  ↑ denotes adding one ICU bed; _ ↓ and _ ↓↓ denote decreasing the
external arrival rate by 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.12: Counterfactual estimates of impact when V increases from the estimated V̂ to 0.9
Hosp V̂ ΔPr(HighCgstn) Relative ΔPr(Balk) Relative ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
(in % points) ΔPr(HighCgstn) (in % points) ΔPr(Balk) (in # days) (in # patients) (in # patients)
1 0.3 1.06 0.22 0.42 0.27 3.85 32.12 4.67
2 0.5 1.59 0.21 0.65 0.25 5.79 45.04 7.59
3 0.1 0.38 0.12 0.11 0.13 1.38 5.41 0.48
4 0.4 0.34 0.09 0.11 0.09 1.25 13.98 2.45
5 0.1 1.70 0.13 0.71 0.15 6.21 22.56 3.38
6 0.2 0.41 0.23 0.14 0.26 1.49 12.98 1.69
7 0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.1 1.72 0.22 0.74 0.27 6.27 37.32 5.15
9 0.5 1.51 0.20 0.58 0.23 5.50 50.25 8.91
10 0.1 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.96 6.04 0.57
11 0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.6 0.62 0.11 0.28 0.15 2.25 16.00 3.70
13 0.1 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.57 2.82 0.08
14 0.3 0.43 0.16 0.14 0.16 1.56 17.11 3.02
15 0.1 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.21 1.18 0.03
16 0.1 0.26 0.21 0.08 0.23 0.94 4.48 0.39
17 0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 0.4 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.12 1.51 0.18
19 0.1 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.47 0.00
20 0.3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03
21 0.7 0.12 0.01 0.35 0.08 0.45 1.59 2.16
22 0.3 0.34 0.06 0.15 0.07 1.24 6.35 1.22
Note: Counterfactual simulation result from increasing discount factor from current estimated level (V̂) to 0.9: The third and fourth columns report
the absolute and relative drops in high congestion probability in (3.21); the fifth and sixth columns report the absolute and relative drops in balking
probability in (3.22). The last three columns report the equivalent numbers of days and patients affected in a year.
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While increasing V helps to reduce ICU congestion, it may also lead to longer ED wait-
ing time as hospitals would reduce the likelihood of ICU admission as the unit gets more
congested. This potentially undesirable effect can also be quantified by our structural model
via simulation. In Table 3.13, we show the increase in average ED waiting time for the two
classes of patients as V increases to 0.9, denoted by ΔEDWait; and ΔEDWaitℎ respectively.
We also compute the difference in average ED waiting time between the two classes at the
estimated V̂ and V = 0.9. A larger V indeed increases the average ED waiting time for both
classes of patients. For example, as V increases from 0.3 to 0.9 in Hospital 1, the average
ED waiting time increases by two hours and 36 minutes (0.6 hour) for low and high severity
classes, respectively. However, the magnitude of the impact is very different for the two
classes. Comparing ΔEDWait; and ΔEDWaitℎ, we see the increase in ED waiting time is
much more significant for patients in the low severity class than for those in the high severity
class. This can be interpreted as follows: As V increases, hospitals tend to reduce the prob-
ability of ICU admission and thus increase waiting times. When they do so, they generally
prefer to delay the admissions of patients from the low severity class rather than those from
high severity class, as the latter on average have higher waiting costs and are more likely to
eventually be admitted to the ICU.
Next, we look into the difference in ED waiting times of the two classes, EDWait; -
EDWaitℎ, evaluated at the estimated V̂ and V = 0.9. The average ED waiting times for
the two classes are very close at the estimated V̂. As seen in Section 3.5.1.2, the average
waiting time of 1.27 hours (low severity) and 1.42 hours (high severity) produced by our
structural model approximates the observed data very well. When V increases to 0.9, the
average ED waiting time for the low severity class becomes significantly longer than that
for the high severity class in most hospitals. As the hospital accounts more for the longer-
term (i.e. the discount factor increases), they tend to actively differentiate across the two
classes by admitting high severity patients more quickly and having low severity patients
wait longer. Such behavior may partially offset the negative impact of longer ED waiting
times, by disproportionately impacting the less severe patients.
We also find there is little impact of V on the overall admission probability, i.e., the
proportion of patients eventually admitted to ICU. This is because the overall admission
136
Table 3.13: Relationship of ED waiting time with V (measured in hours)
Hosp Estimated V̂
EDWait; − EDWaitℎ Change V from V̂→ 0.9
V = V̂ V = 0.9 ΔEDWait; ΔEDWaitℎ
1 0.3 −0.09 1.33 2.05 0.63
2 0.5 −0.03 1.19 1.84 0.63
3 0.1 0.01 1.31 1.59 0.29
4 0.4 −0.10 0.81 1.33 0.42
5 0.1 −0.05 1.26 1.75 0.44
6 0.2 −0.08 1.11 1.70 0.50
7 0.9 −0.06 −0.06 0.00 0.00
8 0.1 −0.15 0.46 1.36 0.76
9 0.5 −0.04 1.02 1.55 0.49
10 0.1 −0.03 0.43 0.73 0.26
11 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
12 0.6 −0.33 0.10 1.15 0.71
13 0.1 −0.02 1.67 2.08 0.38
14 0.3 −0.09 0.71 1.26 0.46
15 0.1 −0.01 0.24 0.37 0.11
16 0.1 −0.03 1.02 1.48 0.44
17 0.9 −0.17 −0.17 0.00 0.00
18 0.4 0.08 1.22 1.42 0.28
19 0.1 −0.02 0.26 0.45 0.16
20 0.3 0.06 1.63 1.90 0.33
21 0.7 −0.13 0.71 1.33 0.49
22 0.3 0.10 2.86 3.23 0.47
Note: This table reports the impact on ED waiting time from increasing discount factor
from current estimated level to 0.9: The third and fourth columns report the difference in
ED waiting time between the two classes (EDWait; − EDWaitℎ) at the estimated V̂ and
V = 0.9; the last two columns (ΔEDWait; and ΔEDWaitℎ) report the increase in ED waiting
time for the two classes of patients when V increases to 0.9.
probability primarily depends on the non-ICU admission costs and system workload. The
non-ICU admission costs measure the average relative effect of admitting the patient to
the ward compared with to the ICU, and the system workload determines the long-run
bed availability in the ICU. As both are unaffected by changes in V, the overall admission
probability also is practically unchanged as V varies. Thus, the primary impact of increasing
V is to “delay” admissions to periods when the ICU is less congested. This effectively reduces
the likelihood of high ICU congestion states but increases the ED waiting time. In a way,
increasing V smooths the load on the ICU.
We use Hospital 2 as an example to further illustrate the trade-off between reduction in
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ICU congestion states and longer ED waiting time. In Figure 3.8, we plot the probabilities
of high ICU congestion and balking versus the average ED waiting time for the two patient
classes, for each V ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. The points on each line from left to right represent
the results with V = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 respectively. The downward patterns again illustrate
the trade-off of increasing V: Larger V decreases the probabilities of high ICU congestion and
balking, but increases ED waiting time for both classes. Moreover, the increase in ED waiting
time is more significant for the low severity class, and the two classes are differentiated by
their average waiting time when V is large.
Figure 3.7: Counterfactual statistics for Hospital 2 with V = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 (from left to
right)
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Note: The left (resp. right) panel shows the high-congestion probability (resp. balking probability) versus
ED waiting time for the low (blue solid line) and high (red dotted line) severity patients at Hospital 2 with
V = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 (from left to right).
3.6.4 Practical ways for increasing the discount factor
While the intervention of increasing the discount factor may seem abstract, in some
instances there may be actionable approaches the hospitals can take to achieve the desired
behavior. Our estimation results demonstrate there are some hospitals that already demon-
strate forward-looking behavior (i.e. have large discount factors) when making decisions.
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Thus, it may be possible for other hospitals to do so with proper interventions.
There may be multiple reasons a hospital is not forward-thinking in making ICU admis-
sion decisions: 1) Conventional training has favored more myopic behaviors that focus on
the current patient. 2) Accurate state information is unavailable or not updated in a timely
way, e.g., the “occupancy information hurdle” studied in Kim et al. (2019). This makes it
impossible to make “correct” forward-looking decisions by taking system state into account.
3) There are other medical and operational constraints that hinder the hospital from acting
in a forward-looking manner. For example, shortage in nurse availability and inappropriate
levels of care in the ED may force the hospital to admit patients quickly and thus behave
“myopically”. The corresponding intervention to achieve more forward-looking behavior will
depend highly on the root cause of the more near-term looking behavior.
First, the hospital can educate the people involved (e.g., ED physicians, interventionists)
about the benefits of forward-looking behaviors and encourage them to act this way. For this
purpose, the counterfactual studies by our structural model can provide valuable evidence
and insight. Many hospitals lack real-time dashboards that track bed availability. If lack of
state information is contributing to near-term focused behavior, the hospital can improve
its information system or sharing process to make accurate system state available to people
involved in ICU admission decisions. Additionally, the hospital can develop and employ
more effective models to forecast the workload of ED and ICU (e.g., Xu and Chan (2016)
and Ang et al. (2016)). If other resource limitations drive the behaviors, the hospital can
take proactive measures in the ED to stabilize the patients and/or address these staffing
limitations. Indeed, it has been observed that providing higher level of care in the ED can
decrease the need for ICU and lead to better medical and economic outcomes (see, e.g.,
Huang (2004); Weingart et al. (2013); Haas et al. (2020))
We use a concrete example of two select hospitals to illustrate how increasing the discount
factor changes the admission behaviors. Figure 3.8 shows the ICU admission probability for
a single high-severity patient (=
;
= 0 and =ℎ

= 1) as the ICU occupancy varies from zero to
 − 1, i.e., only one empty bed, in Hospitals 1 and 9 at their respective estimated discount
factor V̂ (blue) and the intervention level V = 0.9 (red). As there is only one patient in the
ED, it is always permissible to admit the patient to the ICU. Thus, the change in admission
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Figure 3.8: Admission probability for a single high-severity patient at different ICU occu-
pancy levels






































probability reflects the response to different ICU states. First, the overall probability for
ICU admission in each period decreases, e.g., from 33.4% to 26.4% in Hospital 1 and 35.1%
to 32.5% in Hospital 19. Moreover, we see the hospitals react more to increases in the ICU
occupancy level when the discount factor increases to 0.9. To quantify this relationship, we
check the ICU occupancy level where the admission probability drops by one percentage
point, i.e.,
=drop = min{< : Pr(0ℎ,C = 1|=

C = <) ≤ Pr(0ℎ,C = 1|=C = 0) − 0.01}. (3.24)
At current estimated V̂, the level =drop is equal to the ICU capacity  for both hospitals
(i.e., =drop = 21 in Hospital 1 and =

drop = 25 in Hospital 19). That is, the hospitals will not
decrease their ICU admission probability (by up to one percentage point) before the ICU
gets full, at which point the admission probability naturally drops to zero. This shows the
current behaviors of the two hospitals are indeed near-term focused. On the other hand,
with the discount factor increases to 0.9, the level =drop becomes  − 2 for both hospitals
(i.e., =drop = 19 in Hospital 1 and =

drop = 23 in Hospital 19). This means the two hospitals
will decrease its ICU admission probability by more than one percentage point when there
are still two beds remaining in the ICU. Thus, with larger discount factor, the two hospitals
behave more forward-looking by responding to ICU congestion before the the ICU gets full.
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3.6.4.1 Mimicking Heuristic
As we observe some hospitals are forward looking, it may be possible to educate the
people involved in the ICU decision-making and/or providing higher levels of care in ED
and ward in order to achieve such behavior. While this may create an environment where the
hospital is open to changing behavior, it still does not provide concrete guidance on how to
achieve the desired performance. As such, we propose a simple heuristic policy that mimics
the policy from the structural model with V = 0.9. The heuristic is able to achieve most
of the benefits in reducing ICU congestion generated under the ‘optimal’ policy suggested
by the structural model. Crucially, the simplicity of this policy is easy to communicate to
clinicians and administrators, thereby helping to facilitate adoption.
For this heuristic policy, we assume the decisions are made independently for each patient
in the ED. The decision probabilities are restricted to be independent of the ED state and
can only change once with respect to the ICU state. The heuristic policy is implemented
as follows. We divide the ICU states to two regimes given a threshold in ICU occupancy
level )* . Thus, )* separates the ICU state into high versus low congestion states. The
probabilities for ICU admission, non-ICU admission, and ED waiting for each patient in
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where ] ∈ {;, ℎ} denote the patient severity classes. Note that when some of the actions are
not permissible given the ED and ICU states, e.g., not all ED patients can be admitted to
the ICU due to the capacity constraint, we normalize the probabilities of other permissible






for ] ∈ {;, ℎ} and
8 ∈ {1, 2}, as well as the threshold level )* are parameters to be estimated such that the
heuristic policy mimics the structural model with V = 0.9.
We estimate the heuristic policy for each hospital separately. We first use the structural
model with V = 0.9 to generate a large sample of state-action pairs for each hospital with
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100 simulation runs; each run contains the same number of periods as in the data plus a









for ] ∈ {;, ℎ} and 8 ∈ {1, 2} by a simple logit model with only intercepts that are
allowed to change across the two ICU state regimes (e.g. high versus low congestion). We
then search over all possible threshold values to find the one (together with the probabilities)
that maximizes the log-likelihood. In the estimation, we drop the periods when ICU is full,
as no ICU admissions are permissable in this state.
For illustrative purposes, we provide the estimated heuristic policy for the same six
hospitals in Table 3.11. The policies for the other hospitals are similar. The threshold
)* and the action probabilities for the low (= < )* ) and high ICU occupancy regimes
(= ≥ )* ) for each patient class are reported in Table 3.14. We observe the hospitals
change their action probabilities only when the ICU occupancy is relatively high, i.e., the
threshold )* is close to the capacity . When the ICU occupancy reaches the threshold,
the ICU admission probabilities for both types of patients drop. These observations reconcile
the patterns we observed in Figure 3.8 for the ICU admission probability when V = 0.9.
Table 3.14: Heuristic policy for select hospitals
Hosp  )*
Low severity patients High severity patients





































1 21 20 0.05 0.39 0.55 0.03 0.41 0.55 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.19 0.40 0.37
2 26 24 0.05 0.39 0.55 0.036 0.41 0.55 0.22 0.39 0.39 0.18 0.43 0.38
5 11 10 0.05 0.45 0.50 0.041 0.46 0.49 0.30 0.43 0.27 0.25 0.49 0.25
8 16 15 0.07 0.48 0.45 0.05 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.39 0.36 0.19 0.45 0.36
9 22 20 0.04 0.46 0.51 0.03 0.46 0.50 0.20 0.45 0.34 0.17 0.49 0.33
14 36 33 0.04 0.53 0.43 0.03 0.53 0.43 0.23 0.48 0.29 0.21 0.50 0.29
With the heuristic policy for each hospital, we can then measure its performance using
simulation. Table 3.15 reports the effects on ICU congestion reduction for the select hospitals
from the heuristic policy and those from increasing V to 0.9 as given in Table 3.12. We can
see the benefits in reducing ICU congestion from increasing V to 0.9 can be mostly obtained
by the heuristic policy. For some hospitals, the effects from the heuristic policy are even
slightly larger. Additionally, we note that the overall ICU admission probabilities and ED
waiting times for the two classes of patients, as well as the average occupancy level of ICU,
are almost unchanged under the heuristic policy compared to those under the structural
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model with V = 0.9. This suggests the hospitals could reduce ICU congestion safely by
being forward-thinking through the use of a simple policy that is easy to implement in
practice.
Table 3.15: Comparison of effects from the heuristic policy and increasing V to 0.9 (select hospitals)
Hosp V̂
Heuristic policy Structural model with V = 0.9
ΔDaysHighCgstn ΔPatsHighCgstn ΔPatsBalk ΔDaysHighCgstn ΔPatsHighCgstn ΔPatsBalk
1 0.3 3.38 28.20 4.27 3.85 32.12 4.67
2 0.5 6.64 50.12 8.73 5.79 45.04 7.59
5 0.1 5.24 19.02 3.11 6.21 22.56 3.38
8 0.1 5.45 32.41 4.62 6.27 37.32 5.15
9 0.5 6.36 58.22 10.56 5.50 50.25 8.91
14 0.3 1.73 19.07 3.54 1.56 17.11 3.02
Note: Reductions in days of high ICU congestion (ΔDays HighCgstn), patients with highly congested ICU stay (ΔPats
HighCgstn), and external arrival patients who balk (ΔPats Balk) from the heuristic policy and the structural model with
V = 0.9 for select hospitals.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
Clinical practice aims to provide the best care possible for each individual patient. That
said, it has also been well documented that ICU admission behaviors are impacted by ICU
congestion. In this work, we aim to understand if some of this practice variation could be
explained by perceived discounting behavior. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first to study how hospitals internalize intertemporal externalities – i.e., the admission
decision for a current patient impacts ICU congestion and possible other, future patients
– when making the dynamic ICU admission decision. While, on average, the hospitals
appear to be more focused on the near-term when making ICU admission decisions, we find
that there is large heterogeneity in the degree of forward-looking behavior across hospitals.
This suggests that some of the observed practice variation in how hospitals alter admission
behaviors in response to ICU congestion may be partially explained by the fact that hospitals
appear to internalize the intertemporal externalities very differently.
We use counterfactual simulations to show that if it were possible to increase the hos-
pital’s degree of forward-looking behavior alone, this can have a substantial impact on ICU
congestion and patient flow. For some hospitals, the effect of this change is comparable
to increasing the ICU capacity or decreasing external arrivals, which can be very capital
and space expensive. We provide a number of suggestions on how such behavioral change
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may be achieved in practice. For instance, we demonstrate a simple heuristic policy which
alters admission behavior once the ICU reaches a ‘high congestion state’ can achieve most of
the benefit in ICU congestion reduction that is generated by increasing the discount factor.
Despite the practical challenges in altering hospital behavior, our work suggests that how
hospitals respond to staffing and capacity shortages could benefit from a better understand-
ing of their forward-thinking behavior. This would also help the hospital better understand
the potential impact different strategies – e.g. better forecasting capabilities of demand
and/or patient severity – could have on patient flow.
Our study has several limitations that may shed light on future research directions.
First, the data we use have no direct information on the ICU admission decision process
– we can only observe the resulting outcome of where patients are admitted. Thus, while
we posit a structural model to capture various features which influence where patients are
admitted and when, there are many factors which are not explicitly included in the model
nor do we have data to understand their impact on the decisions. Second, the data is also
limited to hospitals within one healthcare system. It is possible that different payment
models may impact the manner in which hospitals internalize intertemporal externalities.
For instance, it is possible that under a purely Fee-For-Service system (rather than the
capitated system of KPNC), hospitals may be even more focused on the near-term. If this
is the case, our counterfactual results suggest that other hospital systems may benefit even
more from shifting to be more longer-term focused. Finally, all the ICUs in our study cohort
are closed, so that the attending intensivist has final say on which patients are admitted.
It is not clear how the hospital would internalize the intertemporal externalities in an open
ICU.
In order to focus on the identification of the intertemporal externalities – the discount
factor – we propose a parsimonious structural model. As ICU patient flow and admission
decisions are quite complex, it would be impossible to capture all features and still have a
tractable model and so we made a number of simplifications in our model. For example, we
assume constant patient arrival rates for ED patients, a homogeneous constant and state-
independent departure rate for all ICU patients, and we do not account for possible ICU
readmissions. As analysis of queueing systems with such features is an active area of research
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which often utilizes approximation approaches (e.g. fluid and/or infinite server models)
and/or asymptotic regimes, it would be interesting to see whether it would be possible to
incorporate such features into the structural model. This might require assuming that the
hospital must heuristically solve the dynamic optimization problem. Finally, this study
focuses on one aspect of the hospital’s behavior in ICU admission decisions – the degree of
internalization of the intertemporal externalities. However, there is evidence that there are
other adaptive behaviors – such as demand driven discharges (Kc and Terwiesch, 2012) – the
hospital may utilize when managing ICU beds. Such behavior may also affect or be affected
by the discount factor of the hospital. Thus, a potential future direction of research is to
study the joint impact of these various behavioral aspects of the hospital’s decision-making
on ICU capacity management.
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Chapter 4
Effects of Surgeon’s Daily Workload and Implications in Operating
Room Scheduling
4.1 Introduction
The relationship between system workload and service performance has drawn increasing
attention in the operations management community. Traditional operation models generally
assume service time is fixed and independent of the system workload (see e.g., Wolff (1989)
and Dallery and Gershwin (1992)). However, other research empirically shows that the ser-
vice time of human-involved systems can be endogenously impacted by the overall workload
(Schultz et al., 1998; Staats and Gino, 2012; Tan and Netessine, 2014). Such impacts are
particularly important in the field of healthcare, as medical services need to be provided
in a time-sensitive manner with limited resources. The system workload has been shown
to affect service time in different healthcare settings, such as intensive care units (Kc and
Terwiesch, 2012), patient transportation and cardiac surgery (Kc and Terwiesch, 2009), as
well as emergency departments (Kc, 2014; Batt and Terwiesch, 2016). While some studies
found the service time can increase with workload levels (Green and Nguyen, 2001; Tan and
Netessine, 2014), the opposite pattern, i.e., service time decreasing in workload levels, is
also observed (Kc and Terwiesch, 2009; Chan et al., 2012). Different mechanisms have been
proposed to explain the observed patterns. For example, the pattern of increasing service
time can be attributed to multitasking (Freeman et al., 2017) and mental strain of workers
(Kuntz et al., 2015), while the decrease in service time can be explained by workers’ be-
havioral response of “working faster” (Kc and Terwiesch, 2009; Staats and Gino, 2012) and
“omitting tasks” (Oliva and Sterman, 2001) when faced with high workloads. Reconciling the
two patterns, some recent studies show that the service time can react non-monotonically to
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workload levels. These studies have found an inverted-U shaped pattern, i.e., service time
first increases and then decreases in the workload measures (see, e.g., Tan and Netessine
(2014), Batt and Terwiesch (2016), and Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017)).
Beyond service time, the effect of hospital’s workload on the quality of care has also
been investigated in both the operations management and medical community. There is
empirical evidence that increased workload can lead to worse medical outcomes, such as
higher mortality (Kc and Terwiesch, 2009) and readmission rate (Kc and Terwiesch, 2012;
Kc, 2014). This positive linkage is also observed in the medical literature (e.g., Needleman
et al. (2011)) . The negative effect of high workload can be explained by the mental strain
of healthcare workers (Kuntz et al., 2015) or the delay in treatment received by patients
(Chalfin et al., 2007). Moreover, some studies have identified a tipping point in the workload
level, after which the service time increases and the quality of care deteriorates (Kuntz et al.,
2015; Berry Jaeker and Tucker, 2017). This suggests a workload-related “saturation effect”:
when the workload is very high, workers become exhausted and system buffers for handling
the demand are depleted.
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the impact of workload on service time and
quality in the context of cardiac surgeries. We focus on the daily workload of surgeons, e.g.,
the number of surgeries performed by the surgeon on a given day. In most of the existing
literature, workload is measured on a system level, usually as the bed occupancy in different
hospital units at the time of patient’s admission (e.g., Kc and Terwiesch (2012), Kuntz et al.
(2015), and Kim et al. (2015)). Different from them, our study considers a novel type of
workload; namely we measure the workload for individual surgeons on each day. To our
best knowledge, we are the first to study the impact of surgeons’ daily workload in the field
of operations management.
In the hospital of our study, it is common for a cardiac surgeon to do multiple surgeries a
day. In particular, the median of surgeons’ daily workload is two surgeries, and the maximum
is four surgeries. On average, each surgery takes more than seven hours to complete, and
the surgeon has to be highly concentrated during the procedure. Although some parts of the
surgery can be done by other members in the medical team, performing multiple surgeries
a day is still a heavy burden for the surgeon. With long working hours, surgeons can
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suffer from severe physical and mental fatigue (see, .e.g, Janhofer et al. (2019)), which may
lead to worse medical outcomes. Thus, understanding the impact of surgeons’ workload is
important for hospitals to improve their surgical outcomes and system performance. Note
that in our sample, the minimum of surgeon’s workload level is one surgery a day, which is
already burdensome and time-consuming for the surgeon. In this sense, our study focuses
on the impact of workload in the region where the workload level is already high.
In this chapter, we examine the impact of surgeons’ daily workload using a data set of
cardiac surgeries from a large hospital. Our data contains detailed information of more than
5,600 cardiac surgeries that are performed over a horizon of four years. We measure the
impact of surgeon’s daily workload on multiple outcomes. First, we examine how surgeon’s
daily workload affects the surgery duration of each case, as measured by its incision time.
This sheds light on the relationship between workload and service time in the context of
cardiac surgery, i.e., whether the incision time increases or decreases when the surgeon
performs more cases. Next, we analyze the effects of surgeon’s daily workload on the patient’s
post-surgery length-of-stay (LOS) in the ICU and in the hospital. The post-surgery LOS is
important for hospital as it affects the demand for downstream resources (e.g., ICU and ward
beds) and overall throughput efficiency. Finally, we check the impact of surgeon’s workload
on the likelihood of adverse post-operation events for their patients, including reoperation,
readmission, and mortality. The comprehensive scope of our analysis also differentiates our
study with most of existing literature, which only considers one or two outcomes such as LOS
and mortality. Besides, the effect of surgeon’s workload may be heterogeneous for different
types of patients. For example, the urgent and emergent patients are generally more severe
than the elective patients, thus their surgical outcomes may be more sensitive to surgeon’s
fatigue. Such potential heterogeneity in the effects of workload is also accounted for in our
study.
Our detailed data set allows us to control for a variety of demographic, risk, and operative
factors that may also affect the surgical outcomes. However, we still face a major challenge
in identifying the true effect of surgeon’s daily workload. That is, the surgeon’s daily
workload is endogenous. This is because there exists risk factors that are considered by
the surgeons when they schedule their cases, but these factors are not observable in the
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data. These unobservable factors will affect both the surgeon’s daily workload and the
surgical outcomes, thus violating the exogeneity condition for identification. For example,
a surgeon may schedule more cases if the unobservables imply less risk. This will generate
a negative bias in the causal effect of surgeon’s daily workload. We handle the endogeneity
bias by proper instrument variables (IV). The IV method has been widely used in healthcare
operations management for patient admission decisions (e.g., Kc and Terwiesch (2011), Kc
and Terwiesch (2012), and Kim et al. (2015)). We now apply it in the context of cardiac
surgeries to control the endogeneity in surgeon’s workload.
A valid IV in our study should influence the surgical outcomes only via the surgeon’s
daily workload. We construct two instrument variables by leveraging the operational factors
in cardiac surgeries. The first IV is the number of cases performed by other surgeons on
the same day. As many resources are shared by surgeons in the cardiac department, more
surgeries performed by other surgeons tend to limit the daily workload of the focal surgeon.
We then construct another IV using novel operational data, which is the block schedule
of surgeons. Specifically, we define the second IV as the number of days until the next
scheduled block of the focal surgeon. This IV is based on the following surgeon’s behavior:
the surgeon may “squeeze in” more cases if his or her next scheduled block is far away. We
validate the two IVs empirically with our data and show they are essential for correctly
estimating the effect of surgeon’s daily workload.
We find higher daily workload for surgeons is associated with longer incision time of
the surgeries and worse outcomes for the patients. Specifically, adding one more case to a
surgeon’s daily workload increases the incision time by 26 minutes for each case performed
by the surgeon in the day. This is a 9% relative increase. In addition, surgeon’s daily
workload leads to longer post-surgery LOS of patients in both the ICU and the hospital:
when the surgeon needs to do one more surgery in a day, the affected patients are expected
to stay in the ICU (resp. hospital) for 1.03 (resp. 1.41) more days after their surgeries. In
addition, we find higher daily workload increases the patient’s likelihood of reoperation and
readmission. These consistent results highlight the negative impact of surgeon’s fatigue due
to daily workload. Recall our study focuses on the impact of workload when the workload
level is already high. Thus, our results also reconcile the findings in Kuntz et al. (2015) and
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Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017) — they show very high levels of workload that exceeds a
tipping point is associated with longer LOS and higher mortality respectively.
We further show there is substantial heterogeneity in the effect of daily workload for
elective and non-elective patients. The non-elective patients refer to those in the urgent,
emergent, and salvage surgeries. We find the effect of surgeon’s daily workload on incision
time is statistically significant for the elective patients, but not for the non-elective ones.
On the contrary, the effects on post-surgery LOS (in both ICU and hospital), reoperation,
and readmission are significant only for non-elective patients. A possible explanation for
such heterogeneity in effect goes as follows: the surgeries for non-elective patients are more
time-constrained, thus their incision time is less impacted by surgeon’s fatigue. On the
other hand, the non-elective patients are generally more severe, and their surgical outcomes
(post-LOS, reoperation, and readmission) are more sensitive to surgeon’s fatigue.
Based on the empirical results, we develop a surgery scheduling model that incorporates
the effect of surgeon’s daily workload. Operating rooms are expensive medical resources and
generate up to a half of hospital’s revenues (McDermott et al., 2017), and accordingly the
literature on surgical scheduling is large (see, e.g., Keskinocak and Savva (2020)). In most of
the existing literature, the surgery duration is assumed to be exogenous with deterministic or
stochastic distributions. However, as shown by our study, the surgery duration endogenously
depends on surgeon’s daily workload. We thus propose a scheduling model that accounts for
such effect. The motivation of our model is to smooth surgeons’ daily workloads by switching
the cases from different days. We consider the objective of minimizing the total expected
incision time and show it can be formulated as a mixed-integer quadratic programming
problem.
In summary, we make following key contributions in this chapter.
• Impact of surgeon’s daily workload: We empirically estimate the impact of sur-
geon’s daily workload on surgery duration and patient outcomes using a detailed data
set of cardiac surgeries. We find surgeons’ workloads increase surgery duration and
lead to worse patient outcomes (post-surgery LOS, reoperation, and readmission). Be-
sides, we show the effects are highly heterogeneous for different types of patients and
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different outcomes. These results highlight the substantial impact of surgeon’s daily
workload. This provides a potential method for hospitals to improve their surgery
performance.
• Estimation methodology: To address the endogeneity bias in surgeon’s daily work-
load, we propose two novel IVs using the operational factors in the cardiac department.
The first IV is based on the resource sharing across surgeons in the department. For
the second IV, we leverage the surgeons’ block schedule data to capture the “squeeze
in” behavior that affects the surgeon’s workload. We validate the two IVs empirically
and show they are essential for identifying the true effect of surgeon’s workload.
• Surgery scheduling: Our findings suggest surgeon’s daily workload can substan-
tially affect the surgery duration and patient outcomes. However, such impacts are
largely ignored in the previous literature on surgery scheduling. Thus, we propose
and formulate a surgery scheduling model that incorporates the effects from surgeon’s
daily workload. The model optimizes for the times of surgery to capture the benefit
of smoothing surgeon’s workload across days.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section is a brief overview
of related literature. Section 4.2 describes the data and clinical setting of our study. In
Section 4.3, we develop the econometric framework and estimation methodology. Section
4.4 provides and assesses the main empirical findings. We propose our surgery scheduling
model in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter and discusses ongoing directions.
The appendices include variable definitions and supplementary tables.
4.1.1 Literature Review
Our study is related to four streams of literature: (1) the effect of system workload
on service rate and quality, (2) volume-outcome relationships, (3) the impact of surgeon’s
fatigue, and (4) operating room scheduling.
While traditional models usually assume a constant and exogenous service rate, there
is rich literature, both analytical and empirical, that focuses on the relationship between
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system workload and service rate. The dynamic queueing control literature has derived
optimal service rates that balance the costs of acceleration and waiting time (e.g., George
and Harrison (2001)). These analytical models suggest the system should increase its service
rate in the face of high workload (i.e., queue length). In reality, such optimal policies can
not always be achieved by human workers. To examine how human workers actually behave
under varying workload, various empirical research has been conducted using observational
data in real-world settings, and the results are mixed. Kc and Terwiesch (2009) show that
workers for patient transport and cardiac surgery increase their service rate under high
workload. Kc and Terwiesch (2012) and Chan et al. (2012) find hospitals are likely to
discharge patients early when ICU occupancy is high, i.e., decreasing the service time. The
opposite direction of the impact is also observed empirically. For example, Dietz (2011) finds
a positive correlation between call volume and the average service time when call volume is
high. Green and Nguyen (2001) show patient’s LOS can increase when patient load becomes
higher
The seemingly opposite effects of workload can be reconciled by an inverted-U shape
pattern between service time and workload. That is, the service time first increases and
then decreases with the workload level. Empirical evidence for this inverted-U shape pattern
is found using restaurant chain data in Tan and Netessine (2014), and in the healthcare
setting in Batt and Terwiesch (2016) and Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017). In particular,
Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017) further show there exists a second tipping point at very high
bed occupancies in the hospital, after which the service time (patient’s LOS) increases again
with workload. Different mechanisms have been proposed to explain the impact of workload
on service time. For example, the decrease in the service time can be explained by server
speedup (Staats and Gino, 2012; Kc and Terwiesch, 2009; Tan and Netessine, 2014), task
reduction (Oliva and Sterman, 2001; Kuntz et al., 2015), or early task initiative between
stages (Batt and Terwiesch, 2016). On the other hand, the slowdown in service time can
be caused by multitasking (Tan and Netessine, 2014; Freeman et al., 2017), mental fatigue
(Kuntz et al., 2015), and change in patient’s average severity level (Berry Jaeker and Tucker,
2017). On the analytical side, Delasay et al. (2016) develop a state-dependent queueing
model to capture the adaptive mechanisms leading to the nonlinear pattern between service
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rate and workload. Delasay et al. (2019) provide a general framework that incorporates
different effects of load on service time.
There is also a rich literature studying the effect of workload on servers’ behavior and
quality. Green et al. (2013) find the nurse absenteeism is positively correlated with the
expected future workload. Hopp et al. (2007) use an analytical queueing model to show
increasing servers may worsen congestion when servers have discretion over task completion
time. Freeman et al. (2017) find that gatekeeper-providers would alter their service config-
uration and referral decisions in response to their workload. In multiple healthcare settings,
the quality of care is found to suffer under high workload. Kc and Terwiesch (2009) and
Kc and Terwiesch (2012) find that hospital’s workload increases the patient’s mortality and
readmission rate. Kim et al. (2015) find the delay of ICU admission due to high occupancy
leads to longer LOS and higher likelihood of transfer-up. This positive linkage between
hospital workload and mortality is also observed in the medical literature (e.g., Schilling
et al. (2010) and Neuraz et al. (2015)). The negative impact on quality is particularly sig-
nificant when the workload is already high, producing a safety tipping point in occupancy
level (Kuntz et al., 2015; Berry Jaeker and Tucker, 2017).
Our study contributes to this line of literature in the following aspects. We focus on a
novel type of workload in the healthcare setting, which is the number of surgeries performed
by a surgeon in a day. We find surgeon’s high workload is associated with longer surgery
duration and worse patient outcomes. This provides consistent evidence for the negative
impact of very high workload level, see, e.g., Kuntz et al. (2015) and Berry Jaeker and
Tucker (2017). Besides, we reveal the effect of surgeon’s workload is highly heterogeneous
across different patients and outcomes. Finally, to control for the endogeneity in surgeon’s
workload, we develop two IVs based on resource sharing and surgeon’s block schedule. These
types of IVs may be applied in other empirical settings to address the endogeneity bias in
workload.
Next, our work is related to the literature on volume-outcome relationship in healthcare
management. In the medical community, there is vast evidence supporting a positive rela-
tionship between a surgeon’s (or a hospital’s) volume and surgical outcome (see, e.g., Falcoz
et al. (2014), Bashir et al. (2017), and Modrall et al. (2018)). The volume in these studies
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usually refers to the number of surgeries performed by the surgeon in a relatively long pe-
riod (e.g., the past one year). The volume-outcome relationship has also drawn attention
in the field of operations management. Research in different empirical settings has been
conducted to investigate the driver and mechanism behind the relationship, e.g., learning
and specialization. For example, Kc and Terwiesch (2011) show that after controlling for
selective patient admissions, the benefit of specialization disappears at the hospital level, but
it still exists at the operating unit level in terms of a shorter patient’s LOS. Kc and Staats
(2012) disentangle the volume-outcome relationship by dividing experience into focal and
related categories. They find a surgeon’s focal experience has a greater impact on surgical
outcome than related experience. Clark and Huckman (2012) identify the existence of com-
plementarities resulting from cospecialization in focal and related segments, i.e., hospitals
with greater specialization in related areas have a higher marginal benefit from specializa-
tion in the focal area. Using transaction data from a Japanese bank, Staats and Gino (2012)
show specialization improves the performance in the short-term (single-day), while variety
increases worker productivity in a longer-term (across days). In a recent work by Wang
and Pourghannad (2020), they show the effects of surgical volume on surgery duration is
heterogeneous across patients. Complementing to this line of literature, we investigate the
impact of surgeon’s short-term volume, i.e., number of cases performed in a day, on surgery
duration and surgical outcomes.
Our work also relates and contributes to the literature on surgeon’s fatigue. As surgeon’s
work is highly demanding both physically and mentally, the potential negative impact of
surgeon’s fatigue has long been a focus of the medical community (see a recent survey in
Janhofer et al. (2019)). Long working hours and the consequent suboptimal sleep of sur-
geons can cause different types of fatigues, including muscular fatigue (Slack et al., 2008;
Dorion and Darveau, 2013), mental fatigue (Gerdes et al., 2008; McCormick et al., 2012),
and decision fatigue (Stewart et al., 2012). Under different medical settings, multiple studies
have shown surgeon’s fatigue is associated with worse surgical outcomes (see, e.g., Halldor-
son et al. (2009), Shanafelt et al. (2010), and Thomas et al. (2012)). However, other studies
have found no significant impact from surgeon’s fatigue on surgical outcomes (Ellman et al.,
2005; Bagrodia et al., 2012; Govindarajan et al., 2015). In general, the medical literature
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does not have a clear conclusion on the relation between surgeon’s fatigue and worse patient
outcomes. Our work sheds light on this problem using a detailed empirical data set of car-
diac surgeries and rigorous econometric analysis. As an important difference from existing
medical literature, we use proper IVs to control for the endogeneity in surgeon’s daily work-
load. This accounts for the possibility that surgeons will schedule less severe cases when
they know their workload is high. Ignoring such endogeneity may make it difficult, or even
impossible, to identify the true effect of surgeon’s fatigue .
We also contribute to the literature of operating room scheduling. Operating rooms
are big cost centers and revenue generators of the hospital. However, efficient management
of operating rooms often faces operational difficulties such as low utilization, late starts,
overtime costs, and unexpected cancellations (Doebbeling et al., 2012). Thus, the literature
on operating room scheduling is huge. Some review of the current research, challenges, and
future directions of this field can be found in Cardoen et al. (2010), May et al. (2011), and
Samudra et al. (2016) among many others. Different objectives are considered in operating
room scheduling, including minimizing total costs (Denton et al., 2010; Batun et al., 2011),
maximizing profit (Freeman et al., 2016), maximizing expected resource utilization (Gupta,
2007; Shylo et al., 2013), reducing patient wait times (Zenteno et al., 2015), and smoothing
downstream census (Zenteno et al., 2016). Combinations of these objectives are also con-
sidered (e.g., Min and Yih (2010), Gul et al. (2011), and Li et al. (2017)). From a different
aspect, Olivares et al. (2008) apply a structural estimation method on observational data
to identify how the hospital actually balances the costs of reserving too much versus too
little operating room capacity for cardiac surgeries. However, most of the existing literature
assumes the surgery duration, either deterministic or stochastic, to be exogenous and inde-
pendent of surgeon’s workload. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a
scheduling model that incorporates the effects of surgeon’s daily workload. Another example
of endogenous surgery duration is the recent work by Wang and Pourghannad (2020), in
which the surgery duration is dynamically determined by the matching between patients and
surgeons. The decision variables in their model is the assignment of patients to surgeons,
while we consider the potential benefit of smoothing surgeon’s daily workloads by changing
the surgery time.
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4.2 Data and Clinical Setting
In this study, we use a sample of cardiac surgeries from a large hospital over the period of
July 2015 to July 2019. We combine two data sets. The first one is the cardiac surgery data
collected from the Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS) Adult Cardiac Surgery Database.1
The second one is the block schedule data for surgeons provided by the hospital.
The STS data contains detailed information of patient demographics, risk factors, pre-
operative status, operative procedures and timelines, as well as postoperative events. This
comprehensive data set allows us to control for the severity of patients and complexity of
surgeries when analyzing the impact of daily workload. The STS data contains basic pa-
tient demographics such as gender, age, and race. Besides, the risk factors section includes
a patient’s status for liver illness, lung disease, diabetes control, and renal failure; the pre-
operative section records whether the patient experienced heart fail, cardiogenic shock, or
myocardial infarction (MI) before the surgery.
We obtain from the STS data each patient’s hospital admission date, surgery date, and
discharge date. Thus, we can compute the patient’s LOS before and after the surgery.
Besides, for each surgery, we can determine its OR time and incision time from the STS
data using the timestamps of its OR entry and exit, as well as skin incision start and end.
We also have the surgeon’s identifier related to each case, which enables us to measure
the daily workload for each surgeon and control for the difference in surgeons’ experience.
Finally, the STS data contains multiple medical outcomes of each surgery, such as the time
spent in ICU, reoperation, readmission, and mortality.
The second data set is the block schedule of surgeons provided by the cardiac department.
The hospital in our study employs a block booking framework to schedule their cardiac
surgeries. Under the block booking, surgeons are assigned with fixed time slots (blocks) and
dedicated resource (e.g., OR and staff) to perform their surgeries. The block schedule is
decided in advance by the management board and adjusted infrequently, e.g., each quarter




convenient for surgeons and hospitals to employ (Erdogan and Denton, 2010). Each block
in our data specifies the date, OR number, and the surgeon assigned, e.g., OR 1 is assigned
to Surgeon A on 10/1/2016. We note that in most cases of our study, each OR is assigned to
only one surgeon for the entire day. That is, OR sharing by multiple surgeons is rare (only
3%). There are in total eight ORs for cardiac surgeries. However, some blocks of the ORs
are assigned to other departments in the hospital (e.g., the pediatrics department). This is
also documented in the block schedule data.
In principle, the block schedule data allows us to determine for each surgery whether
it happens in or out of the block schedule. Here “in block schedule” means the surgery is
performed in an OR that is assigned to its surgeon on the surgery date. However, we have
two limitations in the available data. First, a significant proportion of the block schedule
data is missing: out of the 48 months (resp. 5,604 cases) in our surgery data, we only have
the block schedule data for 22 months (resp. 2,499 cases). Thus, we would need to impute
the block schedule information for the missing periods. We note that the missing block data
is due to the staff absence in the department administration, instead of any selection bias
regarding the patients. Second, we do not have the location information (the OR number)
for each surgery in our data. Because of this limitation, we can only determine the block
status on the surgeon-day level, i.e., whether a surgeon is assigned a block on a specific day.
We then use this block status for all the cases performed by the surgeon on that day.
4.2.1 Data Selection and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe the data cleaning process and provide some summary statis-
tics of the final sample in our study.
We start from 5,604 cases from the STS data. We first drop 20 cases that are eventually
cancelled before or during the surgery. We then drop 232 cases from seven “infrequent”
surgeons in our sample. These surgeons only performed a very small number of cases during
the four year horizon. They are dropped for the following two reasons. First, these surgeons
may be more likely to do unusual procedures that require special expertise. Second, the
small sample size of these surgeons does not allow us to effectively control for the impact
from their experience. Thus, we focus on the cases from the other eight surgeons, each of
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which performed at least 200 cases in the sample. This leaves us with a sample of 5,352
cases in total, which consist of 95.5% of the initial sample. Among them, we have the block
schedule information for 2,492 cases (46.5%). We refer to these cases as the block sample
hereafter.
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of patients’ gender, age, and critical status for
both the full sample and the block sample. Specifically, a patient is classified as critical if
he or she experiences a cardiogenic shock or syncope before the surgery, both of which are
controlled in our estimation. In Appendix D.1, we provide a detailed description of other
factors included in our econometric framework and their summary statistics.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Patients for the Full Sample and Block Sample
(Full Sample: N = 5,352, Block Sample: N = 2,492)
Full Sample Block Sample
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
Gender: Male 0.675 - - 0.671 - -
Age 64.73 66.00 12.56 65.06 66.00 12.33
Critical 0.103 - - 0.102 - -
As a main risk indicator, the cardiac surgeries are divided to four status categories in the
increasing order of patient severity: elective, urgent, emergent, and salvage. The elective
cases are those surgeries that can be deferred without increased risk; the urgent cases are
supposed to be performed during the same clinical stay to reduce further risk; the emergent
and salvage cases refer to the situation that requires emergent operations with no delay upon
the outbreak.2 The surgery status has important implication on the surgical scheduling.
While the hospital has relatively high flexibility in scheduling the elective cases, the schedules
of urgent cases are more difficult to change, and the hospital has little control over the time
of emergent and salvage cases. In Table 4.2 below, we provide the summary statistics for the
four categories in both the full sample and the block sample. We have two findings from the
statistics. First, a significant proportion of the surgeries are urgent or emergent cases. This
consists of 53.5% of the full sample and 52.3% of the block sample. Indeed, the numbers of
2See page 154 in the training manual: https://www.sts.org/sites/default/files/Training%
20Manual%20V2-9%20June%202020.pdf
158
elective and urgent cases are almost the same. Second, the distributions of the four status
are very similar for the full and block samples.
Table 4.2: Statistics of Surgery Status in Full and Block Sample
Full Sample Block Sample
Status Number Ratio Number Ratio
Elective 2479 46.3% 1184 47.5%
Urgent 2488 46.5% 1124 45.1%
Emergent 374 7.0% 180 7.2%
Salvage 11 0.2% 4 0.2%
Besides the surgery status, we can obtain the procedure information for each case from
the STS data, i.e., which types of procedures are performed during the surgery. To control
for the impact from different procedures, we classify the surgeries to different types as
follows. First, there are eight standard types for those most commonly performed cardiac
surgeries. For them, we directly use the classification provided by the STS data: coronary
artery bypass graft (CABG), aortic valve replacement (AVR), mitral valve replacement
(MVR), mitral valve repair (MVr), and their combinations CABG+AVR, CABG+MVR,
CABG+MVr, and AVR+MVR. For other “non-standard” cases, we determine their surgery
types based on the procedures actually performed. In total, we have 14 procedure types for
the cases in our data. The heuristic rule for determining the surgery types of non-standard
cases is described in Appendix D.1. There are 3,420 cases (63.9%) that fall into the eight
standard types, and 1,932 cases (36.1%) for the non-standard types.
We compute the pre-surgery LOS (pre-LOS) for each patient as the number of days
between the hospital admission and the surgery, and the post-surgery LOS (post-LOS) as
that between the surgery and hospital discharge. Besides, the OR time of each case is
calculated as the time elapsed between its OR entry and OR exit. As shown in Figure
4.1, the OR time can be decomposed to three stages: pre-incision time, incision time, and
post-incision time. The incision stage corresponds to the time between skin incision start
and end, and the pre-incision (resp. post-incision) stage refers to the time before (resp.
after) it. Different tasks are performed in the three stages. The pre-incision stage includes
pre-operative tests, positioning the patient in OR, and anesthetic. The post-incision stage
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Figure 4.1: OR Timeline for a Cardiac Surgery
includes closing the incision and cleaning up the OR. In cardiac surgeries, these tasks can
be largely performed by medical staff or surgical fellows without the presence of the focal
surgeon. On the other hand, the incision stage requires relatively high participation of the
surgeon. Thus, the incision time is a more accurate measure for a surgeon’s working time
than the total OR time.
We present the summary statistics for pre-LOS, post-LOS, and total LOS by the four
surgery status in Table 4.3. We can see the elective cases have relatively short pre-LOS.
This is because most of the elective patients are admitted one day before or on the same day
of their surgeries. The elective cases also have the shortest post-LOS, while the emergent
cases have the longest one. This reflects the fact that the patients of the elective cases are
generally less severe than those of the urgent and emergent cases. Next, Table 4.4 provides
the summary statistics for the pre-incision, incision, post-incision, and OR time by the four
surgery status. We see that the average incision and OR time are longer for urgent and
emergent cases than that for the elective cases. This is not surprising as the non-elective
cases tend to be more complicated and thus take longer time to perform. On average, the
incision stage consists of 67% of the total OR time.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of LOS by Surgery Status (in Days)
Status Num Obs. pre-LOS post-LOS total LOS
Elective 2479 1.16 (2.92) 8.77 (7.89) 9.93 (9.04)
Urgent 2488 4.90 (9.83) 13.28 (18.55) 18.17 (23.06)
Emergent 374 15.32 (30.11) 25.88 (22.28) 41.21 (37.86)
Salvage 11 8.09 (7.54) 20.55 (12.15) 28.64 (14.41)
All 5352 3.9 (11.19) 12.09 (15.58) 15.99 (21.19)
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of OR and Incision Time by Surgery Status (in Hours)
Status Num Obs. Pre-incision Incision Post-incision OR time
Elective 2479 1.48 (0.28) 4.52 (1.56) 0.73 (0.38) 6.79 (1.79)
Urgent 2488 1.51 (0.31) 4.88 (1.76) 0.78 (0.40) 7.24 (1.99)
Emergent 374 1.48 (0.45) 5.80 (2.31) 0.87 (0.47) 8.31 (2.59)
Salvage 11 1.18 (0.51) 5.96 (2.27) 0.95 (0.49) 8.28 (2.60)
All 5352 1.49 (0.31) 4.78 (1.75) 0.76 (0.40) 7.11 (1.99)
We then report the summary statistics for the following surgical outcomes. The first
two are the total time in ICU after the surgery and post-LOS in the hospital (in days).
The total time in ICU accounts for both the initial ICU visit and potential revisits. In
addition, we consider three binary outcomes: reoperation, readmission to the hospital, and
mortality. The reoperation accounts for all types of causes for returning to OR: bleeding,
valve dysfunction, MI, aortic disease, other cardiac and non-cardiac reasons. However, we
exclude the reoperations within 24 hours after the surgery due to acute bleeding. This is
because these acute reoperations increase the surgeon’s workload on the same day, but they
are not documented in the STS data. The mortality includes death in 30 days after the
surgery regardless of the location (e.g., in hospital or at home). The summary statistics
of these surgical outcomes are reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Not surprisingly, we see the
urgent cases on average are associated with worse outcomes than the elective ones, and the
emergent cases have the worst average outcomes among the three categories.
Table 4.5: Binary Surgical Outcomes by Status
Status Num Obs. Reoperation Mortality Readmission
Elective 2479 0.035 0.016 0.089
Urgent 2488 0.076 0.031 0.104
Emergent 374 0.251 0.061 0.118
Salvage 11 0.364 0.455 0.200
All 5352 0.070 0.027 0.098
Finally, we determine the block status on the surgeon-day level using the block schedule
data. We find that out of the 1,744 surgeon-day pairs with block information, 1,343 (77%)
of them are in block schedule, i.e., the surgeon has a block assignment on that day, while
the remaining 401 (23%) pairs happen out of schedule. On average, a surgeon performs 1.4
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Table 4.6: Total ICU Time and post-LOS by Status (in Days)
Tot ICU post-LOS
Status Num Obs. Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
Elective 2479 3.61 2.00 5.55 8.77 6.00 7.89
Urgent 2488 5.88 2.88 11.36 13.28 8.00 18.55
Emergent 374 13.29 7.69 17.35 25.88 21.00 22.28
Salvage 11 15.69 9.33 13.03 20.55 19.00 12.15
All 5352 5.37 2.67 10.09 12.09 7.00 15.58
(resp. 1.2) cases a day if he or she is in (resp. out of) block schedule. In total, we have
2,010 cases classified as in block schedule, 482 as out of block schedule, and 2,860 cases as
unknown because the block information is missing for their surgery dates.
4.3 Econometric Framework
In this section, we develop the econometric framework for identifying the effect of daily
workload on surgery duration and outcomes. For each case 8, denote its surgeon and surgery
date by B and C respectively. We consider two measures for the surgeon’s daily workload.
The first measure #D<0B4B8 is the total number of cases performed by surgeon B on day
C. The second measure (D<=28 represents the total incision time of other cases (excluding
8) by surgeon B on day C. The summary statistics of the two daily workload measures is
reported in Table 4.7 below. From the results, we see it is very common for a surgeon to
perform multiple cases a day in our sample: the median of #D<0B4B8 is two for both the
full sample and the block sample. That is, for half of cases in our sample, their surgeons
perform at least two cases on the day of surgery. This is also reflected by the average of
(D<=28, which is 3.27 (resp 3.14) hours for the full (resp. block) sample. Note that if
the surgeon performs only one case in a day, we would have (D<=28 equal to zero by its
definition. The two daily workload measures are highly correlated. The correlation is 0.91
and 0.92 for the full and block sample, respectively. The first measure #D<0B4B8 is easier
to interpret, but it has less variation than (D<=28 as it is forced to take integer values.
We control for a variety of demographic, medical, operative, and operational factors as
independent variables in our estimation. The demographic variables include patient’s gen-
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics of Daily Workload for Full and Block Sample
(Full Sample: N = 5,352, Block Sample: N = 2,492)
Full Sample Block Sample
Workload Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
#D<0B4B8 1.69 2.00 0.69 1.66 2.00 0.65
(D<=28 3.27 3.17 3.58 3.14 3.10 3.38
der, age, and race. The medical variables include 18 risk factors or preoperative conditions
of the patient. The operative variables include the surgery status, the patient’s admission
type, the surgery type, the surgeon’s identifier, an indicator for aorta procedure, and the
number of arteries bypassed in the surgery. The admission type refers to the channels for
the patient to be admitted to the hospital. The four admission types and their numbers
of observations are: elective (3,777), emergency department (448), transfer-in (1,117), and
other (10). The number of arteries bypassed is calculated if the coronary artery bypass is
performed in the surgery, and set to zero otherwise. Besides, we include five operational
variables: dummies for the weekday, month, and year of the surgery, the pre-LOS, and the
block schedule status (in-schedule, out-of-schedule, or unknown). A detailed description of
the independent variables used in our estimation can be found in Appendix D.1.
We represent the above independent variables (plus a constant) by -8 for case 8. To
estimate the effect of daily workload, we consider the following the econometric set-ups. For
continuous dependent variable H8, we employ the linear model:
H8 = -8V + W,>A:;>038 + Y8 , (4.1)
where ,>A:;>038 is the daily workload of case 8’s surgeon on its surgery date, it is measured
by the number of cases #D<0B4B8 or the total incision time of other cases (D<=28; the
error term Y8 is assumed to follow a normal distribution. On the other hand. for binary
dependent variable H8, we use the following probit model:
H∗8 = -8V + W,>A:;>038 + Y8 , (4.2)
H8 = 1{H∗8 > 0},
where H∗
8
is a latent variable and the error term Y8 follows a standard normal distribution.
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Note that by (4.1) and (4.2), we are estimating the “average” effect of daily workload for all
cases performed by the surgeon on a same day.
The coefficient W in models (4.1) and (4.2) measures the impact of daily workload on
the dependent variable. As a naive approach, we can estimate the coefficients in (4.1) and
(4.2) by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) or maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and
interpret W as the effect of daily workload on the dependent variable H8. However, this
approach ignores the endogeneity in the daily workload of surgeons. That is, the surgeon’s
daily workload can be affected by patients’ severity factors that are unobservable in the
data but are considered by the surgeons (e.g., a patient’s cognitive state). For example, the
surgeon may schedule more cases a day if the unobservable severity factors imply shorter
incision times. Consequently, both the dependent variable (incision time) and the daily
workload (number of cases) are affected by regressor -8 as well as the unobserved severity
factors. If we ignore this, the unobserved severity factors will be absorbed as a part of
the error term Y8 and thus violate the strict exogeneity constraint required for consistent
estimation. In the case described above, it could introduce a negative bias to the estimates
of W, as the unobservable severity factors are negatively correlated with the daily workload
(and we expect W to be positive). Thus, simple OLS on (4.1) may yield a negative W even
the true effect is positive.
Figure 4.2 shows the endogeneity issue of surgeon’s daily workload in more details. To
address the endogeneity bias, we employ the IV method that yields consistent estimates of
the coefficients. We construct two IVs using the operational data from the cardiac depart-
ment. We describe and validate the two IVs in next section.
4.3.1 Instrument Variables
To address the endogeneity bias, a valid IV must satisfy the following two conditions.
The first is the instrument relevance, i.e., the instrument variable has to affect the endoge-
nous variable. The second condition is the instrument exogeneity : the instrument variable
should impact the outcome only via the endogenous variable (after other exogenous variables
are controlled). That is, the instrument variable must be uncorrelated with the unobserv-
able factors that also affect the patient outcomes (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). While the
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between Surgeon Daily Workload, Observed/Unobserved factors,
and Surgery Duration/Patient Outcomes
relevance condition can be tested statistically, the exogeneity condition is generally difficult
to test as the error term is unobserved. Thus, the construction and validation of instrument
variable depend on the specific economic context of the problem and data generation pro-
cess. In the following, we propose two IVs using the operational data and demonstrate their
validity. The two IVs are both computed on the surgeon-day level, i.e., they are the same
across the cases performed by a surgeon on the same day.
The first IV, )>C$Cℎ4A8, is the total number of cases performed by other surgeons on
the same day of case 8. It is supposed to affect the daily workload of the focal surgeon via
the channel of resource sharing across surgeons. When surgeons perform surgeries on the
same day, many resources in the cardiac department are shared by them, e.g., medical staff,
medicine, and equipment. Thus, more cases performed by other surgeons on the same day
tend to limit the daily workload of the focal surgeon. As such, we expect )>C$Cℎ4A8 to be
negatively correlated with the focal surgeon’s daily workload. This supports the relevance
condition. We then argue )>C$Cℎ4A8 also satisfies the exogeneity condition. Based on our
discussion with the doctors, the surgeons in the cardiac department have high ownership
of their patients, and they rarely coordinate when scheduling their own cases. That is, an
individual surgeon has little control over others’ patients and workload. This suggests the
workload of other surgeons should be uncorrelated with the unobservable severity factors of
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the focal surgeon’s patients.
Besides the total workload by other surgeons, we further construct a novel IV using
the block schedule data. Our argument is based on the following behavioral analysis: if
a surgeon has to wait for a long period until the next scheduled block, the surgeon may
be motivated to “squeeze” more cases into the current day. Thus, we expect the gap to
next block (in days) of the focal surgeon, 0?#4GC8, to be positively correlated with the
surgeon’s daily workload. Thus, 0?#4GC8 satisfies the relevance condition. On the other
hand, the block schedule of each surgeon is fixed in advance and adjusted very infrequently
(e.g., twice a year), thus it is unlikely for 0?#4GC8 to be correlated with the unobservable
severity factors of the surgeon’s patients. This supports the exogeneity requirement for
0?#4GC8 as an IV.
For the periods with the block schedule, we can directly compute 0?#4GC8 for each
case. However, the block schedule data is missing for a significant proportion of the sample
horizon. For the periods without the block schedule, we construct 0?#4GC8 as follows.
First, we impute the block schedule on the surgeon-day level using a logistic model. Then,
we calculate the expected 0?#4GC8 based on our imputation. This enables us to maintain
the entire sample for estimation. Indeed, the block schedule data is missing for more than
half (53%) of the cases in our sample. So simply dropping the missing periods would largely
reduce our sample size.
We impute the block schedule information on the surgeon-day level. Let .B,C be a binary
variable which takes value one if surgeon B has an assigned block on day C (i.e., in block
schedule), and zero otherwise. We estimate .B,C using a logistic model, i.e.,
ln
[Pr(.B,C = 1|- ′B,C )
Pr(.B,C = 0|- ′B,C )
]
= - ′B,C V + 4B,C , (4.3)
where - ′B,C is a set of independent variables and 4B,C denotes the error term. Note that we
only estimate the model for the surgeon-day combinations that appear in our sample. That
is, we implicitly set Pr(.B,C = 1) = 0 if surgeon B does not perform any case on day C. The
regressor - ′B,C contains 23 independent variables (plus a constant term) for surgeon B on day
C. For example, it includes the numbers of elective, urgent, and emergent cases by the focal
and other surgeons on day C. As we are imputing instead of predicting .B,C , the regressor
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- ′B,C also contains variables that depend on the “future” information after day C, e.g., the
number of days worked by surgeon B in the current calendar week. A complete description
of the independent variables in - ′B,C can be found in Appendix D.2.
We estimate the logit model (4.3) using the surgeon-day pairs in the block sample, for
which the values of .B,C are known. We then use the estimated model to impute for the
periods where the block schedule is missing. With the fitted probability Pr(.B,C = 1|- ′B,C ),

























C+; := Pr(.B,C+; = 1|-
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B,C+;).
Here C denotes the surgery date of case 8; ? (1;:)
C+; is the probability that case 8’s surgeon has
a block on day C + ;; ) is the truncation level for the maximum expected gap. We set it as
14 days in our computation, as we find from the block schedule data that it is rare for a
surgeon to stay idle without any block assignment in consecutive two weeks. The calculation
in (4.4) is based on an implicit assumption that whether a surgeon has a block assignment






C+; represents the probability
that the first block assignment after day C occurs on day C + ;. Note that for the periods
with block schedule data, the corresponding 0?#4GC8 can also be computed by (4.4) with
?
(1;:)
C+; set to zero or one according to the block schedule.
4.3.2 Estimation Methods
With the two IVs introduced above, we can estimate the effect of daily workload in
models (4.1) and (4.2). We describe the estimation methods below.
For continuous dependent variable H8, we estimate the linear model (4.1) using the two-
stage least squares (TSLS) regression (see Woodridge (2010)). The TSLS estimation is
conducted as follows. In the first stage, we regress the daily workload on the exogenous
variables -8 and the two IVs using OLS:
,>A:;>038 = -8V + [1)>C$Cℎ4A8 + [20?#4GC8 + b8 . (4.5)
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The first stage regression measures the impact of the two IVs on a surgeon’s daily workload.
For the two IVs to affect the daily workload (i.e., the relevance condition), at least one of
[1 and [2 should be statistically different from zero. Then in the second stage, we replace
,>A:;>038 in (4.1) with its fitted values from (4.5) and estimate W by OLS. Note that the
standard errors in the second stage need to be adjusted as we are plugging in estimates of
,>A:;>038.
For binary dependent variable H8, we use the full maximum likelihood estimation method
to estimate the effect W in the probit model (4.2) (Woodridge, 2010; Cameron and Trivedi,
2013). Specifically, the models for the daily workload in (4.5) and the outcome in (4.2)
are estimated jointly under the assumption that the error terms (Y8 , b8) follow a bivariate
normal distribution. To capture the endogeneity in daily workload, we allow Y8 and b8
to be correlated. Thus, there can be unobservable severity factors that affect the surgical
outcomes and daily workload simultaneously.
We find that the distributions of incision time, post-LOS, and total ICU time have
long tails on the right end, thus we winsorize them by their 97.5th percentiles to mitigate
the impact from extreme values. Our estimation results are robust to other choices of
winsorization levels. In addition, for both the linear and probit models in (4.1) and (4.2),
we cluster the standard errors by the surgeon’s identifier to account for the heteroskedasticity
across the cases by different surgeons
4.4 Main Empirical Results
This section provides the main empirical results regarding the impact of daily workload
on surgery duration and outcomes. Section 4.4.1 includes the results for the schedule impu-
tation model (4.3) and regression (4.5), which measures the effect of IVs on daily workload.
Then, the results for the main models (4.1) and (4.2) are assessed in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Schedule Imputation and Impact of IVs on Daily Workload
In this section, we discuss the empirical results related to schedule imputation and re-
gression (4.5), i.e., the impact of IVs on surgeon’s daily workload. For continuous dependent
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variables, it is the first stage regression when we estimate the effect of daily workload in
(4.1). For binary dependent variables, it is estimated jointly with (4.2) jointly by full MLE
method.
4.4.1.1 Schedule Imputation Model
We first provide the results for the schedule imputation model (4.3), which is used when
we construct the second IV 0?#4GC8 by (4.4) for the periods without block information.
A detailed description of the independent variables in - ′B,C is given in Appendix D.2. We
estimate the model using the periods with block schedule information. The weekends are
dropped as all blocks are assigned on weekdays. This leaves us with 1680 surgeon-day pairs
in the block sample for estimation. To measure the model performance, we compute the
McFadden’s R-squared as




where ;<>3 is the likelihood from the estimated model, ;=D;; is the likelihood from the null
model with only intercept. The McFadden’s R-squared of the estimated model is 0.31.
Besides, the AUC from the model classification is 0.86. Both measures show the imputation
model fits the block schedule data well.
In Table 4.8 below, we report the estimated coefficients and average marginal effects
(AME) for select variables in model (4.3). Due to space limitation, we only include the vari-
ables that have a p-value smaller than 0.05 besides the surgeon and weekday dummies. We
have the following findings from the estimated results. First, more elective and urgent cases
of other surgeons on day C (;42$CℎB,C and *A6$CℎB,C) decrease the probability that surgeon
B is assigned a block schedule (i.e., Pr(.B,C = 1)), while more elective cases (;42DAB,C) and
patients admitted (3<DAB,C) by the focal surgeon increase Pr(.B,C = 1). This reflects the
resource sharing among surgeons in the department on the same day. Next, a late start after
8AM ((C0AC!0C4B,C) of the cases by the focal surgeon B decreases the probability Pr(.B,C = 1).
Besides, we find the surgeon’s workload around current day C also has explanatory power
for Pr(.B,C = 1). For example, the number of days worked in the current calendar week
(#D<DA,44:B,C) and the distance to next work day (8BC#4GCB,C) are negatively associated
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with Pr(.B,C = 1). Finally, the variable ,;42'0C8>B,C denotes the proportion of elective
cases by surgeon B in [C−180, C+180] that fall on the same weekday as C. We see its coefficient
and AME are significantly positive. This is because blocks tend to be assigned on specific
weekdays for each surgeon in adjacent periods. Moreover, more than 90% of elective cases
are performed in their surgeons’ block schedule. Thus, the ratio ,;42'0C8>B,C has strong
explanatory power for the surgeons’ block assignment.
Table 4.8: Select Coefficients in the Logistic Model (4.3)


















Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? <
0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. Select coefficients for
schedule imputation model (4.3).
4.4.1.2 Impact of IVs on Daily Workload
With the estimated logistic model, we compute the expected gap to next block following
(4.4). The summary statistics of the two IVs are shown in Table 4.9 for both the full sample
and the block sample. The statistics of the first IV )>C$Cℎ4A8 suggests that other surgeons
on average perform 4.1 cases on the surgery day of the focal surgeon. For the second IV
0?#4GC8, we find the average (resp. median) gap to next block schedule is 3.46 days (resp.
2.21 days) for the full sample. The standard deviation of 0?#4GC8 is 3.04 days, reflecting
a large variation in the gap to next block. This is because the blocks of each surgeon are
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distributed unevenly across the days. We also notice that the statistics of 0?#4GC8 is very
similar for the full sample and the block sample. Recall that 0?#4GC8 can be calculated
accurately for the block sample. Thus, the comparison here supports the effectiveness of
our schedule imputation model (4.3) as the distribution of 0?#4GC8 imputed by the model
is close to that calculated directly from the block data.
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics of the IVs for Full and Block Sample
(Full Sample: N = 5,352, Block Sample: N = 2,492)
Full Sample Block Sample
IV Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
)>C$Cℎ4A8 4.11 4.00 1.78 4.18 4.00 1.77
0?#4GC8 3.46 2.21 3.04 3.40 2.00 3.22
In Table 4.10, we show the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the two IVs in
the OLS regression (4.5). The daily workload in (4.5) is specified as the number of cases
(#D<0B4B8) or the total incision time of other cases ((D<=28) by the focal surgeon on
the given day. The estimation results are reported for the full sample and block sample
respectively. We see the IVs are all statistically significant with expected signs. For the full
sample, we see one more case by other surgeons on the same day leads to a reduction of
0.074 (resp. 0.37 hours) in the number of cases (resp. total incision time of other cases)
by the focal surgeon. This reflects the resource sharing among surgeons, i.e., more cases by
other surgeons limit the workload by the focal surgeon. On the other hand, the gap to next
block 0?#4GC8 is associated with higher daily workload of the focal surgeon. This shows
the effect of “squeezing in” more cases by the focal surgeon if the next scheduled block is far
away.
The regression results in Table 4.10 show that the two IVs indeed significantly affect the
daily workload of the focal surgeon, thus validating the relevance condition required for IV.
We also notice that the results are similar when we estimate (4.5) using the block sample,
for which the second IV 0?#4GC8 can be accurately computed. This further supports
the validity and robustness of the two IVs used in our estimation. Besides, we estimate
regression (4.5) using the samples consisting of elective and non-elective cases respectively.
The results are summarized in Table 4.11. It shows the two IVs still have expected signs for
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the elective and non-elective samples, although the impact of 0?#4GC8 on the number of
cases becomes insignificant. This is potentially due to the smaller sizes of the elective and
non-elective samples.
Table 4.10: Impact of IVs on Daily Workload (Full and Block Sample)
Full Sample Block Sample
IV #D<0B4B8 (D<=28 #D<0B4B8 (D<=28
)>C$Cℎ4A8 −0.074∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.028) (0.008) (0.040)
0?#4GC8 0.006† 0.045∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.022)
Num Obs. 5345 5344 2490 2489
Adj '2 0.147 0.161 0.176 0.179
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and
∗∗∗? < 0.001. Coefficients and standard errors of two IVs in (4.5) for full sample
and block sample.
Table 4.11: Impact of IVs on Daily Workload (Elective and Non-elective Sample)
Elective Sample Non-elective Sample
IV #D<0B4B8 (D<=28 #D<0B4B8 (D<=28
)>C$Cℎ4A8 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.039) (0.008) (0.040)
0?#4GC8 0.006 0.053∗ 0.005 0.042∗
(0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (0.021)
Num Obs. 2474 2474 2871 2871
Adj '2 0.122 0.142 0.160 0.171
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and
∗∗∗? < 0.001. Coefficients and standard errors of two IVs in (4.5) for elective and
non-elective samples.
Finally, Table 4.12 reports the coefficients [1 and [2 for the two IVs when we estimate
(4.5) and (4.2) jointly by full MLE for binary dependent variables. Due to space limitation,
we only show the estimation results for the full sample. Unlike the OLS estimates in Tables
4.10 and 4.11, the estimated [1 and [2 from the full MLE may vary when we choose different
dependent variable H8 in (4.2). Thus in Table 4.12, we show the estimation results of (4.5)
for three binary outcomes separately3, i.e., reoperation, readmission, and mortality. We
3The sample size varies for the three outcomes. This is because some levels of categorical variables
(e.g., specific procedure types) lead to perfect predictions of the binary outcome, thus the corresponding
observations are dropped from the estimation.
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find that the two IVs have expected signs for all the three outcomes and both workload
measures. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant in most cases.
This supports the validity of the two IVs for estimating the effect of daily workload on binary
outcomes.
Table 4.12: Estimated Coefficients of IVs by Full MLE of (4.5) and (4.2) (Full Sample)
Reoperation Readmission Mortality
IV #D<0B4B8 (D<=28 #D<0B4B8 (D<=28 #D<0B4B8 (D<=28
)>C$ℎC4A8 −0.074∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.359∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.051) (0.008) (0.052) (0.008) (0.051)
0?#4GC8 0.005 0.043† 0.007† 0.053∗ 0.006† 0.047∗
(0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.022)
Num Obs. 5345 5345 5116 5116 5081 5081
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. Coefficients and standard
errors of two IVs in (4.5) when we estimate (4.2) and (4.5) jointly by full MLE for reoperation, readmission, and mortality.
4.4.2 Effect of Daily Workload on Surgery Duration and Patient
Outcomes
In this section, we provide the estimation results for our main models (4.1) and (4.2)
to analyze how surgeon’s daily workload impacts surgery duration and patient outcomes.
To save space, we only show the results when we measure surgeon’s daily workload by the
number of cases performed, i.e., with ,>A:;>038 specified as #D<0B4B8 in (4.1) and (4.2).
The results for (D<=28 (the total incision time of other cases) as the daily workload measure
are qualitatively similar, and are reported in Tables D.5 and D.6 in Appendix D.3. Note
that the estimation results here capture the average effect for all the cases performed by the
surgeon in a day.
In Table 4.13, we show the estimation results for the full sample. For the three continuous
dependent variables (“Incision time”, “Post-LOS”, and “Total ICU time” columns), we show
the estimated W in (4.1) and its standard errors. For the three binary dependent variables
(“Reoperation”, “Readmission”, and “Mortality” columns), we report the estimated average
marginal effects (AME) of daily workload as they are easier to interpret. The AME calculates
the marginal effect of daily workload for each case given the other independent variables are
173
unchanged, and then averages across the resulting effect estimates. In Panel A, we show the
estimation results from the TSLS and full MLE with the two IVs, as described in Section
4.3.2. For comparison, we also show in Panel B the results when we ignore the endogeneity
bias, i.e., from simple OLS on (4.1) or MLE on (4.2). The estimated coefficient W in (4.2)
for the three binary dependent variables are given in Tables D.7 and D.8 in Appendix D.3.
To account for the heterogeneity in the impact of daily workload, we further report in
Table 4.14 the estimated effects when we estimate the models using elective patients (Panel
A) and non-elective patients (Panel B) respectively. The non-elective patients include those
in the urgent, emergent, and salvage surgeries. For the two subsamples, we still estimate
models (4.1) and (4.2) following the methods in Section 4.3.2. The effectiveness of the two
IVs for the full and sub-samples is validated in Section 4.4.1.
Table 4.13: Estimated Effects of Daily Workload (Number of Cases) on Surgery Duration
and Patient Outcomes: Full Sample
Continuous H8 : Coefficients Binary H8 : AME
Incision time Post-LOS Total ICU time Reoperation Readmission Mortality
Panel A: Full 0.430∗ 1.408∗ 1.031∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.065† 0.010
(0.217) (0.565) (0.482) (0.011) (0.039) (0.011)
Num Obs. 5345 5344 5319 5345 5116 5081
Panel B: Full (w/o IV) −0.102∗∗ −0.020 −0.002 −0.002 −0.000 0.010∗
(0.039) (0.147) (0.086) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Num Obs. 5345 5344 5319 5345 5116 5081
The estimated effects of surgeon’s daily workload (number of cases) on surgery duration and patient outcomes for the
full sample. We report the estimated coefficients in (4.1) for the three continuous dependent variables, and the AME
from (4.2) for the three binary dependent variables. Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05,
∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
4.4.2.1 Impact of workload on incision time
We first discuss the impact of workload on the surgery incision time. First, we see from
the “Incision time” in Panel A of Table 4.13 that higher daily workload tends to increase the
incision time of the cases performed by the focal surgeon. In particular, adding one more
case increases the incision time of each case performed by the surgeon by 0.43 hour (26
minutes). This translates to a 9% relative increase of the average incision time. The effect
is statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, if we ignore the endogeneity in
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Table 4.14: Estimated Effects of Daily Workload (Number of Cases) on Surgery Duration
and Patient Outcomes: Elective and Non-elective Sample
Continuous H8 : Coefficients Binary H8 : AME
Incision time Post-LOS Total ICU time Reoperation Readmission Mortality
Panel A: Elec 0.378∗∗ −0.288 0.121 0.017 0.029 0.060
(0.140) (1.015) (0.729) (0.039) (0.066) (0.050)
Num Obs. 2474 2474 2454 2394 2398 1897
Panel B: Non-elec 0.486 3.004∗ 1.906† 0.049∗ 0.082∗ −0.004
(0.341) (1.501) (1.054) (0.021) (0.039) (0.012)
Num Obs. 2871 2870 2865 2871 2697 2769
The estimated effects of surgeon’s daily workload (number of cases) on surgery duration and patient outcomes for the
elective and non-elective sample. We report the estimated coefficients in (4.1) for the three continuous dependent variables,
and the AME from (4.2) for the three binary dependent variables. Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1,
∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
daily workload and estimate the model by OLS, the results become completely opposite. By
the ‘Incision time” column in Panel B, we see the coefficient of #D<0B4B8 is significantly
negative. The negative coefficient implies surgeons may schedule more cases a day if the
unobservable factor implies shorter incision times. This shows it is essential to control the
endogeneity in the daily workload by proper IVs.
A priori, the surgeon’s daily workload may impact the incision time in both directions.
First, surgeons may “speed up” the surgeries when they have more cases to perform in a
day, leading to a shorter incision time. This type of speedup effect is found in, e.g., Kc and
Terwiesch (2009). On the other hand, surgeons may take more time to complete their tasks
due to fatigue associated with high daily workloads. For example, Berry Jaeker and Tucker
(2017) finds patient’s LOS increases in the occupancy after the occupancy level exceeds
a tipping point. Our empirical results here support the second direction, i.e., higher daily
workloads of surgeons leads to longer incision times. This can be explained as follows. First,
as cardiac surgeries are complex and delicate procedures, it is very difficult for surgeons to
speed up in their operations. Second, as a demanding task, performing multiple cases a
day can lead to severe fatigue of surgeons, both physically and mentally. For these reasons,
the impact of surgeon’s fatigue outweighs other potential channels for speedup, and causes
longer incision time for each case performed.
We notice that by model (4.1), the expected total incision time of all cases performed by
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a surgeon in a day increases not linearly, but quadratically in the number of cases. This is
because the coefficient W measures the average effect of daily workload for all cases performed
by the surgeon. To see this, index the cases by a surgeon on a given day by 8 = 1, 2, ..., =.












-8V + W=2. (4.6)
This quadratic structure highlights the negative effect of surgeon’s high daily workload.
On the other hand, it suggests the hospital can improve its performance by ‘smoothing”
surgeon’s workloads across days. For example, if we assign two cases by a surgeon in a day
to two separate days, their expected total incision time would decrease by 0.43×22−0.43×2 =
0.86 hour. Following this spirit, we propose in Section 4.5 a scheduling model for minimizing
the total expected incision time.
We also estimate the impact on incision time for elective and non-elective cases sepa-
rately. This captures the potential heterogeneity in the effect for different types of patients.
By the “Incision time” column in Table 4.14, we see that the effect of daily workload on
incision time is statistically significant (at 1% level) for elective cases (Panel A), but it turns
out to be insignificant for non-elective cases (Panel B). The magnitude of the impact for
elective cases is similar to that for the full sample. In particular, performing one more case
increases the incision time of each elective case by 23 minutes, which is equivalent to an 8%
increase on average. One possible explanation for the difference in effects is the non-elective
cases (urgent and emergent cases) are generally more urgent and time sensitive, thus their
incision time is less impacted by surgeon’s daily workload.
4.4.2.2 Impact of workload on patient outcomes
Next, we examine the effect of daily workload on patient outcomes, including two contin-
uous outcomes (post-LOS and total ICU time) and three binary outcomes (reoperation, read-
mission, and mortality). The estimation results are reported in the corresponding columns
in Table 4.13 for the full sample, and in Table 4.14 for elective and non-elective samples
separately.
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By the “post-LOS” and ”total ICU time” columns in Panel A of Table 4.13, we find that
higher daily workload increases the post-LOS and total ICU time. Specifically, adding one
more case increases the total ICU time and post-LOS by 1.05 and 1.45 days, respectively, for
the cases performed by the surgeon on the same day. This is equivalent to a 12% increase for
post-LOS and a 19% increase for total ICU time. However, the effects becomes insignificant
for both outcomes if we do not control the endogeneity by IVs, as shown in Panel B of Table
4.13.
We then compare the effects on post-LOS and total ICU time for elective and non-
elective cases. For the post-LOS, we see the coefficients of daily workload are statistically
significant for the non-elective cases, but insignificant for the elective cases (“Post-LOS”
column in Table 4.14). Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is larger for the non-
elective cases than that for the full sample. For example, adding one more case leads to 3.13
more days in the post-LOS of non-elective patients, which is equivalent to a 21% relative
increase. This effect is more than twice as that for the full sample (1.45 days). We also find
a similar heterogeneous effect for total ICU time (“Total ICU time” column in Table 4.14).
The estimated coefficient of #D<0B4B8 is 1.967 days for the total ICU time of non-elective
cases, which is almost twice as large as that for the full sample. On the other hand, the
daily workload does not significantly impact the total ICU time of elective cases.
The heterogeneous effect for the post-LOS and total ICU time can be explained as
follows. The non-elective cases are generally more urgent and complicated than the elective
ones as the non-elective patients are usually more severe. Thus, the outcomes of non-elective
cases tend to be more sensitive to surgeon’s fatigue due to daily workload. On the other
hand, the elective patients are on average less severe, and they recover more quickly after
the surgery. This is shown by the summary statistics of post-LOS and total ICU time in
Table 4.6, as we see the average post-LOS and total ICU time are much longer for the non-
elective cases than that for the elective ones. Moreover, the standard deviations of total
ICU time and post-LOS are also much larger for the non-elective cases, implying there is
more variation in the surgical outcome of non-elective patients.
The effect on total ICU time and post-LOS, as identified above, is important for the
hospital to manage its patient flow. With longer post-surgery LOS, the patients would
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occupy the beds in ICU or ward for more time, thus increasing the demand for downstream
resources and reducing the system throughput efficiency. This can lead to overcrowding in
the perioperative environment and delay in surgeries (Zenteno et al., 2016). Besides, the ICU
is often congested and extremely expensive to operate (e.g., Halpern (2011)). Given almost
all the patients (99%) in our sample are sent to the ICU after surgery, understanding the
factors that impact their ICU recovery time provides a potential method for managing ICU
congestion. Similar to (4.6) for incision time, the total expected ICU time and post-LOS
also grow quadratically in the number of cases of the surgeon, so smoothing the surgeon’s
workload across days can reduce the total time needed for recovery of the patients. According
to the estimation results for the full sample, moving two cases performed by a surgeon in
a day to two different days leads to a reduction of 2.06 (resp. 2.82) days in total expected
ICU time (resp. post-LOS).
We then check the impact of workload on three binary patient outcomes (reoperation,
readmission, and mortality), which are estimated by full MLE on (4.5) and (4.2) jointly.
The estimated AME and their standard errors are reported in the corresponding columns in
Table 4.13 for the full sample, and in Table 4.14 for the elective and non-elective subsamples.
The estimated coefficient W in (4.2) for the three binary outcomes are provided in Tables
D.7 and D.8 in Appendix D.3.
By the “Reoperation” column in Panel A of Table 4.13, we see a higher daily workload
increases the probability of reoperation when estimated from the full sample. Specifically,
adding one more case leads to a three percentage points increase in the reoperation proba-
bility for each case performed by the surgeon on the same day. The magnitude of such an
increase seems large at first, as the original reoperation probability is only 7% (see Table
4.5). However, we note that the median of surgeons’ daily workload is two cases, thus adding
one more case is equivalent to a 50% increase in daily workload. The large impact of work-
load on medical outcome is also observed in the literature. For example, Kc and Terwiesch
(2009) finds that 10% increase in overwork increases the morality rate by 2.2 percentage
points, which is a 32% relative change in their setting.
When we estimate the impact on reoperation probability for elective and non-elective
patients separately, we find that daily workload significantly increases the reoperation prob-
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ability for non-elective patients (“Reoperation” column in Table 4.14). In particular, adding
one more case increases the reoperation probability by 4.9 percentage points for the non-
elective cases. This AME is larger than that for the full sample (three percentage points).
However, no statistically significant impact is observed for elective patients. Such hetero-
geneity reconciles the discussion for post-LOS and total ICU time in the previous section:
the non-elective cases are generally more severe and urgent than the elective ones, thus their
outcomes are more sensitive to surgeon’s fatigue due to high daily workload.
A similar effect of daily workload is also observed for hospital readmission probability.
The “Readmission” column in Panel A of Table 4.13 shows that higher daily workload in-
creases the probability of readmission. Specifically, adding one more case increases the read-
mission probability by 6.5 percentage points when estimated from the full sample. Moreover,
as shown by the “Readmission” column in Table 4.14, the effect on readmission probability
is statistically significant for the non-elective cases, but not so for the elective cases. The
magnitude of the AME is also larger for the non-elective cases (0.082) than that for the full
sample (0.065). These results are consistent with other outcomes, i.e., post-LOS, total ICU
time, and reoperation.
For the 30-day mortality, however, the effect of daily workload vanishes. By the “Mortal-
ity” column in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, we see the AME of daily workload are insignificant for
both the full sample and the two subsamples once we control the endogeneity bias using IVs.
The insignificant effect for mortality seems surprising, especially given the negative impact
of daily workload on other outcomes. One possible reason for such difference is surgeons
tend to pay greater attention to the patients with high risk of death, thus the mortality rate
is less impacted by surgeon’s daily workload.
The consistent results in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 demonstrate the negative impact of sur-
geon’s high daily workload on multiple patient outcomes. Such effect is especially significant
for non-elective patients, who are generally more severe. Our results provide new evidence
for the link between high workload level and worse patient outcomes (see, e.g., Kc and Ter-
wiesch (2009) and Kuntz et al. (2015)). From the managerial perspective, it suggests that
when hospitals design their surgery schedules, they should take into account the effect of
surgeon’s fatigue due to high daily workload. We shed light on this direction in our next
179
section.
4.5 A Surgery Scheduling Model with Impact from Daily
Workload
In this section, we propose a shuffling model for surgery scheduling based on the effect
of daily workload estimated in the previous sections. While there is a rich literature on
surgery scheduling, most of it assumes exogenous distributions for the surgery duration and
patient outcomes (e.g., post-LOS). That is, the behavioral impact from surgeon’s workload
is ignored. However, our econometric analysis suggests that higher daily workloads for
surgeons are associated with longer incision times and worse surgical outcomes. Thus, our
model in this section sheds lights on the potential benefit we can obtain by incorporating
these effects in the surgical scheduling.
There are different layers of decisions to be made in OR scheduling, such as determining
the number of ORs to open, assigning surgeries to ORs and surgeons, choosing surgery date
and starting time, and sequencing of surgeries within each OR in a day. Different studies
usually focus on one or more of these aspects while assume the others to be fixed. For
example, Shylo et al. (2013) consider the allocation of surgeries to blocks under a block
booking framework. Denton et al. (2010) determine the number of ORs to open and the
assignment of surgeries to ORs. The sequencing of surgeries is considered in Gupta (2007)
and Batun et al. (2011). The model in Wang and Pourghannad (2020) solves for the optimal
matching between patients and surgeons.
In our model, we consider the decision to switch two cases that are performed within the
same calendar week in our sample. In the switching, we keep the surgeon of each surgery
unchanged and only switch the surgery dates. In addition, we require the number of days
worked by each surgeon in the week does not increase after switching. These constraints lead
to three properties of the shuffling model that facilitate its practical implementation. First,
the total number of cases by all surgeons performed on each day is unchanged. Thus, the
cardiac department does not need to adjust its resource allocation across days or change the
schedule of its ORs shared with other departments. Second, the patients assigned to each
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surgeon remain unchanged. This reflects the reality that surgeons in the cardiac department
have high ownership of their patients. Finally, the number of working days in the week does
not increase for each surgeon. This is imposed because it would be difficult to ask the
surgeons to work for more days than they originally do, although this can smooth their
daily workload.
Our objective is to minimize the total expected incision time of all cases in a given
week. By the empirical results in Section 4.4.2.1, the total incision time will endogenously
depend on surgeon’s daily workload. We show this objective can be formulated as a mixed-
integer quadratic programming (MIQP) problem. That is, the objective is quadratic in the
decision variables, the constraints are linear, and some of the decision variables are forced
to take integer values. Note that as we can only switch the dates of surgeries with their
surgeons unchanged in our model, the corresponding results provide a conservative estimate
for the benefit of incorporating the effect of surgeons’ workloads in surgery scheduling. If we
introduce more flexibility to the model, e.g., changing the number of ORs or the surgeons
assigned to each patient, we may be able to achieve larger improvements.
We develop and solve the shuffling model for each calendar week separately. We impose
the following constraints on the switching of different types of cases. First, the elective cases
can be moved to any weekday of the week; second, the urgent cases can only be moved to one
day before or after the original surgery date; finally, the emergent and salvage cases cannot
be moved. These constraints reflect the fact that the hospital has less flexibility in changing
the schedule of non-elective cases. Thus, we can switch two elective cases regardless of their
original surgery dates. However, for an urgent case, we can only switch it with the cases
that are performed one day before or after its surgery date. Besides, we assume the cases
performed on weekends cannot be moved.
Let  be the set of movable cases described above. For cases 8, 9 ∈ , we introduce the
binary variable G8, 9 , which takes value one if cases 8 and 9 are switched and zero otherwise.
By symmetry, we have G8, 9 = G 9 ,8. In our model, we only consider one-round shuffling, i.e.,
the pairs (8, 9) that are switched do not overlap. This constraint facilitates the formulation of
the model as an MIQP problem. In addition, the model solution from the one-round shuffling
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is easier to interpret and implement. This constraint can be mathematically expressed as:∑
9
G8, 9 ≤ 1, ∀8 ∈ . (4.7)
Denote the surgeons and weekdays by set ( and ) , respectively. For each case 8 ∈ ,
we represent its surgeon and original surgery date by B̃(8) and C̃ (8). As we do not change
the surgeon assigned to each case in our shuffling model, it will be meaningless to switch
the cases that are performed on the same day. Besides, as we measure the surgeon’s daily
workload by the number of cases performed, switching two cases by the same surgeon on
different days will not change the surgeon’s daily workload. Thus we only consider the
switching between cases that are performed by different surgeons on different days. Thus
we have
G8, 9 = 0, if C̃ (8) = C̃ ( 9) or B̃(8) = B̃( 9). (4.8)
As the urgent cases can only be moved to one day before or after the original date, we
impose
G8, 9 = 0, if 8 or 9 ∈ DA6 and |C̃ (8) − C̃ ( 9) | > 1, (4.9)
where DA6 denotes the set of urgent cases.
We then formulate the constraint that the number of days worked by each surgeon does
not increase after switching. Let  (1)B,C and 
(2)
B,C denote the sets of elective and non-elective
cases by surgeon B on day C before switching. To compute the number of cases by surgeon B
on day C after switching, we need to account for both the cases that are moved out and the
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}
for ] ∈ {1, 2}. It is easy to verify the set $ ( ])B,C has the following interpretations: suppose
(8, 9) ∈ $ (1)B,C (resp. (8, 9) ∈ $
(2)
B,C ) and G8, 9 = 1, then the number of elective (resp. non-
elective) cases performed by surgeon B on day C is reduced by one. This is because the case 8
by surgeon B on day C is switched with another case 9 , which must be performed by another
surgeon on a different day by constraint (4.8). Similarly, to account for the cases that are
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for ] ∈ {1, 2}. The set  ( ])B,C can be interpreted as follows: if (8, 9) ∈ 
(1)
B,C (resp. (8, 9) ∈ 
(2)
B,C )
and G8, 9 = 1, then the number of elective (resp. non-elective) cases performed by surgeon B
on day C is increased by one. This is because case 9 performed by surgeon B is now moved
to day C, replacing the original case 8 performed by another surgeon.
With the above preparation, we can express the number of elective and non-elective
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∑
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G8, 9 , (4.11)
where =(1)B,C and =
(2)
B,C denote the numbers of elective and non-elective cases by surgeon B on
day C before the switching, i.e., =(1)B,C = |
(1)




B,C |. As we discussed, the second
and third terms in equations (4.10) and (4.11) represent the cases that are moved out of or
into day C for surgeon B.





B,C > 0} ≤ #B, ∀B ∈ (.
where #B is the number of days worked by surgeon B before switching. However, this
constraint is non-linear as it involves the indicator function. To facilitate implementation,
we employ the following equivalent linear formulation:∑
C ∈)
IB,C ≤ #B, ∀B ∈ (, (4.12)
with
IB,C ≤ " · (=̃(1)B,C + =̃
(2)





Here IB,C ∈ {0, 1} are binary variables; " (resp. <) is a big (resp. small) enough constant
number. It is easy to verify IB,C satisfies




Next, we formulate the objective function to minimize the total expected incision time
of all cases in the week. For each case 8, we decompose its expected incision time ;8 to two
parts
H8 = ;8 + 38 ,
with
;8 = -8V and 38 = W · #D<0B4B8 . (4.14)
where #D<0B4B8 denotes the number of cases performed by the surgeon of case 8 on its
surgery date; the coefficients V and W are estimated by TSLS on model (4.1) as reported
in Section ??. Thus, the part 38 captures the effect of #D<0B4B8 on the incision time.
To focus on the impact of daily workload, we assume the part ;8 remains unchanged after
switching. However, the part 38 will be affected by the new daily workload of the surgeon.








;8 · G8, 9 +
∑
C̃ (8)=C ,B̃ ( 9)=B
; 9 · G8, 9 + B,C . (4.15)
The first term is the sum of ;8 before switching; the second and third terms represent the
changes in the sum of ;8 due to switching. The final term capture the impact from the new











which is quadratic in the new daily workload =̃(1)B,C + =̃
(2)
B,C . We can also incorporate the
heterogeneous effect for elective and non-elective cases as shown in Section 4.4.2.1. In this














where W (1) and W (2) denote the effects for elective and non-elective cases respectively.






where .B,C is given by (4.15). Apparently, the objective is quadratic in the decision variable
G8, 9 . Then, the MIQP is formulated by combining (4.15) and the linear constraints in (4.7)
– (4.13).
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In many human-involved service systems, the service time and quality are found to be
endogenously affected by the level of workload. To shed light on this topic, we empirically
investigate the relationship between workload and performance in the context of cardiac
surgery. Specifically, we study how surgery duration and patient outcomes are impacted by
surgeon’s daily workload, i.e., number of cases performed in a day. Using a detailed data
set of cardiac surgeries, we find that higher surgeons’ daily workloads lead to longer surgery
durations and worse patient outcomes, including longer post-surgery LOS in the ICU and
hospital, as well as higher likelihoods of reoperation and readmission. Our study provides
new evidence for the negative impact of surgeon’s fatigue due to high daily workload. It
suggests hospitals may improve their surgery performance if they could smooth surgeons’
workloads across days. Based on our findings, we develop a surgery scheduling model that
incorporates the effect of surgeon’s workload.
When identifying the true effect of surgeon’s workload, it is crucial to address the endo-
geneity bias that arises from unobservable risk factors. To handle this challenge, we develop
two IVs using the operational factors in the cardiac department. In particular, we leverage
a novel data set, which is the surgeons’ block schedule assigned by the department. We find
surgeons tend to schedule more surgeries if their next scheduled block is far away. This in-
troduces exogenous variation in surgeon’s daily workload, which is essential for constructing
proper IVs. We also find there is substantial heterogeneity in the effects of daily workload
for different types of patients: the impact on incision time is more significant for elective
patients, while the surgery outcomes of non-elective patients are more affected by surgeon’s
daily workload.
We are currently exploring following directions in our study. First, we are implementing
the surgery scheduling model proposed in Section 4.5 on our sample. We aim to quantify
185
the benefit of incorporating the effect of surgeon’s daily workload in surgery scheduling,
i.e., the reduction in total expected incision time. We also plan to investigate other types of
objectives, such as total expected overtime or patient’s post-LOS. Besides, we are conducting
more robustness checks of our empirical results, as well as communicating with doctors to
discuss other potential mechanisms for the effects of surgeon’s workload. Finally, as a
potential future research, we hope to obtain the surgery data in the period of the COVID-
19 pandemic. During the first several months of the pandemic, the hospital cancelled most
of its elective surgeries. This provides an exogenous shock to the surgeon’s workload and
patient’s waiting time. If we were able to get this data (i.e., extending our sample by one
year), we may be able to find other interesting results related to the effects of surgeon’s
workload and delays in patient treatment.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Supplemental Information
A.1 Information Production
We decompose the time C + 1 dividend "C+1 into a total of #̄ units of information [8, so
that "C+1 = [1+· · ·+[#̄ . These units are i.i.d. normally distributed with variance var(")/#̄.
To capture the idea that each piece of information is small, we assume #̄ is large. Let 5C
be the fraction of the #̄ units that are observable at time C, and 1 − 5C be the fraction of








And we’ll have var(<̃C ) = 5Cvar(") and var(nC+1) = (1 − 5C )var(").
We assume that in every period: (a) with probability c>:D any previously observable
piece of information may become unobservable next period; (b) with probability cD:> any
previously unobservable piece of information becomes observable next period; and (c) a
certain number n 5 ,C+1 of information units transitions at random from unobservable at time
C to observable at time C + 1, or vice versa. It is possible for a given C that n 5 ,C = 0. This
shock proxies for large aggregate changes in observability, as opposed to the micro changes
that are captured by cD:> and c>:D. Note that n 5 ,C+1 should be specified to ensure that
5C+1 ∈ [0, 1].
When 1 5 = 0, we can derive the 5C dynamics in (1.5) and (1.6) in terms of these two
transition probabilities. Given 5C , and in the absence of any information production, next
period’s fraction of information units that are knowable will be
5C+1 ≈ (1 − 5C ) × cD:>︸            ︷︷            ︸
unobservable → observable




The approximation becomes exact for large #̄, where the fraction of units that change states
approaches the probabilities cD:> and c>:D. Matching this expression to the corresponding
parts in our 5C dynamics in (1.5) requires
(1 − 5C ) × cD:> + 5C × (1 − c>:D) = 0 5 + ^ 5 × ( 5C − 0 5 ). (A.1)
Equating the coefficient of 5C on the two sides yields
cD:> = (1 − ^ 5 ) × 0 5 , c>:D = (1 − ^ 5 ) × (1 − 0 5 ),
which we solve to get
^ 5 = 1 − cD:> − c>:D , 0 5 =
cD:>
cD:> + c>:D .
The persistence parameter ^ 5 is therefore greater when the transition probabilities for in-
dividual units are smaller. The ratio defining 0 5 is the stationary probability that an
individual unit is observable, so (A.1) says that 5C mean-reverts to the average fraction of
observable units.
Given the model calibration from Table A.1, the relationships above imply
cD:> = 0.01575 c>:D = 0.07425.
It is about five times more likely that a currently observable piece of information becomes
unobservable, than a currently unobservable piece of information becomes observable. This
result is a direct outcome of the steady state level of information in the absence of feedback,
i.e. 0 5 , being low and is an inevitable feature of a two-regime model (since the no-feedback
regime has to be at a low value of 5C).
Information Production Sector
Each news outlet 9 can discover  9 units of information, i.e. [8’s from above, at a fixed
cost per unit of 2%. We assume each outlet discovers a unique set of information. Once
a unit of information is discovered, the marginal cost of revealing it to investors is zero,
and that unit becomes a generic observable unit with a 1 − c>:D probability of remaining
observable in the next period.
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Recall from Section 1.2.2 that informed investors pay an amount 2" (out of the total cost
2 of becoming informed) to acquire information from the news outlets. We show in Section
A.5.3 that in our calibration for a low enough 2" all informed investors prefer spending 2"
on acquiring information from the news producers, over consuming 2" . 1 In deciding how
much information to produce, news producers forecast next period’s demand for news. A
market price of a unit of information is determined to clear the news production market.
Each news outlet believes that the number of informed investors at time C + 1 will be
EC [_C+1], and that each of the C +1 informed will choose to buy all of the outlet’s production
 9 at a price of ? per unit of information. Since each outlet is small and ex-ante identical,
it assumes the price ? is fixed. Each outlet’s profit is given by
EC [_C+1]  9 ? − 2%  9 .
The _C+1 term is present due to the zero marginal cost of transmitting information, once it’s






Because of the zero marginal cost of sharing information with additional investors, the per
unit price of information is decreasing in the number of informed investors.2 This is similar
to Veldkamp (2006), except in our model investors buy more information as the price falls,
whereas in Veldkamp (2006) the cost of becoming informed varies but investors cannot
choose the quantity of information they acquire.
Each investor chooses to spend 2" of the total cost 2 on buying information from all
the producers. The choice to spend 2" will be discussed in Section A.5.3. Therefore, the
budget constraint becomes
2" =  × ?,
1We also show that uninformed investors would not choose to opt into an information set where they
become informed but choose to consume 2" rather than pay it to the information production sector.
2A similar result obtains if we assume monopolistic competition, i.e. each media outlet produces a
differentiated piece of information, while taking as given the prices of all other news outlets. This case is
analyzed in Perloff and Salop (1985) and Veldkamp (2006), though it does not add to the intuition here.















EC [_C+1] . (A.2)
The information producers are assumed to be myopic and believe that tomorrow’s num-
ber of informed is equal to today’s number of informed.
EC [_C+1] ≈ _C (A.3)
Figure (A.1) shows that in our equilibrium, this is a very accurate approximation because,
in the steady state, the economy spends very little time in the _C ∈ [0, 0.05] region in
which the approximation is less precise (see equilibrium _ in Figure 1.4 and the equilibrium
steady-state distribution in Figure 1.5). With this we augment the 5C+1 dynamics in the





yields the reconciliation of our process with that of (1.6). Section A.5.3 discusses the mag-
nitude of feasible 2" s in our calibration; and since 2% is a free parameter in the model, from
(A.4) we see that given a 2" any 1 5 is attainable for some 2%.
The foregoing discussion describes the interior behavior of 5C , given in (1.5). At the left
boundary, we disallow realizations of n 5 ,C+1 that will push 5C+1 below zero. At the right
boundary, we similarly disallow realizations of n 5 ,C+1 that will push 5C+1 above one. When
the 1 5 _C term would push 5C+1 above one, we assume this effect is exactly offset by n 5 ,C+1.
A.2 Model Calibration
In calibrating the model to the aggregate market, we take one period in the model to
represent one month. We estimate a monthly dividend process of the form (1.1) using
daily dividend data for the S&P 500 index from 1998–2018, then aggregating this up to
the quarterly level (to mitigate seasonality effects), and estimating an ARMA(1,1) process
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Media equilibrium: RR=1.0015 a=0.175 k=0.91 b=0.384 phi0=0.35 gm=0.46 
sigX=0.1629 c=0.2627 Xb=1.00 Db=1.00 rho=0.967 sigM=0.0471
 eps=0.135 p_eps=0.030  |BelCrv|=101 Nstep=7 NstepA=10000
Figure A.1: Comparison of EC [_C+1] against _C .
Note: The figure uses parameter values from Table A.1.
for the quarterly dividend. From this we back out the monthly parameters d = .967 and
f" = 0.0471. See the Supplementary Appendix for details.
We adopt the normalization ̄ = 1 and -̄ = 1, so dividends and share supplies are
measured in units of their monthly averages. We calibrate f2
-
to match monthly turnover,
meaning the number of shares traded per month divided by the shares outstanding. Recall
from Section 1.2.4 that in each period C, investors buy the new supply -C originating from
liquidity demanders, and investors from the previous period sell back -C−1 shares to the
previous period’s liquidity demanders unwinding their trades. The total trading volume in
period C is therefore |-C | + |-C−1 |. Using the normality of the supply shocks, the expected
volume per period becomes




≈ 1.596f- . (A.5)
In the Supplementary Appendix, we find that the average weekly turnover of the Dow
Industrials index is 0.065.3 To model a period of stress, we assume that turnover, or the
turnover expectation of market participants, is four times higher than normal, so f- =
4 × 0.065 × 1/2 ×
√
c/2 = 0.1629.4
3Lo and Wang (2000, Table 3) show that from 1987-1996, weekly turnover on a value-weighted index of
NYSE and AMEX common shares was 1.25%. Therefore the monthly turnover on this index was 52/12 ×
1.25% = 5.42%.
4The trading volume of SPY, which tracks the S&P 500 index and is one of the most liquid exchange-
traded funds, has spiked by a factor of four during stress periods. For example, in 1/18/2011 the trailing
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We use a monthly gross risk-free return of ' = 1.0015 and set the risk-aversion pa-
rameter at W = 0.46. This yields an annualized excess return of roughly 15%, which is
not unreasonable for periods of stress. We choose a per month cost of being informed of
2 = 0.2627, which should be compared with a monthly aggregate average dividend of 1
(since -̄ = ̄ = 1). This high cost of information is comparable to the 2/20 fee structure
of many hedge funds, and leads to an equilibrium number of informed of under 18% of the
overall population.
For the dynamics of the 5C process in (1.6), we set 0 5 = 0.175, ^ 5 = 0.91 and 1 5 =
0.384. In the context of our information production microfoundation (see Section A.1),
these choices of 0 5 and ^ 5 imply the probability of a unit of information transitioning from
observable to unobservable is roughly five times larger than the probability of transitioning
from unobservable to observable. A value of ^ 5 close to 1 makes the information state
persistent by making both of the above probabilities small, and a positive 1 5 produces
positive feedback from the fraction informed to the level of accessible information. When 5C
is low, _( 5C ) = 0, and 5C is pulled toward a level of 0 5 = 0.175.5 We fix q = 0.35, implying
that 65% of the knowable information is publicly known. This introduces a high degree of
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, and leads to a large
drop in price in the high-information regime; see the discussion in Section 1.5.1.
Beyond these qualitative considerations, these specific parameters were chosen to pro-
duce plausible model dynamics. Finally, for the shocks n 5 ,C+1, we use a three-point distribu-
tion taking values {−0.135, 0, 0.135} with probabilities {0.03, 0.94, 0.03}, so shocks are rare.
Model parameters are summarized in Table A.1.
Our results are robust to changes in model parameters. For a wide range of values in
our non-dividend parameters (since d and f" are estimated from actual data) in Table A.1,
there exists a q close to its base value of 0.35 which generates the bimodal 5C distribution
and the large price drops that we discuss below. In fact, in many cases the resultant price
month’s average daily trading volume was 106.2 million and in 8/26/2011 the trailing month’s daily trading
volume was 407.0 million.
5Fama and French (2000) show '2’s of year-ahead firm-level earnings forecasts are between 5% and 20%.
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̄ -̄ ' f- d f" W 2 q P[n 5 ≠ 0] n 5 0 5 1 5 ^ 5
1 1 1.0015 0.1629 0.967 0.0471 0.46 0.2627 0.35 0.03 × 2 0.135 .175 .384 .91
Table A.1: Calibrated parameters for model (1.6)
drops are larger than the one that occurs under our base parameterization.6
A.3 Model Solution: Statement of Main Results
This appendix provides precise statements of the results described in Section 1.3. For
some of the results in this section (Propositions 4–6), and for numerical calculations, we
discretize the state space by restricting D — the set of values that 5C can take — to be a
finite subset of [0, 1]. This discretization allows us to represent any function of 5 as an =-
dimensional vector. Our numerical procedure is discussed in the Supplementary Appendix.
The proofs are given in Sections A.4 and A.5.
A.3.1 Market Equilibrium
Recall that a market equilibrium with conjectured variance + consists of a price pro-
cess and investor demand functions that clear the market and solve (1.9), with the true
conditional variance replaced by +, as in (1.16).
Proposition 3. For any conjectured variance function + (·) bounded above and bounded
away from zero, and any _(·), there exists a market equilibrium with a price process of the
form (1.11) in which 0C , 1C , and 2C are functions of 5C and do not otherwise depend on C,
and the constants 3 and 6 are given by 3 = d/(' − d) and 6 = 1/(' − d).
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.4.1. Given price coefficient functions 1
and 2, the conjectured-variance updating equation (1.17) defines a new +, and given +,
Proposition 3 defines new coefficients 1 and 2. (The coefficient 0 depends on + but does
not enter in the update of +.) Combining the two steps yields a mapping from an initial
pair of functions (1, 2) to an updated pair (1, 2). We have a rational expectations market
equilibrium, at a fixed point of this mapping. We need some modest parameter restrictions
to ensure existence of a fixed point. The following condition is particularly simple to state:
6This analysis is available from the authors.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that ' ∈ [1, 1.2] and the model parameters satisfy
(1 + 3)Wf"f- ≤ 0.28. (A.6)
Then for any fixed _(·), there exists a fixed point of the conjectured-variance updating map-
ping. This fixed point defines a self-consistent variance conjecture and thus a rational ex-
pectations market equilibrium with prices of the form in (1.11).
The point of condition (A.6) is that we need (1 + 3)Wf"f- to be small, and with the
mild bounds on ' we can show that 0.28 is small enough. If we fix 5C ≡ 0 and _ ≡ 0 we
have an OLG model without asymmetric information, similar to the one in Spiegel (1998).
As in Spiegel’s (1998) model, the coefficients in the price function can be expressed through
solutions of quadratic equations,7 and a condition like (A.6) arises naturally.
A.3.2 Information Equilibrium
Given a market equilibrium, we need to ensure the existence of an endogenous fraction
informed. For every 5 , we need to find a _( 5 ) that makes investors exactly indifferent
between paying the cost 2 of becoming informed or staying uninformed; if no such _ exists,
we set _ equal to zero or one according to Definition 1.
For technical reasons, in the following result we assume that the shocks n 5 ,C have a den-
sity. The dynamics in (1.6) project 5C to a finite grid, even when the shocks are continuous.
In our numerical examples, it is easier to work with a discrete distribution for n 5 ,C . The
details of our numerical procedure are included in Appendix A.5.1 and the Supplementary
Appendix.
7When 5C ≡ 0, the equation for a self-consistent variance conjecture reduces to solving a quadratic
equation with two real roots, which is given by
+2 +
[





+ + (1 + 3)4f4" = 0.
The two roots describe two market equilibria, one with high price variance and one with low price variance,
and we need an upper bound on the left side of (A.6) to ensure that both roots are positive. However, the
high variance equilibrium is unstable under arbitrarily small parameter perturbations; only the low variance
equilibrium is robust to such changes. In our numerical experiments, we find that if we start from a low
value of + (·) we converge to the low variance equilibrium.
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Proposition 5. Suppose the shocks n 5 ,C have a density. Then for any strictly positive +
there exists an endogenous _ in the sense of Definition 1.
Given an exogenous _(·) and the associated self-consistent +, we can solve for a new
endogenous _(·). However, once we change _, the conjectured variance may no longer be
self-consistent. When we solve the model numerically, we start with an arbitrary8 variance
conjecture +, we then solve for the endogenous fraction informed (as provided by Propo-
sition 5), we then calculate the realized variance (1.17) using the endogenous _, update the
conjectured variance and repeat. We can formulate this process as starting with a pair of
coefficient functions (1, 2), from which we calculate _ and then a new (1, 2). Combining the
two steps yields a mapping from an initial (1, 2, _) to a new (1, 2, _). A fixed point of this
mapping defines an information equilibrium, in the sense that it yields a rational expecta-
tions market equilibrium in which investors do not want to deviate from their information
choices. We now address the existence of such a fixed point.
For any coefficient functions (1, 2), let Λ> (1, 2) denote the set of _ satisfying Definition 1,
which we know from Proposition 5 is nonempty. Let Λ(1, 2) denote the set of all convex
combinations of elements of Λ> (1, 2). If there is just one _ in Λ> (1, 2), then Λ(1, 2) =
Λ> (1, 2) = {_}. In our numerical experiments, instances of multiple _ satisfying Definition 1
occur rarely, and we have never encountered multiple solutions _ when using self-consistent
+s. However, because we have not proved the uniqueness of _, we need to work with
the potentially larger set Λ(1, 2) in establishing the existence of an information equilibrium
(1, 2, _).
A convex combination _ ∈ Λ(1, 2) represents a mixed equilibrium in the following heuris-
tic sense. For each 5 ∈ D, we can write
_( 5 ) = F 5 _1( 5 ) + (1 − F 5 )_2( 5 ), (A.7)
with F 5 ∈ [0, 1] and _1, _2 ∈ Λ> (1, 2), _2( 5 ) > _1( 5 ). Interpret this to mean that a fraction
F 5 of investors thought equilibrium _1( 5 ) would be selected, and a fraction 1−F 5 thought
_2( 5 ) would be selected. At the outcome _( 5 ), the marginal investor is not indifferent
8More precisely, we start with a + within the region where Proposition 4 ensures the existence of a
fixed point.
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between becoming informed or not. A fraction F 5 of investors, expecting an outcome of
_1( 5 ), will see _( 5 ) as too high, and in response a fraction F 5 (_( 5 ) −_1( 5 )) of investors will
switch from informed to uninformed. Similarly, a fraction 1 − F 5 , expecting _2( 5 ), will see
_( 5 ) as too low, resulting in a fraction (1 − F 5 ) (_2( 5 ) − _( 5 )) switching from uninformed
to informed. But then (A.7) implies that these effects offset each other, leaving the fraction
informed at _( 5 ).
We establish existence of an information equilibrium — a joint equilibrium in (1, 2, _) —
within the broader class of information choices in Λ(1, 2). For the following, let " (_) be the
set of market equilibrium parameters (1, 2) consistent with the fraction informed function
_ = {_( 5 ), 5 ∈ D}; these are the fixed points in Proposition 4. The following proposition is
proved in the Supplementary Appendix.
Proposition 6. Suppose the conditions of Propositions 4 and 5 hold. Then there exists
an information equilibrium (1, 2, _), meaning that (1, 2) ∈ " (_) and _ ∈ Λ(1, 2). In other
words, (1, 2) defines a market equilibrium given _, and _ defines a (possibly mixed) endoge-
nous fraction informed given (1, 2).
A.4 Market Equilibrium
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 3 (Existence of a Market Equilibrium)
Investor Demands for the Risky Asset
We prove Proposition 3 by solving explicitly for the coefficients of the price in (1.11).
To allow for arbitrary +, we write the investor optimization problem (1.9) as




E[,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] −
W
2
v̂ar(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1)
I ]C ] , ] ∈ {,*}, (A.8)
where, using (1.16),
v̂ar(,C+1 |IC , 5C+1) = @2(1 + 3)2
[
var(<C |IC ) + (1 − 5C )f2"
]
+ @2+ ( 5C+1). (A.9)
If the conjectured variance + is self-consistent, then (A.9) yields the conditional variance,
but (A.8) makes explicit investors’ objectives with arbitrary +.
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We can write the terminal wealth in (1.7) as ,C+1 = ',C + @cC+1. Recalling that ,C is
known to time-C investors, we set v̂ar(cC+1 |IC , 5C+1) = v̂ar(,C+1 |IC , 5C+1)/@2 to get
v̂ar(cC+1 |IC , 5C+1) = (1 + 3)2
[
var(<C |IC ) + (1 − 5C )f2"
]
++ ( 5C+1). (A.10)










v̂ar(cC+1 |I ]C , 5C+1)








is the conditional expectation of the net profit, and @ ]

is the expectation of its
conditional variance, given a price variance of +. Through (A.10), the conditional variances,
reflecting the cash-flow component and the time-C price variance, take the form
@ = (1 + 3)2(1 − 5C )f2" + EC+ ( 5C+1),
@* = @

 + (1 + 3)2var(<C |%C , \C ).
(A.12)
Evaluating the conditional mean in the numerator of (A.11) as in (1.14), the demands for




























For the informed, we have used the fact that E[<C |I C ] = <C and var(<C |I C ) = 0. For the
uninformed, we evaluate (A.13) using9
E[<C |%C , \C ] =  C (1C<C − 2C-C ),
var(<C |%C , \C ) = q 5Cf2" (1 −  C1C ) = q 5Cf2" (1 − R2C ), (A.14)
with
 C =
cov(<C , %C |\C , C )









and R2C ≡  C1C . (A.15)
9Say  [< |%] =  (1< + 2-) for  = cov(<, %)/var(%) and var(< |%) ≡ var(<− [< |%]). Since <− [< |%] =
(1− 1)< − 2- then var(< −  [< |%]) = (1− 1)2var(<) + 222var(-). This equals (1− 2 1 + 212)var(<) +
 222var(-) = (1 − 2 1)var(<) +  2 (12var(<) + 22var(-)). Note that  = 1var(<)/(12var(<) + 22var(-)) and
therefore  2 (12var(<) + 22var(-)) = 12var2 (<)/(12var(<) + 22var(-)) =  1var(<). And therefore var(< |%) =
(1 −  1)var(<).
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Market Clearing and Price Coefficients
We now impose market clearing (1.10), taking _ as given. We substitute investor de-





in the following because these depend on 5C but not on C , <C , \C , or
-C . Equation (1.10) becomes
_@*
[












 -̄ . (A.16)
Collecting the C terms and then the \C terms yields the constants
3 =
d
' − d and 6 =
1
' − d . (A.17)












+ (1 − _)@

-̄ + EC0( 5C+1)
]
. (A.18)
The function 0 appears on both sides. Assuming for a moment that a solution 0C = 0( 5C )
exists, we can proceed to solve for 1 and 2 because 0 plays no role in the inference the
uninformed make from the price in (A.15). We return to solve (A.18) after solving for 1 and
2.












+ (1 − _)@

. (A.19)










if _ = 0. (A.20)
We can now combine these equations to solve for 1 and 2 through the following steps, each
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of which involves only known quantities on the right side:
@ ( 5 ) = (1 + 3)2(1 − 5 )f2" + E[+ ( 5C+1) | 5C = 5 ], (A.21)
A ( 5 ) = _( 5 ) (1 + 3)/(W@ ( 5 )), (A.22)
R2( 5 ) =
A2( 5 ) 5 qf2
"





@* ( 5 ) = @

 ( 5 ) + (1 + 3)2 5 qf2" (1 − R2( 5 )), (A.24)




( 5 ) + (1 − _( 5 ))@

( 5 )R2( 5 )
_( 5 )@*





2( 5 ) =

1( 5 )/A ( 5 ), _( 5 ) > 0;
W@*

( 5 )/', _( 5 ) = 0.
(A.26)
Equation (A.21) restates the first line of (A.12); (A.22) is the ratio in (A.20); (A.23) rewrites
the expression for R2 in (A.15); (A.24) follows from the second line of (A.12); (A.25) and
(A.26) come from (A.19) and (A.20).
A.4.2 Solving for the 0() curve
We now return to (A.18). Using the price function from (1.11) and the net profit from
(1.8), we see that
EC [cC+1] = EC [C+1 + %C+1 − '%C ]
= EC [` + dC + 0C+1 + 3 (` + dC ) − '0C − '3C ]








+ (1 − _)@

, (A.27)
where the third step follows from the definition of 3 in (A.17) and the fourth step follows













[(1 + 3)` − EC+1 [cC+2] + EC+10( 5C+2)]
}]
= · · · = (1 + 3)`







If the conjectured variance + is bounded above and bounded away from zero, then |EC [cC+8] |
is bounded and the expression in (A.28) is well-defined and finite. The quantities in (A.21)–
(A.26) and (A.27) are all functions solely of the information state 5 , so the conditional
expectations in (A.18) and (A.28) are taken with respect to the evolution of the information
state in (1.6), for given _. Equation (A.28) shows 0C is equal to the present value of all future
expected dividend payments minus a discount reflecting the expected present value of all
future net profits. We show how to calculate the expectation in (A.28) in the Supplementary
Appendix.
A.4.3 Statement and Proof of Proposition 4 (Existence of a Rational
Expectations Equilibrium)
In this section, we prove the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium by showing
that the conjectured-variance updating mapping has a fixed point. This demonstrates the
existence of self-consistent + given an exogenously specified _() curve.10
We now precisely state Proposition 4 for model (1.6). With 5C restricted to a finite set
D, we represent any function of 5C as a vector of dimension = = |D|. We suppose _() is
fixed (not necessarily constant) with 0 ≤ _( 5 ) ≤ 1 for all 5 . Let  (1, 2) be the mapping
that sends the initial coefficients (1, 2) to updated coefficients (1′, 2′) through (1.17) and
(A.21)–(A.26). A fixed point refers to the coefficients 1 and 2 such that (1, 2) =  (1, 2).
Assume there exists a scalar 2̄ > 0 satisfying the following four polynomial conditions:
Wf-
(




4 − (1 + 3)2W2f2"f2-q
)
≤ 0, (A.29)
4W'f2- 2̄@̄ − 4'2f2- 2̄2 + (1 + 3)2f2"q
(










(1 + 3)2f2"[ + 2̄2f2-
)
− '2̄ ≤ 0, (A.32)
where @̄ in (A.29), (A.30), and (A.31) is a quadratic function in 2̄,
@̄ = (1 + 3)2f2" X + 2̄2f2- , (A.33)
10Note that this exogenous _() curve need not result in equivalent utilities for informed and uninformed
investors. We endogenize the _() curve in Section A.5.
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Our simplest conditions would require X ≤ [ ≤ 2, which is natural for 5 ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1]
and ' > 1. The precise statement of Proposition 4 is that the mapping  has a fixed point





The existence of a 2̄ satisfying (A.29)–(A.32), and thus the existence of fixed point for
mapping , only depends on model parameters.
As a shortcut for checking that these conditions hold, we show in Appendix A.4.3.1 that
if ' ∈ [1, 1.2] and condition (A.6) holds, then  has a fixed point in [0, 1̄]= × [0, 2̄]= with
1̄ = (1 + 3)/' and 2̄ = '/(2Wf2
-
).
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the result, we use Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, which states that if  is a
continuous function mapping a compact convex set ( to itself, then  has a fixed point in
this set, meaning there exists G ∈ ( for which G =  (G); see, for example, p.29 of Border
(1989).
We show conditions for the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem are satisfied with the +
updating mapping  and the compact convex set [0, 1̄]= × [0, 2̄]=, = = |D|. First, it is
evident that  is continuous as each mapping in (A.21)–(A.26) is continuous in its input.
It is also evident that  (1, 2) ≥ 0 since each step in (A.21)–(A.26) returns a nonnegative
value. Next, for any input (1, 2), we have 1′( 5 ) ≤ (1 + 3)/' = 1̄ for all 5 : it is easy to see
@

( 5 ) ≥ 0, R2( 5 ) ∈ [0, 1], and @*

( 5 ) ≥ 0, so the second factor in (A.25) is in [0, 1] and the
bound on 1′( 5 ) follows.
It only remains to show that if (1, 2) ∈ [0, 1̄]= × [0, 2̄]= and (1′, 2′) =  (1, 2), then
2′( 5 ) ≤ 2̄ for all 5 . For this we first establish two useful bounds. To lighten notation, in
the following we abbreviate conditional expectations of the form E[+ ( 5C+1, q) | 5C = 5 ] as
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EC [+ ( 5 )]. Recalling (1.17), we get the bound
EC [+ ( 5 )] = EC
[
1( 5 )2 5
]





≤ 1̄2EC [ 5 ]qf2" + 62(1 − q)EC [ 5 ]f2" + 2̄2f2-
= (1 + 3)2 1
'2
EC [ 5 ]f2" + 2̄2f2- . (A.35)
The inequality uses the assumption (1, 2) ∈ [0, 1̄]= × [0, 2̄]=, and the last equality uses the
relationship 1̄ = (1 + 3)/' = 6, which follows (A.17). Combining this with (A.21), we can
bound @

( 5 ) by
@ ( 5 ) = (1 + 3)2(1 − 5 )f2" + EC [+ ( 5 )]
≤ (1 + 3)2f2" X + 2̄2f2- = @̄, (A.36)
where @̄ is given in (A.33). The inequality follows from the definition of X in (A.34). We
now proceed to prove the desired bound 2′( 5 ) ≤ 2̄ for all 5 by the following two cases.
I. The Case Without Informed Investor: _( 5 ) = 0
We first prove the bound for 2′( 5 ) for the case _( 5 ) = 0. By the second case in (A.26),
2′( 5 ) is now given by 2′( 5 ) = W@*

( 5 )/'. With _( 5 ) = 0, (A.22), (A.23), and (A.25) lead to
A ( 5 ) = R2( 5 ) = 1′( 5 ) = 0. Plugging these into (A.21) and (A.24) we have
@* ( 5 ) = @

 ( 5 ) + (1 + 3)2 5 qf2"
= (1 + 3)2(1 − 5 )f2" + EC [+ ( 5 )] + (1 + 3)2 5 qf2" .
With the bound for EC [+ ( 5 )] in (A.35), we can derive
@* ( 5 ) ≤ (1 + 3)
2f2"
(
1 − 5 + 1
'2
EC [ 5 ] + 5 q
)
+ 2̄2f2-
≤ (1 + 3)2f2"[ + 2̄2f2- ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of [ in (A.34). Then the updated
coefficient 2′( 5 ) satisfies
2′( 5 ) = W
'




(1 + 3)2f2"[ + 2̄2f2-
)
≤ 2̄,
which follows from condition (A.32).
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II. The Case With Informed Investors: _( 5 ) > 0
Next, we prove the bound 2( 5 ) ≤ 2̄ under the case _( 5 ) > 0 . Applying the first case in
(A.26), we get
2′( 5 ) = 1( 5 )







_( 5 ) ·
_( 5 )@*

( 5 ) + (1 − _( 5 ))@

( 5 )R2( 5 )
_( 5 )@*






We need to derive a bound for the quantity in the parenthesis above.
We substitute @*

( 5 ) and R2( 5 ) in (A.37) using (A.24), (A.22), and (A.23). Then the



































where we have dropped the dependence on 5 to simplify notation. In the following, we
establish the needed bound for 2′( 5 ) by combining expression (A.38), bound for @

( 5 ) in
(A.36), and conditions (A.29)–(A.31). In particular, we need a bound of (A.38) that is valid
for all _ ∈ (0, 1], as we do not make _ endogenous in this proof.
We first consider the case 5 = 0 or q = 0. If this holds, (A.38) directly reduces to
W@

( 5 )/' itself. By (A.36), 2′( 5 ) satisfies
2′( 5 ) = W
'







(1 + 3)2f2" X + 2̄2f2-
)
.
As we have X ≤ [ by (A.34), the desired bound for 2′( 5 ) can be established as
2′( 5 ) ≤ W
'
(





(1 + 3)2f2"[ + 2̄2f2-
)
≤ 2̄,
where the last inequality directly follows from condition (A.32).
Next, we consider the case (A.38) for 5 > 0 and q > 0. Here we need to consider the
maximum of (A.38) over all _ ∈ (0, 1]. We compute the derivative of (A.38) with respect
to _. As the numerator and denominator of (A.38) are linear and quadratic functions in _
respectively, the numerator of its derivative is a quadratic function in _. Furthermore, it
is easy to check this quadratic function is concave and the denominator of the derivative is
always positive. Thus the maximum of (A.38) is attained at the larger root of its derivative,
as long as that root falls in (0, 1]. Through algebraic manipulations, the larger root of the
217
























. Also, _̃ ∈ (0, 1] is guaranteed by condition (A.31)
and the bounds @

≤ @̄ and 5 ≤ 1. Thus the maximum of (A.38) is indeed attained at
_ = _̃.
Letting _ = _̃ in (A.38), we can derive
























'f- (4 − (1 + 3)2W2f2"f2- 5 q)
.
(A.40)
Denote the right side by ^( 5 , @

). It is positive as condition (A.29) directly implies the
denominator is greater than zero. As ^( 5 , @

) clearly increases in both @

and 5 , it can be
further bounded by setting @

and 5 at their upper bounds @̄ and one, respectively. Thus
to establish the needed bound 2′( 5 ) ≤ 2̄, it suffices to show
2′( 5 ) ≤ ^( 5 , @) ≤ ^(1, @̄) ≤ 2̄. (A.41)
Setting @




















2@̄ + (1 + 3)2f2"q
)
. (A.42)
By condition (A.29), the right side of (A.42) is positive, so this inequality is equivalent to
the one obtained by squaring both sides. Taking squares and simplifying, we can show the
quadratic terms @̄2 cancel out, and inequality (A.42) is equivalent to
4W'f2- 2̄@̄ ≤ 4'2f2- 2̄2 − (1 + 3)2f2"q
(
1 + W'f2- 2̄
)2
,
which holds as long as 2̄ and @̄ satisfy condition (A.30). By (A.41), this proves the needed
bound 2′( 5 ) ≤ 2̄ for _( 5 ) > 0. Combining the two cases with _( 5 ) = 0 and _( 5 ) > 0, we
have proved 2′ ≤ 2̄ holds when conditions (A.29)–(A.32) are satisfied. The existence of a
fixed point for the + updating mapping now follows by Brouwer’s theorem.
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A.4.3.1 The Simplified Condition in (A.6)
Finally, we prove that (A.6) is a simple sufficient condition for the existence of fixed point.
We follow the general conclusions established above and show that as long as ' ∈ [1, 1.2] and
condition (A.6) hold, then the value 2̄ = '/(2Wf2
-
) satisfies conditions (A.29)–(A.32). Thus
by the proposition, a fixed point of + updating exists in [0, (1 + 3)/']= × [0, '/(2Wf2- )]=.
Plugging 2̄ = '/(2Wf2
-
) into (A.29)–(A.32), algebraic computation shows that they sim-
plify to following equivalent conditions:
(1 + 3)2W2f2"f2- ≤
3'2





(4 + 4'2 + '4)q + 8'2X , (A.43)
(1 + 3)2W2f2"f2- ≤
4 − '2







respectively. A nice property of these new conditions is that they are all upper bounds for
the product (1 + 3)Wf"f- . Thus it suffices to propose a bound for (1 + 3)Wf"f- that is
small enough such that all the four conditions are satisfied. Since all the bounds in the right-
hand sides of (A.43) and (A.44) are decreasing in q, X, and [, it suffices to consider their
values at q = 1 and X = [ = 2, as by (A.34) we clearly have X ≤ [ ≤ 2. On the other hand, as
the bounds do not monotonically depend on the risk-free return ', we impose a relatively
mild condition ' ∈ [1, 1.2]. Plugging these values into the right-hand sides of (A.43) and
(A.44), the minimum of the four upper bounds approximately equals to 0.283, thus (A.6) is
sufficient for the four conditions. Consequently, the corresponding 2̄ = '/(2Wf2
-
) is a valid
upper bound for the existence of fixed point.
A.5 Information Equilibrium
A.5.1 Equate Expected Utility of Informed to Uninformed given +
In this section we discuss the procedure for solving for an endogenous _ given a conjec-
tured variance +. Given the demands in (A.12) and +, we have, for ] ∈ {,*},
E
[
E[,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1]





var(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1)





We can therefore write the agent’s value function in (1.9), conditional on I ]C as








, ] ∈ {,*}. (A.46)
To find an endogenous _ in the sense of Definition 1, we need to evaluate the conditional
expectation of  C − *C given the information state 5C . We can pull the denominators @ ]
out of the conditional expectation because we know from (A.21) and (A.24) that they are
purely functions of the information state. For the numerator terms, using the demands from
(A.13), the price process from (1.11) and the condition on 0C in (A.18), it is straightforward
to show that
@ ]# = EC [cC+1] + (1 + 3)E[<C |I ]C ] − '1C<C + '2C-C
where EC [cC+1] — which is a function of _ — is given by (A.27). The \C and C terms drop
out, as do the terms involving 0C .11 Note that @ ]# equals the expected net profit EC [cC+1],
which only conditions on 5C , adjusted for the information set of agent ].
Since E[<C |I C ] = <C we have
E[(@# )2 | 5C ] = (EC [cC+1])2 + (1 + 3 − '1C )2q 5Cf2" + '222Cf2- . (A.47)
And from (A.14) we have E[<C |I*C ] =  C1C<C −  C2C-C . From this we have that
E[(@*# )
2 | 5C ] = (EC [cC+1])2 + [(1 + 3) C1C − '1C ]2q 5Cf2" + ['2C − (1 + 3) C2C ]2f2-
= (EC [cC+1])2 + [(1 + 3) C − ']2(12C q 5Cf2" + 22Cf2- ). (A.48)
Combining these expressions with  ]C in (A.46), we get an expression for the difference in
conditional expectations
Δ 5 = E[ C − '2 | 5C = 5 ] − E[*C | 5C = 5 ] . (A.49)
When this difference is positive, the marginal investor has an incentive to become informed.
For a given 5 we numerically solve for the _ ∈ [0, 1] which sets Δ 5 = 0. If this difference is
always strictly positive we set _ = 1, and if it is always strictly negative we set _ = 0.
11In particular, we do not need to evaluate 0(·) to find the endogenous _(·), which is useful in solving the
model numerically.
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A.5.2 Proof of Proposition 5 (Existence of _() given +)
Recall that we have restricted 5C to a finite set D. We need to be more explicit about
the mapping to D in (1.6). Suppose D = {B1, . . . , B=} ⊂ [0, 1]. Partition the extended real
line using
−∞ = 20 < 21 < · · · < 2= < 2=+1 = ∞,
and let ΠD : (2 9 , 2 9+1] ↦→ B 9+1, 9 = 0, 1, . . . , =. We prove the proposition for this choice of
ΠD .



































− '2 . (A.50)
The terms on the right depend on the mapping _ : D ↦→ [0, 1]. However, for each 5 ,
Δ 5 depends on _ only through _( 5 ). This follows from the expressions in (A.21)–(A.26).
We may therefore write Δ 5 as Δ 5 (ℓ), with the interpretation that ℓ is the value of _( 5 ).
The proposition will follow once we show that Δ 5 (·) is continuous: given continuity, either
Δ 5 (ℓ∗) = 0 at some ℓ∗ ∈ [0, 1] (in which case we set _( 5 ) = ℓ∗), or Δ 5 (ℓ) < 0 for all ℓ ∈ [0, 1]
(in which case we set _( 5 ) = 0), or Δ 5 (ℓ) > 0 for all ℓ ∈ [0, 1] (in which case we set _( 5 ) = 1).
This specification satisfies the conditions in Definition 1.
To establish continuity of Δ, we use the representation in (A.50). It is evident that,
holding 5 fixed, each of the operations in (A.22)–(A.25) is continuous in ℓ = _( 5 ). But _
is also implicit in (A.21) through the conditional expectation of the conjectured variance,
which takes the form
E[+ ( 5C+1) | 5C = B8] =
∑
B 9 ∈D
P( 5C+1 = B 9 | 5C = B8)+ (B 9).
With _(B8) = ℓ, the transition probabilities take the form
P( 5C+1 = B 9 | 5C = B8) = P(0 5 + 1 5 ℓ + ^ 5 ( 5C − 0 5 ) + n 5 ,C+1 ∈ (2 9 , 2 9+1] | 5C = B8)
= P(n 5 ,C+1 ∈ (2 9 − [0 5 + 1 5 ℓ + ^ 5 (B8 − 0 5 )], 2 9+1 − [0 5 + 1 5 ℓ + ^ 5 (B8 − 0 5 )]),
which is the integral of the density of n 5 ,C+1 over the indicated interval and is therefore
continuous in the endpoints and in ℓ. It follows that E[+ ( 5C+1) | 5C = 5 ] is continuous in
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Figure A.2: Uninformed utility * and semi-informed utility ( as functions of 5
Note: Comparison of the uninformed utility * to that of the semi-informed utility (
averaged over the steady-state conditional probabilities as shown in (A.52). The red, vertical
line shows the threshold 5C at which _ > 0. The figure uses parameter values from Table
A.1.
_( 5 ), and therefore that the mapping (A.21)–(A.25) is continuous in _( 5 ), including, in
particular, @

( 5 ) and @*

( 5 ).
Next we turn to (A.26) and verify that 2( 5 ) is continuous at _( 5 ) = 0. Using (A.37), we
can write, for _( 5 ) > 0,
2( 5 ) = W
'




























As _( 5 ) → 0, we have R2( 5 ) → 0 and
2( 5 ) → W
'
(





@* ( 5 ),
which coincides with the value specified for 2( 5 ) in (A.26) at _( 5 ) = 0.
A.5.3 Out of Equilibrium Utility and the Value of 2"
Given our model equilibrium, we analyze the incentive of an atomic agent to become
informed but to forego the output of the information production sector. Because the agent
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is atomic, the agent’s deviation will not affect the equilibrium. By foregoing the information
production output, the agent only spends 2 −2" on acquiring information; we refer to such
agents as semi-informed. The semi-informed learn only a portion <> (suppressing the C
subscript) of <C
<C = <> + <D with <> ⊥ <D , (A.51)
where <D is the output of the information production sector. An agent evaluating this semi-
informed information set I( solves the same problem as in (1.9). The solution is similar
to the derivation in Section A.4 and is in the Supplementary Appendix. We now verify
the conditions under which uninformed and informed agents prefer their information sets to
being semi-informed.
In particular, we verify in our model calibration that for a low enough 2" , the expected
utility of the semi-informed ( + '2" and that of the uninformed * + '2 satisfy
* ( 5 ) + '2 ≥ ( ( 5 ) + '2" ,
for all 5 . When _ = 0, the utility of the uninformed dominates that of the informed. When
_ ∈ (0, 1), the utility of the uninformed equals that of the informed. In our calibration _ < 1
for all 5 so we do not need to consider the case when the informed are better off. Therefore if
the uninformed would never prefer to be semi-informed, neither would the informed agents.
In the context of our microfoundation, we can think of the variance of <> as being
( 5C − 1 5 _C−1)qvar(") (recall that var(<C ) = 5Cqvar(")). The loss in precision from not
paying 2" for the information sector’s output is 1 5 _C−1, where _C−1 = _∗( 5C−1) is the time
C − 1 endogenous fraction resulting from the prior information state 5C−1.
Given the information sets I* and I  from Section 1.2.4, agents observe 5C . They
are unaware of 5C−1. We assume agents make decisions consistent with the steady-state 5C
distribution from Figure 1.5. Writing ̃( ( 5C , 5C−1) for the utility the semi-informed would
attain if they observed both 5C and 5C−1, we then have ( ( 5C ) = E[̃( ( 5C , 5C−1) | 5C ]. To
compare * ( 5 ) + '2 and ( ( 5 ) + '2" , agents check the condition
* ( 5 ) + '2 −
∑
5 ′
̃( ( 5 , 5 ′)P( 5C−1 = 5 ′ | 5C = 5 ) > '2" , (A.52)
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where
P( 5C−1 = 5 ′ | 5C = 5 ) =
P( 5C = 5 | 5C−1 = 5 ′) × P( 5C−1 = 5 ′)
P( 5C = 5 )
.
In this expression, P( 5C−1 = 5 ′) and P( 5C = 5 ) are the steady-state probabilities of 5 ′ and 5 ,
respectively. For fixed 5 , the distribution of n 5 ,C in Table A.1 implies that P( 5C = 5 | 5C−1 = 5 ′)
is nonzero for three values of 5 ′ associated with the three possible shocks, n 5 , 0, and −n 5 .
The sum in (A.52) therefore reduces to a sum over these three possible shocks.
Figure A.2 shows the left side of (A.52) for all values of 5 . We see that this difference is
always positive, with a minimum value of 0.0072. Therefore for any 2" < 0.0072/', neither
the uninformed nor informed agents in our equilibrium would choose to deviate from their
equilibrium information choice.
We note from Figure A.2 the welfare benefit to the informed relative to the semi-informed
is low (this is the part of the curve to the right of the vertical red line which is the threshold
5C at which the fraction informed turns positive). In our calibration 2 = 0.2627 and the
maximum benefit of being informed relative to semi-informed is roughly 0.04. The intuition
is that the increase in information precision from the 1 5 _C part of the 5C+1 dynamics in (1.5)
is small. And yet, despite the small welfare contribution of this feedback term, the feedback
has a pronounced effect on the market equilibrium.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6 (Existence of Information
Equilibrium)
To prove the result, we apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, which states the following
(see, for example, p.72 of Border 1989). Let the domain ( be a non-empty, compact and
convex set, and let  : ( ↦→ 2( be a set-valued function on (. Suppose  (G) is non-empty
and convex for all G ∈ (, and suppose that  has a closed graph (as defined shortly). Then
 has a fixed point, meaning a point G ∈ ( for which G ∈  (G).
Let  (1, 2, _) be the mapping that sends initial coefficients (1, 2) to updated coefficients
(1′, 2′) using _ through (A.21)–(A.26). Let
 (1, 2, _) = (1′, 2′,Λ(1′, 2′)) = ( (1, 2, _),Λ( (1, 2, _)))
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be the mapping that returns the updated (1′, 2′) and the set of _s in Λ(1′, 2′). This rep-
resentation is consistent with our algorithm: we first update (1, 2) given _; we then solve
for the endogenous _ given the new (1′, 2′). The mapping  returns all of Λ(1′, 2′), rather
than a single element.
Based on the proof of Proposition 4, we can restrict (1, 2) to a domain [0, 1̄]= × [0, 2̄]=,
= = |D|, in the sense that  (·, ·, _) maps this set into itself for any _. We may therefore take
the domain of  to be ( = [0, 1̄]=× [0, 2̄]=× [0, 1]=, which is compact and convex. Moreover,
for any (1, 2, _) ∈ (,  (1, 2, _) is non-empty (by Propositions 3 and 5), and it is convex by
the definition of Λ(1, 2).
It only remains to show that  has a closed graph. The closed graph property states
that for any sequences G= → G, H= → H with H= ∈  (G=) we have H ∈  (G). Because 
is single-valued and continuous (as in the proof of Proposition 4), it suffices to show the
following:
if _′ ∉ Λ(1′, 2′), then _ ∉ Λ(1, 2) for all (1, 2, _) in a neighborhood of (1′, 2′, _′). (A.53)
We detail the case of model (1.6). Recall from the discussion surrounding (A.49) that
when we solve for a _ ∈ Λ> (1, 2), we may solve for each _( 5 ), 5 ∈ D, separately; the
conditions on _( 5 ) for different values of 5 do not interact. For each 5 , we look for a point
at which
Δ 5 (ℓ) ≡ Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) = E[ C − '2 | 5C = 5 ] − E[*C | 5C = 5 ]
crosses zero and set _( 5 ) = ℓ; if zero is never crossed, we get a boundary case of _( 5 ) = 0 or
1. We have written Δ1,2, 5 to emphasize that the utilities on the right are evaluated using
(1, 2).
We know from Section 5 that Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) is continuous in ℓ for each 5 , and continuity in
(1, 2) follows similarly from (A.49). If Δ1,2, 5 (·) crosses zero, then we may define the first
and last zero crossings by
ℓmin( 5 ) = min{ℓ ∈ [0, 1] : Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) = 0}, ℓmax( 5 ) = max{ℓ ∈ [0, 1] : Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) = 0};
otherwise, set ℓmin( 5 ) = ℓmax( 5 ) = 0 if Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) < 0 for all ℓ, and ℓmin( 5 ) = ℓmax( 5 ) = 1 if
Δ1,2, 5 (ℓ) > 0 for all ℓ.
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Returning to (A.53), it now follows that if _′ ∉ Λ(1′, 2′) then it must be that _′( 5 ) ∉
[ℓmin( 5 ), ℓmax( 5 )] for some 5 , again because the constraints on each _′( 5 ) depend only
on that 5 . In particular, then, it must be that Δ1′,2′, 5 (ℓ) ≠ 0 for all ℓ ∈ [0, _′( 5 )] or
for all ℓ ∈ [_′( 5 ), 1]; it suffices to consider the first case because a symmetric argument
works for the second case. Suppose Δ1′,2′, 5 (_′( 5 )) < 0; a symmetric argument applies if
Δ1′,2′, 5 (_′( 5 )) > 0. Then
Δ1′,2′, 5 (ℓ) < 0 for all ℓ ∈ [0, _′( 5 )]. (A.54)
We claim that this holds in a neighborhood of (1′, 2′, _′). To argue by contradiction,
suppose not. In other words, suppose that in any n neighborhood of (1′, 2′, _′) we can
find a point (1 n , 2n , _n ) and an ℓn ∈ [0, _n ( 5 )] with Δ1n ,2n , 5 (ℓn ) = 0. Taking a se-
quence of ns decreasing to zero, gives us a sequence of such (1 n , 2n , _n ) and ℓn , with
(1 n , 2n , _n ) → (1′, 2′, _′). As the ℓn take values in the compact set [0, 1], they have a
convergent subsequence. So, by taking a subsequence n ′ of the original n values, we get,
for some ℓ0, (1 n ′, 2n ′, _n ′, ℓn ′) → (1′, 2′, _′, ℓ0). And since ℓn ′ ≤ _n ′ ( 5 ) for all n ′, we have
ℓ0 ≤ _′( 5 ). By the continuity of Δ,
Δ1′,2′, 5 (ℓ0) = lim
n ′→0
Δ1n ′ ,2n ′ , 5 (ℓn ′) = lim
n ′→0
0 = 0,
which contradicts (A.54). We have thus shown that (A.54) holds in a neighborhood of
(1′, 2′, _′). But then _ ∉ Λ(1, 2), for all (1, 2, _) in a neighborhood of (1′, 2′, _′), which is
what we needed to show to prove the closed graph property.
A.7 Derivation of Utility of Semi-Informed
This section derives the semi-informed expected utility discussed in Section A.5.3 of
the paper. Such agents assume that the economy remains in equilibrium, and evaluate the
expected utility of a deviation from the equilibrium behavior of other informed agents. We
assume that semi-informed agents observe <> of <C = <> + <D where the variable jC is the
amount of the variance of <C that is observable via <>, i.e.
var(<>) = jCvar(<C ) = jC 5Cqvar(").
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Here 1 − jC reflects the amount of foregone information by not buying the output of the
information producers. In the context of (A.51) from the main paper, we have
j =
5C − 1 5 _C−1
5C
,
where _C−1 can have one of three values depending on whether n 5 ,C equals n 5 , 0, or −n 5 , as
discussed in Section A.5.3 in the paper.
An agent evaluating the semi-informed information set I( solves the following problem:










where I represent the information set under consideration. Here 5C−1 is determines the value











a○ = (1 + 3) (` + dC + \C + E[<C |I]) + E 5C0( 5C+1) − '%C ,
b○ = (1 + 3)2
[
var(<C |I) + (1 − 5C )f2"
]
+ E 5C+ ( 5C+1),
and b○ is known given I. Note that the 0(·) and + (·) functions are those from the equi-
librium of the paper. The first-order condition is @ = a○/(W b○). Plugging this back into the























In light of the value of the linear price form in (1.11) and 3, 6 in (A.17), the C and \C terms
in a○ and in '%C cancel and we get
a○ = (1 + 3) (` + E[<C |I]) + E 5C0( 5C+1) − '(0C + 1C<C + 2C-C ),
From (A.28) we have '0C = (1 + 3)` − EC [cC+1] + E 5C0( 5C+1). And therefore we can write
a○ = (1 + 3)E[<C |I] + EC [cC+1] − '(1C<C + 2C-C ),
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For the semi-informed agent, the signal contained in the price is %̂C = 1C<D + 2C-C . If he
also conditions on the price to learn about <D then his information set is I = {<>, %̂C } and
E[<C |I] = <> + E[<D |%̂C ]
E[<D |%̂C ] =  (1C<D + 2C-C )
 =
1C (1 − jC ) 5Cqvar(")
12C (1 − jC ) 5Cqvar(") + 22C var(-)
var(<C |I) = (1 − R2) (1 − j) 5Cqvar(")
R2 = 1C 
In this case we have
a○ = (1 + 3) (<> +  1C<D +  2C-C ) + `c,C − '(1C<C + 2C-C )
= (1 + 3 − '1C )<> + ((1 + 3) − ')1C<D + ((1 + 3) − ')2C-C + `c,C
= (1 + 3 − '1C )<> + ((1 + 3) − ') (1C<D + 2C-C ) + `c,C .
From this we calculate
EC a○2 = `2c,C + (1 + 3 − '1C )2jC 5Cqvar(")
+ ((1 + 3) − ')2 [12C (1 − jC ) 5Cqvar(") + 22C var(-)] .
A.8 Correlated Shocks Case
We prove that our model solution for the correlated case in (1.20) is essentially unchanged
under the assumption that the noise term n 5 ,C+1 is independent of time-C variables and has





That is, 5C is the fraction of the knowable part of the dividend innovation that is orthogonal
to the information shock.
First, we follow the proof in Section D to show the market equilibrium still holds with
the price process taking the form in (1.11). Under the correlated case, the conditional mean
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of terminal wealth ,C+1 = ',C + @(C+1 + %C+1 − %C ) can be solved as
E[,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] = @ [(1+3) (`+dC+\C+E[<C |I ]C ]−n 5 ,C+1)+0( 5C+1)−'%C ]+',C , ] ∈ {,*}.
(A.56)
For the conditional variance, suppose the conjectured variance + is self-consistent, we have
v̂ar(,C+1 |I ]C , 5C+1) = @2(1 + 3)2
[
var(<C |I ]C ) + (1 − 5C )f2"
]
+ @2+ ( 5C+1). (A.57)
Here we use the fact that the value of n 5 ,C+1 can be fully determined conditional on IC and
5C+1. The first-order condition for investor’s utility maximization problem is
@ ]C =
E{E[cC+1 |I ]C , 5C+1] |I ]C }














are still given by (A.12) as for the independent shocks case. For
conditional means, we have by (A.56) that
@ ]# = E{E[cC+1 |I ]C , 5C+1]I ]C }
= (1 + 3) (` + dC + \C + E[<C |I ]C ] − E[n 5 ,C+1 |I ]C ] + EC0( 5C+1)) − '%C .
With the assumption that the noise term n 5 ,C+1 is independent of time-C variables and





also coincide with their counterparts in the independent
shocks case.
As both conditional means and variances are not changed in the correlated shocks case,
the investor demands and the market clearing condition are still given by (A.13) and (A.16)
respectively. Then we can follow the steps in (A.17) – (A.26) to prove the market equilibrium
holds with the price process taking the form in (1.11). Similarly, for the net profit cC+1, we
can show EC [cC+1] still follows by (A.27) under the assumption EC [n 5 ,C+1] = 0. Thus, the 0()
curve does not change in the correlated shocks case by (A.18), (A.27), and (A.28).
Finally, it is easy to see the information equilibrium is not impacted in the correlated
shocks case, i.e., the endogenous _() curve is the same as its counterpart in the independent
shocks case. By (A.45) and (A.46), the agent’s value function conditional on I ]C is given by









, ] ∈ {,*}.
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remain unchanged in the correlated shocks case, so does the value
function  ]C for ] ∈ {,*}. This leads to the same endogenous _() as in the independent
shocks case.
Combining the above results, we show the model solution for correlated shocks case is
essentially the same as the independent shocks case. The case of n 5 ,C+1 = n 5 1,C+1 + n 5 2,C+1
and "C+1 = <C + \C + nC+1 − ℎ × n 5 1,C+1 can be proved in a similar manner.
A.9 Numerical Implementation
To solve the model numerically, we take the state space D for 5C to be the grid {0, 1/(=−
1), 2/(= − 1), . . . , 1}, with = = 101. We can then represent functions of 5 as =-dimensional
vectors. Much of the algebra behind these calculations can be found in Appendixes A.4.1
and A.5.1 of the main paper.
Market equilibrium. For this step, we need to find a self-consistent variance belief, meaning
the fixed point in Proposition 4. We start from a flat variance belief + with a small and
constant value on D — smaller than the smaller of the two roots in footnote 7. We then
iteratively apply equations (A.21)–(A.26) until the difference between consecutive variance
beliefs becomes small throughout the state space. We have not proved convergence of
this iterative procedure, but in all of our experiments we have found numerically that the
method converges very quickly, in roughly seven iterations, provided the initial variance
belief is small.
In each iteration, we need to evaluate the conditional expectation of + over 5C+1 given 5C
in (A.21). To reduce the impact of our discretization of the state space and approximate the
results we would obtain with larger =, we use linear interpolation. In more detail, with _(·)
given, we approximate the evolution of 5C through an =-state Markov chain with a transition
matrix %, where %8 9 is the probability of transitioning from state 5 [8 ] ∈ D to state 5 [ 9 ] ∈ D.
With 5C = 5 [8 ] on the grid D, a shock n 5 ,C+1 may map 5C+1 off the grid without the projection
ΠD . Rather than round to the nearest grid point, we interpolate to reduce discretization
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error.12 If a shock n 5 ,C+1 puts probability ? on a point 5C+1 = U 5 [ 9 ] + (1−U) 5 [ 9+1] , 0 ≤ U ≤ 1,
between two grid points, we assign probability U? to %8 9 and (1−U)? to %8, 9+1. We use these
interpolated probabilities in calculating the conditional expectation E[+ ( 5C+1) | 5C = 5 [8 ]] and
similar expressions. The steady-state distribution of 5C in Figure 1.5 is calculated from the
transition matrix %. We also use linear interpolation the plots in the paper.
Prices. In calculating self-consistent variance beliefs, we get the price coefficients 1(·) and
2(·), and the coefficients 3 and 6 are constants. It only remains to find 0(·), for which we use
(A.28) and the matrix % of transition probabilities. The vector of <-step ahead expected
net profits satisfies EC [cC+1+<] = %<EC [cC+1]. The series in (A.28) can therefore be written


























EC [cC+1] . (A.58)
Endogenous _. For each 5 we search numerically for a point _( 5 ) at which the difference
of expected utilities in (A.49) is zero, using linear interpolation between grid points. That
difference does not depend on 0(·), so we can find _(·) without calculating 0(·). If the
difference in (A.49) is always positive, we set _( 5 ) = 1; if it is always negative, we set
_( 5 ) = 0.
Information equilibrium. For a complete model solution we proceed as follows. We start
with a small flat variance belief + and an arbitrary _; e.g., _ ≡ 0. We do one update
of + using (A.21)–(A.26) and then calculate the endogenous _. We repeat these updates
iteratively, each time updating + and then solving for the new _. Once + has converged,
we evaluate 0(·).
12This mechanism differs slightly from that used in Proposition 5. Assuming the shocks n 5 ,C have a density
simplifies the continuity argument needed there, but for numerical calculations it is simpler to assume they
have finite support.
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A.9.1 Approximating Return Moments
Returns are given by AC+1 = (%C+1+GC+1)/%C−1, where G ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether we
want total (with dividends) or net returns. Because prices can become negative, we cannot
calculate return moments in the usual sense. We instead normalize by %0 = 0( 5 ) + 3̄ and
calculate returns moments conditional on I = {C = ̄, 5C = 5 , <C = \C = -C = 0}; %0 is the
mean price given I. The corresponding expected excess return for a given level of 5 is given
by 12 × EC [cC+1]/%0.
Using (1.11), we make the approximation
AC+1 ≈
0C+1 + 1C+1<C+1 + 6\C+1 − 2C+1-C+1 + (G + 3) (̄ + nC+1)
0( 5 ) + 3̄
− 1,
where all quantities are conditioned on I. The variability in the numerator (we refer to it
as a) above will be driven by shocks <C+1, \C+1, -C+1 and nC+1, but also by changes in the
coefficients 0C+1, 1C+1, 2C+1 which are functions of 5C+1. We will use the relationship that
var(a) = E[var(a | 5C+1)] + var(E[a | 5C+1]). (A.59)
The moments in (A.59) are conditional on I, but we omit I to avoid clutter. We see that
var(a | 5 ′) = 1( 5 ′)2q 5 ′f2" + 2( 5 ′)2f2- + 62(1 − q) 5 ′f2" + (G + 3)2(1 − 5 ′)f2" .
The first expectation in (A.59) is∑
5 ′
¶( 5C+1 = 5 ′ | 5C = 5 ) × var(a | 5 ′),
using the transition probabilities of 5C .
We note that E[a | 5 ′] = 0( 5 ′) + (1 + 3)̄ and therefore








5 ′ ¶( 5C+1 = 5 ′ | 5C = 5 ) × 0( 5 ′).




0( 5 ) + 3̄
. (A.60)
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The return moments derived in this section entail two approximations required by the
possibility of negative prices: we evaluate moments conditional on I and we normalize by
the conditional mean price in calculating returns. We have verified via simulation (where
negative prices are very rare) that the conditional return volatility above is close to the
realized return volatility from simulated data.
A.10 Calibration Details for 5C Model
A.10.1 Dynamics of S&P 500 Dividends
We interpret C as an unobserved dividend process that would obtain if all S&P 500
companies paid a monthly dividend in each month. This C does not correspond to the
actual, observed monthly S&P 500 dividend which represents the quarterly dividend pay-
ments of only a subset of the S&P 500 companies. To be consistent with (1.1), we model
C as an AR(1) process where
C+1 = ` + dC + "C+1
C+2 = ` + d` + d2C + d"C+1 + "C+2
C+3 = ` + d` + d2` + d3C + d2"C+1 + d"C+2 + "C+3︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
[C+3
.
If we interpret a time period as a single month then the quarterly dividend &8 = C+1+C+2+
C+3 can be written (expressing each  as in the last equation above) as an ARMA(1,1)
process:
&8+1 = `& + d&&8 + D8+1 + \D8 (A.61)
where  [D8+1D8] = 0 and
`& = 3` (1 + d + d2)
d& = d
3 (A.62)
D8+1 + \D8 = [C+3 + [C+2 + [C+1
= d2"C+1 + d"C+2 + "C+3 + d2"C + d"C+1 + "C+2 + d2"C−1 + d"C + "C+1.
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The parameters \ and f2D are chosen to match the variance and autocorrelation of the error
term [C+3 + [C+2 + [C+1. The variance of the error term yields the restriction that
var(D8+1 + \D8) = f2D + \2f2D
= f2"
[
1 + (1 + d)2 + (1 + d + d2)2 + (d + d2)2 + d4
]
= f2" [3 + 4d + 5d2 + 4d3 + 3d4] . (A.63)
Note that the quarter 8 dividend contains innovations from months C − 4, C − 3, C − 2, C − 1, C,
and therefore the correlation of the error terms from quarter 8 +1 and 8 yields the restriction
that
cov(D8+1 + \D8 , D8 + \D8−1) = \f2D
= (d + d2)f2" + d2(1 + d)f2" = f2" (d3 + 2d2 + d). (A.64)
We use (A.62) and (A.63) to pin down f" . Equation (A.64) is then an overidentifying
restriction on the model parameters, which together with (A.63) implies
\
1 + \2 =
d + 2d2 + d3
3 + 4d + 5d2 + 4d3 + 3d4 (A.65)
A.10.1.1 Estimating AR(1) Parameters
Estimating13 (A.61) yields four parameter estimates: ˆ̀&, d̂&, \̂, f̂2D . Our monthly divi-







3 + 4d̂ + 5d̂2 + 4d̂3 + 3d̂4 .






3` (1 + d + d2)
1 − d3 = 3
`
1 − d ,
where the last step follows from (1 + d + d2) (1 − d) = 1 − d3. Therefore the long-run level of
the monthly dividend is equal to ̄ = &̄/3. Since we are interested in a monthly dividend
13We use the arima function in R.
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Model d& \ f2D &̄ ̄ d f"
Qtr (det) 0.9056 -0.2632 0.0043 1.0261 0.3420 0.9675 0.0470
Qrt (det,SA) 0.9160 -0.1808 0.0032 1.0310 0.3437 0.9712 0.0394
Table A.2: Calibration of the S&P500 dividend model.





























Figure A.3: Detrended and seasonally-adjusted S&P 500 quarterly dividend series.
process with a mean of 1, we set ` = 1 − d̂ and normalize the innovation volatility by
f̂"/ ˆ̄.
Our system of equations (involving `&, d&, f2D , \) for ` , d, f2 is overidentified. In fact,
(A.65) places an additional restriction on d̂ coming from \̂. In our estimates (below) we
find \̂ < 0 suggesting the model is misspecified.
To estimate the model we use an exponentially detrended real (deflated using the PCE
ex food and energy seasonally adjusted index) quarterly dividend series from January 1998
(when our daily S&P 500 dividend series starts) until March 2018. We also do an estimation
with a seasonally adjusted series that involves regressing quarterly dummies out of the log
dividend. Estimates from these two models are given in Table A.2. The two rows correspond
to the detrended and the detrended-seasonally-adjusted series respectively. The first four
parameters are from the estimated ARMA(1,1) model. f" is the volatility of the monthly
dividend innovation, normalized for ̄ = 1.
Figure A.3 shows the S&P 500 dividend series used in this estimation.
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Firm level monthly turnover for SML 6/8/2018
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Firm level monthly turnover for DOW 5/25/2018














Figure A.4: Dynamics of turnovers
Turnover, defined as share trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding, for
the Dow Industrial and the S&P 600 SmallCap (SML) indexes.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Supplemental Information
B.1 Derivation of Portfolio-implied Realized Correlation
In this section, we provide the derivation for the portfolio-implied realized correlation
(2.6). Denote the two mutually exclusive sets of stocks by  and . We construct three









where F8 and '8 denote the weight and return of stock 8, respectively. For ease of representing
the portfolio return, here we use '8 to denote the simple return instead of log return of
individual stocks. In our high-frequency setting, these two are generally very close. Note
that we do not require
∑
8 F8 = 1 as long as F8 are fixed. The third portfolio ( consists of
stocks from both  and , with return given by '( =
∑
8∈∪ F8'8 .


















F8F 9d8, 9f8f9 , (B.1)
where f8 denotes the standard deviation of the returns of stock 8. The last summation
term in f2
(
captures the covariance between the stocks from the two sets. With average
correlation d̄, defined in (2.5), the last term can be expressed by∑
8∈, 9∈














8∈, 9∈ F8F 9f8f9
. (B.2)
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To estimate the realized version of d̄, with high-frequency data, we plug the realized






− RV( , )














This leads to the portfolio-implied realized correlation estimator in (2.6).
B.2 Supplementary Tables
Table B.1: Average passive ownership for the highest and lowest passive owenership bins
Bins 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Low 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
High 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.26
Table B.2: Number of stocks in the S&P 500 Index in each entire year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
475 478 458 458 461 469 483 474 481 476 483 472 471 472 478
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Table B.3: Average daily correlation of stock pairs in each daily correlation bin
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2003 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.57
2004 -0.02 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.45
2005 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.45
2006 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.42
2007 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.47 0.57
2008 0.18 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.70
2009 0.04 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.67
2010 0.08 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.68
2011 0.23 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.76
2012 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.56
2013 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.54
2014 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.56
2015 -0.01 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.52 0.63
2016 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.46 0.58
2017 -0.20 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.39
2018 -0.06 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.60
Table B.4: GICS codes and sector names




25 Consumer discretionary Disc
30 Consumer staples Stap
35 Healthcare Heal
40 Financial Fin
45 Information technology Tech
50 Communication services Comm
55 Utilities Util
60 Real estate Estat
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Table B.5: Number of stocks in different sectors
Years Comm Disc Stap Eng Fin Heal Ind Tech Mat Util Estat
2003 23 71 36 25 78 50 55 78 35 33 3
2004 21 70 35 25 71 51 52 78 34 33 5
2005 18 67 34 26 76 58 53 77 32 32 5
2006 19 63 35 26 72 56 51 68 30 31 7
2007 23 64 38 30 73 52 50 61 28 29 10
2008 18 63 37 34 68 52 53 64 27 31 14
2009 19 61 40 37 64 54 54 67 28 31 14
2010 19 64 41 37 65 52 56 70 31 31 17
2011 18 65 39 40 65 51 57 62 30 31 16
2012 21 66 38 40 66 53 57 63 30 30 17
2013 18 65 39 44 62 52 59 58 31 30 18
2014 20 69 37 42 62 54 64 57 28 30 20
2015 20 69 35 39 62 51 63 56 26 28 21
2016 21 67 35 35 58 56 63 58 24 26 24
2017 19 63 33 29 63 57 67 56 23 28 29
2018 20 63 32 28 64 58 66 60 23 28 31
Table B.6: Selected sector pairs with high and low daily correlations in each year
Years Lowest 2rd lowest 3rd lowest 3rd highest 2rd highest Highest
2004 (Eng, Stap) (Eng, Tech) (Eng, Heal) (Ind, Fin) (Fin, Mat) (Mat, Ind)
2005 (Heal, Eng) (Eng, Stap) (Eng, Tech) (Ind, Mat) (Fin, Util) (Eng, Util)
2006 (Stap, Eng) (Heal, Eng) (Disc, Eng) (Mat, Eng) (Fin, Ind) (Ind, Mat)
2007 (Heal, Tech) (Heal, Disc) (Heal, Eng) (Eng, Mat) (Fin, Mat) (Mat, Ind)
2008 (Eng, Disc) (Eng, Fin) (Fin, Util) (Util, Eng) (Eng, Mat) (Mat, Ind)
2009 (Disc, Heal) (Stap, Heal) (Tech, Heal) (Ind, Mat) (Eng, Ind) (Eng, Mat)
2010 (Stap, Disc) (Tech, Stap) (Heal, Stap) (Ind, Mat) (Ind, Fin) (Eng, Ind)
2011 (Tech, Stap) (Disc, Stap) (Comm, Stap) (Mat, Fin) (Ind, Mat) (Fin, Ind)
2012 (Disc, Util) (Util, Tech) (Util, Comm) (Mat, Ind) (Fin, Mat) (Fin, Ind)
2013 (Tech, Util) (Tech, Stap) (Eng, Heal) (Mat, Ind) (Fin, Mat) (Ind, Fin)
2014 (Util, Disc) (Util, Tech) (Comm, Util) (Fin, Mat) (Tech, Fin) (Fin, Ind)
2015 (Util, Eng) (Real, Eng) (Disc, Util) (Fin, Tech) (Util, Real) (Fin, Ind)
2016 (Fin, Util) (Disc, Util) (Util, Eng) (Fin, Tech) (Mat, Fin) (Fin, Ind)
2017 (Fin, Util) (Eng, Util) (Util, Comm) (Mat, Ind) (Mat, Fin) (Ind, Fin)
2018 (Disc, Util) (Util, Eng) (Fin, Util) (Fin, Tech) (Mat, Ind) (Fin, Ind)
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Table B.7: Average daily beta of stocks in each daily beta bin
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2003 0.38 0.52 0.63 0.77 0.86 0.93 1.02 1.13 1.25 1.45 1.88
2004 0.42 0.53 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.25 1.50 2.03
2005 0.50 0.63 0.73 0.82 0.91 0.99 1.06 1.12 1.20 1.33 1.62
2006 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.71 0.80 0.89 1.00 1.11 1.25 1.46 1.94
2007 0.48 0.61 0.69 0.79 0.87 0.94 1.01 1.09 1.21 1.36 1.71
2008 0.50 0.62 0.71 0.80 0.87 0.95 1.03 1.13 1.29 1.48 1.87
2009 0.32 0.47 0.61 0.75 0.89 1.03 1.21 1.36 1.60 1.96 2.74
2010 0.46 0.56 0.69 0.81 0.93 1.03 1.14 1.26 1.38 1.53 1.82
2011 0.46 0.58 0.73 0.86 0.97 1.05 1.15 1.25 1.37 1.53 1.80
2012 0.36 0.48 0.62 0.78 0.90 1.01 1.11 1.23 1.38 1.54 1.88
2013 0.58 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.92 0.99 1.07 1.15 1.25 1.37 1.60
2014 0.38 0.55 0.68 0.80 0.90 0.99 1.07 1.14 1.22 1.34 1.61
2015 0.53 0.67 0.75 0.85 0.91 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.12 1.20 1.38
2016 0.30 0.51 0.67 0.82 0.91 1.01 1.14 1.24 1.35 1.53 1.96
2017 0.06 0.27 0.50 0.66 0.77 0.90 1.03 1.17 1.29 1.46 1.80
2018 0.19 0.40 0.57 0.72 0.82 0.89 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.19 1.44
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 Supplemental Information
C.1 Reduced-form Evidence for Discounting Behavior in
ICU Admissions
In this section, we conduct reduced-form regressions to analyze the main determinants
of the system’s ICU admission decisions. We show the ICU admission decisions are indeed
impacted by the system state, i.e., the number of patients in ED and ICU. The results
from the reduced-form regression provide consistent evidence for the discounting behaviors
captured by our structural model.
C.1.1 Model
We apply a multinomial logit model to estimate the ICU admission decisions. In each
period, the hospital chooses one of the three options for each patient: admit the patient
into the ICU; admit the patient to non-ICU units like medical/surgical ward; or make the
patient wait in the ED. Note that the decision to keep the patient waiting in the ED is
often necessitated by system-level considerations; in the absence of capacity constraints,
a patient would not be kept waiting for admission to the hospital. We include patient
characteristics, system state variables, and seasonality effects as the potential determinants
of these decisions.
As with the structural model, we set a period to be two hours in the logit model. At the
start of each period, we construct system “snapshots” which includes detailed information
(e.g., gender, age, and severity scores) for each patient in the ED, as well as the total number
of patients boarding in the ED and the number of patients in the ICU.
The system’s decision on patient 8 in period C is determined by two types of variables
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in the model: patient 8’s characteristics X8 and system state variables in period C, SC . X8
includes patient 8’s gender, age, as well as three severity scores–i.e., LAPS2, COPS2, and
CHMR. To account for potential differences between hospitals, we also include a categorical
variable to represent the hospital in which patient 8 is treated. In summary, we have
X8 = {Gender8 ,Age8 ,LAPS28 ,COPS28 ,CHMR8 ,Hosp8}.
The system state vector SC includes the following variables
SC = {ICUOccuC ,EDNumC ,DepPreC ,AvgLAPS2C ,DayOfWeekC ,HourOfDayC ,MonthDummyC },
where ICUOccuC denotes the current ICU occupancy level. As the ICU sizes vary dramati-
cally across the hospitals, we use the ICU percentile rank to measure occupancy. EDNumC
denotes the number of current ED patients for whom a decision to admit them to the hos-
pital has been made but for which a decision about when and where to admit them needs
to be made, and DepPreC denotes the number of patients who left the ICU (i.e. discharged
from the ICU or died) in the previous period. AvgLAPS2C denotes the average severity
level measured by the LAPS2 score of the current ICU patients in period C. Finally, the
categorical variables DayOfWeekC , HourOfDayC , and MonthDummyC capture the potential
seasonality and time trend in the decisions: DayOfWeekC and HourOfDayC denote the day
of week and hour of day respectively; MonthDummyC is the dummy variable representing
the month in the sample (total 23 months).
For patient 8 who is in the ED at the start of period C, we estimate the system’s decision
38C using a multinomial logit model:
ln
[
Pr(38C |X8 , SC )
Pr(nonICU8C |X8 , SC )
]
= W0,3 + W,3Gender8 + W,3Age8 + W!,3LAPS28 + W%,3COPS28
+ W,3CHMR8 + W,3Hosp8 + W*,3ICUOccuC + W,3EDNumC
+ W4?,3DepPreC + W!,3AvgLAPS2C + W, ,3DayOfWeekC
+ W,3HourOfDayC + W">=,3MonthDummyC + n8C , (C.1)
where 38C ∈ {,08C8C , 3<8C }. Pr(38C |X8SC ) is the probability of 38C conditional on (X8 , SC ).
Pr(nonICU8C |X8SC ) is the probability of admitting patient 8 to non-ICU units in period C con-
ditional on (X8 , SC ). We use the non-ICU admission decision as the base case, and estimate
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the probabilities of the ICU admission (3 = ICUAdm) and waiting (3 =Wait) decisions rel-
ative to the non-ICU admission decision respectively. To account for the heteroskedasticity,
we cluster standard errors by hospitals in the regression.
We use the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared to measure the goodness of fit of the multi-
nomial logit model (C.1). It is defined as:




where ;<>3 is the likelihood from the estimated model, and ;=D;; is the likelihood from the
“null” model that only includes the intercept and categorical variable for each hospital, i.e.,
ln
[
Pr(38C |X8 , SC )
Pr(nonICU8C |X8 , SC )
]
= W0,3 + W,3Hosp8 + n8C ,
where 38C ∈ {Wait8C , ICUAdm8C }; Hosp8 is the hospital categorical variable.
We first estimate the model by combining the patient data from all hospitals. Then,
considering the heterogeneity across hospitals, we also estimate the model for individual
hospitals separately after dropping the categorical variable term W,3Hosp8 in (C.1). We
discuss select coefficients from the multinomial logistic regression in next section; other
regression results are available upon request.
C.1.2 Results
In this section, we report the estimation results for the multinomial logit model (C.1).
We report the estimated coefficients for three main variables: LAPS28, ICUOccuC , and
EDNumC . Table C.1 below shows the estimation results for model (C.1) with all hospitals
combined. Note that in the estimation, each hospitalization may be counted multiple times
if the patient waits in the ED for more than one period. Thus, the sample size (183,691) is
larger than the number of total hospitalizations (164,167).
The results in Table C.1 show that all the coefficients except W for ICU admission
decision are statistically significant at 0.1% level and have the expected sign. The W
for ICU admission decision is significant at 5% level with the expected sign. In particular,
higher LAPS2 score increases the probability of admission to ICU relative to other units,
as these patients are more critically ill. For these severe patients, the system may also need
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Waiting 0.008∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.031) (0.006)
Admission 0.028∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗ −0.014∗
(0.000) (0.030) (0.006)
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? <
0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. Select coefficients (LAPS2 score, ICU
occupancy level, and number of ED boarding patients) from
(C.1) for waiting and admission decisions respectively.
to keep them waiting in the ED when the ICU is congested. Thus, higher LAPS2 score
also increases the probability of waiting, although the magnitude of the impact is smaller.
More importantly, the estimates of W* and W suggest that, even after controlling for
patient characteristics and fixed effects, a busier system state (more congested ICU or more
congested ED) decreases the probability of ICU admission and increases the probability
of waiting, respectively. Such evidence suggests that the system indeed internalizes the
intertemporal externalities on the ICU admission decisions by adjusting their behaviors
according to the current system state: When ICU or ED is more congested, they are more
likely to delay the admission of current patients to save ICU beds for future patients.
We also report the McFadden’s pseudo '2 in Table C.1. While 0.16 is relatively low, we
emphasize that the pseudo '2 is computed using the null model where hospital fixed effects
are included. Moreover, it is consistent with the magnitude seen for models of operational
decisions in healthcare systems (see, e.g., Kim et al. (2015), Chan et al. (2016), and Song
et al. (2019) among others).
In Table C.2, we report the coefficients for the three main covariates when we estimate
model (C.1) for each hospital separately. In the last column, we also provide the McFadden’s
'2 of the model for each hospital. The results are qualitatively similar to that for all hospitals
combined in Table C.1. Most of the coefficients have the expected signs for individual
hospitals, although some are not statistically significant as the sample size of each individual
hospital is much smaller than all hospitals combined. Full estimation results are available
from authors upon request.
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Table C.2: Estimation results for multinomial logistic regression (C.1): Individual hospitals
for Waiting decision for ICU Admission decision
Hosp Size LAPS2 ICUOccu EDNum LAPS2 ICUOccu EDNum '2
W! W* W W! W* W
1 13,964 0.006∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗ −0.019 0.19
(0.001) (0.113) (0.018) (0.001) (0.114) (0.020)
2 12,871 0.007∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.642∗∗∗ −0.007 0.14
(0.001) (0.093) (0.015) (0.001) (0.116) (0.021)
3 8,391 0.005∗ 0.605∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.191 0.022 0.15
(0.002) (0.228) (0.053) (0.002) (0.193) (0.048)
4 16,162 0.013∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.344∗ 0.022 0.22
(0.001) (0.149) (0.019) (0.001) (0.140) (0.023)
5 5,499 0.013∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.782∗∗∗ 0.002 0.16
(0.002) (0.222) (0.051) (0.002) (0.183) (0.051)
6 11,698 0.012∗∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.270 −0.015 0.17
(0.001) (0.162) (0.027) (0.001) (0.146) (0.028)
7 5,200 0.010∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −1.489∗∗∗ 0.092 0.14
(0.002) (0.211) (0.057) (0.002) (0.230) (0.069)
8 9,382 0.011∗∗∗ 2.227∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.012 0.14
(0.001) (0.153) (0.029) (0.001) (0.117) (0.027)
9 14,774 0.007∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.010 0.20
(0.001) (0.104) (0.014) (0.001) (0.126) (0.020)
10 6,032 0.009∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.434∗ −0.014 0.16
(0.003) (0.333) (0.073) (0.002) (0.201) (0.055)
11 3,334 0.008∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.112 0.029∗∗∗ −0.969∗∗∗ −0.095 0.15
(0.002) (0.184) (0.070) (0.002) (0.216) (0.093)
12 8,413 0.012∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −1.025∗∗∗ −0.023 0.14
(0.001) (0.146) (0.020) (0.002) (0.219) (0.033)
13 8,620 0.008∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.214 0.011 0.18
(0.002) (0.229) (0.042) (0.002) (0.184) (0.040)
14 14,209 0.011∗∗∗ 1.523∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.269∗ 0.025 0.14
(0.001) (0.129) (0.021) (0.001) (0.132) (0.024)
15 7,073 0.006 0.509 0.181∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.083 0.024 0.14
(0.003) (0.365) (0.083) (0.002) (0.182) (0.045)
16 7,517 0.008∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.393∗ −0.035 0.20
(0.002) (0.229) (0.057) (0.002) (0.171) (0.048)
17 3,896 0.014∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ −1.444∗∗∗ −0.043 0.21
(0.002) (0.256) (0.071) (0.002) (0.237) (0.083)
18 7,550 0.004∗ 0.266 0.272∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.001 0.046 0.17
(0.002) (0.238) (0.043) (0.002) (0.218) (0.045)
19 7,732 0.008∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.341∗ −0.071 0.16
(0.002) (0.289) (0.054) (0.001) (0.172) (0.036)
20 5,678 0.001 1.208∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗ −0.003 0.24
(0.002) (0.215) (0.053) (0.002) (0.208) (0.062)
21 3,154 0.007∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −1.091∗∗∗ 0.091 0.16
(0.002) (0.175) (0.044) (0.003) (0.253) (0.077)
22 2,542 0.012∗∗∗ 0.006 0.205∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ −0.751∗∗ −0.104 0.14
(0.002) (0.256) (0.061) (0.003) (0.276) (0.078)
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001. Select coefficients
(LAPS2 score, ICU occupancy level, and number of ED boarding patients) from (C.1) for waiting and
admission decisions respectively.
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C.2 Formulae and Supplementary Tables
C.2.1 Explicit expressions for state transition probability 6(B′|B)
In this section, we provide explicit expressions for the function 6(B′ |B) used in Propo-
sition 1, which is the transition probability from the intermediate state B (after action










C+1), which are the state after action is taken in period C and the state
at the beginning of period C + 1 (before action) respectively. By (3.7), the transition from
B to B′ includes the ED arrivals from the two classes of patients, external arrivals to the
ICU, and departures from the ICU. As the ED arrivals are independent of the ICU external
arrivals and departures, we have

















where 6&,; and 6&,ℎ denote the transition probabilities for the numbers of ED patients from
low and high classes respectively, and 6 denotes the transition probability for the number
of ICU patients.
For the ED transition probabilities 6&,; and 6&,ℎ, we only need to consider the new
arrivals for class 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}, which follow truncated Poisson distributions with rate _&,8 and
truncation by "8 from above. Additionally accounting for the ED capacity constraint, the
number of ED arrivals is capped by max{"8 , &8 − =̃8,C }, i.e., the bigger of the maximum
arrival per period and the remaining ED capacity. Thus, the transition probability can be
computed as











exp(−_&,8)/ 9 ! if < = = +max{"8 , &8 − =}
(C.4)
and 6&,8 (< |=) = 0 elsewhere. The second line in (C.4) considers the case where the upper
bound of the number of arrivals, max{"8 , &8 − =̃8,C }, is reached.
For the ICU transition probability 6 , we need to consider both external arrivals and
departures. The number of external arrivals C follows a Poisson distribution with rate _ ,
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and is capped by the remaining ICU capacity − =̃C . With C external arrivals in the period,
the ICU would have total =̃C + C patients. Then, the number of departures, C , follows a
Binomial-(=̃C + C , ` ) distribution. We have following relationship:
=C+1 + C = =̃C + C .
Thus, given the number of external arrivals, C , the number of departures follows by C =
=̃C + C − =C+1. We note that C can be greater than max{=C+1 − =̃C , 0}. Summing up the
probability of all possible choices of the Poisson-distributed C (and the Binomial-distributed
C accordingly), we can derive transition probability 6 (< |=) as









(= + 9 − <)!<!`
=+ 9−<












 (1 − ` )<, for 0 ≤ < ≤ , (C.5)
where the second line considers the case that C is truncated by the remaining capacity −=.
Under this case, the ICU reaches the full capacity and C is a Binomial-(, ` ) variable.
Combining (C.4) and (C.5), we obtain the explicit expression for state transition probability
6(B′ |B) by (C.3).
C.2.2 Model Assumptions for Identification
This section documents the assumptions made in Komarova et al. (2018), which are
also satisfied by our model. In their paper, G and 0 denote the system state and action,
respectively; Y represents the random perturbation in utility.
Assumption 2. (i) (Additive Separability) For all 0, G, Y, the per-period utility follows:
D(0, G, Y) = c(0, G) + Y(0).
(ii) (Conditional Independence) The transition distribution of the states has the following
factorization for all G ′, Y′, G, Y, 0:
%(G ′, Y′ |G, Y, 0) = &(Y′) (G ′ |G, 0),
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where & is the cumulative distribution function of Y and  denotes the transition law
of GC+1 conditioning on GC and 0C . Furthermore, YC has finite first moments, and a
positive, continuous, and bounded density.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) - = {1, . . . ,  }.
Assumption 3 (Linear-in-Parameter). For all 0, G:
c(0, G; \) = c0(0, G) + \>c1(0, G),
where c0 is a known real value function, c1 is a known ?-dimensional vector value function
and \ is the ?-dimensional unknown parameter.
In our setting, we have per-period cost given by (3.2) as
2(BC , 3C ) = 2A ,;A;,C + 2F,;
(
=;,C − 0;,C − A;,C
)
+ 2A ,ℎAℎ,C + 2F,ℎ
(
=ℎ,C − 0ℎ,C − Aℎ,C
)
.
The deterministic part of the per-period utility follows by D(BC , 3C ) = −2(BC , 3C ). Thus, it is
indeed linear in parameters \ = {2A ,; , 2F,;, 2A ,ℎ, 2F,ℎ}. In our model, the functions c0 and
c1 specify to
c0(3C , BC ) ≡ 0,
and




















and 3C = {0;,C , A;,C , 0ℎ,C , Aℎ,C }.
C.2.3 Supplementary Tables
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Table C.3: Sample Size: Numbers of observed days and hospitalizations for each hospital























Figure C.1: Examples of log-likelihood versus discount factor for a subset of hospital





































Note: The estimated likelihood at V = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 for four different hospitals (5, 14, 17, and 21). The V
with the best log-likelihood is highlighted in red.
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Table C.4: Drop in ICU admission probability as ICU gets congested: e.g. increasing from
50% occupancy to having only 1 available bed
Hosp V̂ AdmDrop Rel. AdmDrop
1 0.3 0.047 0.142
2 0.5 0.047 0.170
3 0.1 0.013 0.060
4 0.4 0.021 0.082
5 0.1 0.036 0.099
6 0.2 0.031 0.099
7 0.9 0.017 0.105
8 0.1 0.047 0.139
9 0.5 0.036 0.140
10 0.1 0.018 0.068
11 0.9 0.055 0.150
12 0.6 0.025 0.104
13 0.1 0.021 0.075
14 0.3 0.029 0.101
15 0.1 0.024 0.078
16 0.1 0.018 0.072
17 0.9 0.047 0.171
18 0.4 0.018 0.074
19 0.1 0.035 0.100
20 0.3 0.021 0.081
21 0.7 0.030 0.106
22 0.3 0.047 0.127
The estimated discount factor and drop in admis-
sion probability: AdmDrop and Rel.AdmDrop de-
note the absolute and relative admission probabil-
ity drop given in (3.19) and (3.20), respectively.
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Table C.5: Counterfactual estimates of impact when _ decreases by 10%
Hosp V̂ ΔPr(HighCgstn) Rel ΔPr(HighCgstn) ΔPr(Balk) Rel ΔPr(Balk) ΔDays HighCgstn ΔPats HighCgstn ΔPats Balk
(in % points) (in %) (in % points) (in %) (in # days) (in # patients) (in # patients)
1 0.3 1.35 0.28 0.47 0.30 4.93 41.11 6.37
2 0.5 2.16 0.29 0.76 0.29 7.90 61.43 11.13
3 0.1 0.94 0.31 0.29 0.34 3.44 13.51 1.54
4 0.4 1.95 0.53 0.70 0.58 7.12 79.53 17.11
5 0.1 2.21 0.16 0.82 0.17 8.06 29.28 5.78
6 0.2 0.79 0.44 0.27 0.50 2.87 25.05 3.55
7 0.9 4.41 0.24 1.95 0.29 16.08 58.18 20.06
8 0.1 1.80 0.23 0.65 0.24 6.57 39.08 5.98
9 0.5 2.75 0.37 0.96 0.39 10.02 91.62 17.29
10 0.1 1.56 0.36 0.56 0.44 5.69 35.84 6.31
11 0.9 2.84 0.19 1.15 0.23 10.37 21.77 3.75
12 0.6 2.45 0.45 0.96 0.50 8.95 63.72 13.84
13 0.1 0.39 0.31 0.09 0.25 1.41 7.02 0.54
14 0.3 1.46 0.54 0.50 0.56 5.33 58.57 11.58
15 0.1 0.14 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.51 2.83 0.05
16 0.1 0.52 0.42 0.19 0.52 1.91 9.15 0.97
17 0.9 2.60 0.18 1.15 0.23 9.48 22.27 4.50
18 0.4 0.31 0.76 0.09 0.78 1.12 14.18 2.23
19 0.1 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.48 0.03
20 0.3 0.10 0.25 0.04 0.39 0.37 1.53 0.13
21 0.7 2.66 0.24 1.20 0.29 9.72 34.54 9.17
22 0.3 1.98 0.34 0.85 0.41 7.22 36.97 7.73
Note: Counterfactual simulation result from decreasing external arrival rates _ by 10%: The third and fourth columns report the absolute and relative drops in
high congestion probability in (3.21); the fifth and sixth columns report the absolute and relative drops in balking probability in (3.22). The last three columns
report the equivalent numbers of days and patients affected in a year.
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C.3 Choice of interval length in structural model
In this section, we briefly discuss our choice of time window in the structural model, i.e.,
2hr in our study. In reality, admission decisions cannot occur instantaneously. Figure C.2
shows a histogram of the minutes for the admission actions (to ICU and non-ICU units)
with data from all hospitals. From the figure, we observe that there are rounding of the
admission times, as shown by the peaks at 5 minutes, 15 minutes, and at the half hour
marks. Thus, there is already some quantization of time.
Figure C.2: Histogram of minutes for admission actions






To choose a reasonable time window, we report in Table C.6 the proportion of intervals
with admission actions (i.e., non-waiting decisions) when we choose different lengths for the
time window. The proportions are computed using all hospitals in our sample. We see from
Table C.6 that if we choose very small time windows (e.g. less than 30 minutes), very few
admission actions take place in each time window. This would render many state-action
pairs useless for the identification purpose and lead to noisy estimates. Thus, it is more
reasonable to use one-hour or two-hour time windows.
We further compare the choice of one hour versus two hours as the interval length. We
construct the state-action pairs with a one-hour time window and compare their distribution
with those from the two-hour time window as used in our estimation. The distribution of
the state-action pairs is the main variation in the data that provide identification for the
model parameters. We find that the distributions from the two time slots are close for the
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number of ICU admissions of both classes (0; and 0ℎ), number of patients in ICU (= ),
and number of high severity patients in ED (=
ℎ
) who are much more likely to be admitted
to ICU. This is not surprising as the ICU admission decisions and the ED arrivals of high
severity patients happen infrequently in our data. Thus, while using one-hour time window
may change the cost estimates and their interpretations, we believe it will not substantially
change the estimated discount factor and the predictions in the counterfactual studies as the
observed ICU occupancy levels and ICU admission decisions are very similar to those with
the two-hour time window. For illustration, Figures C.3 and C.4 show the distributions of
states and actions with one-hour and two-hour time windows for Hospital 4, which has 31
beds in ICU.
Table C.6: Proportion of intervals with admission actions
Interval 5 min 15 min 30 min 1 hour 2 hour
Ratio 4.2% 12.1% 22.5% 38.8% 59.3%
Figure C.3: Distribution of states for Hospital 4 with one-hour and two-hours windows
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C.4 Proof for Proposition 2
Proof:
Preliminaries : From the definition of the value functions + (BC , YC ) in (3.5) and +̃ (B) in
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Figure C.4: Distribution of actions for Hospital 4 with one-hour and two-hours windows
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V 9−C* (B 9 , 3 9 , Y 9) |BC , YC
}
6(BC |B)@(YC |BC )3YC . (C.6)
The expectation above is taken over the transition of (B 9 , Y 9) starting from (BC , YC ).
Recall 6(B′ |B) is the transition probability from the intermediate state B (after action is
taken) to the state B′ at the start of the next period, and @(Y′ |B′) is the probability density
of the random utility component in the next period. Thus, the function +̃ (B) represents
the expected future utilities starting from intermediate state B and assuming the hospital
always takes the optimal action.
We introduce following notations. We consider two systems B and B′. For every period












































to denote the intermediate states after actions 3C and 3 ′C are taken in period C, which are given
by B̃C = i(BC , 3C ) and B̃′C = i(B′C , 3 ′C ) according to (3.6). Note that for notational compactness
we suppress the dependence of the states on the action. Assume the two systems start from










then Proposition 2 translates to
+̃ ( B̃0) ≥ +̃ ( B̃′0). (C.8)
Coupling: Our proof is based on a coupling argument and induction in time. We first
introduce the coupling of the two systems B and B′ as follows: First, the two systems witness
identical arrivals to ED and external arrivals to ICU in every period, i.e., ;,C = ′;,C , ℎ,C =
′
ℎ,C
, and C =  ′C for every C. Next, we couple the ICU departures from the two systems as
follows. Denote the numbers of ICU patients before departures by =̄C and (=̄C ) ′ respectively
and assume =̄C ≤
(
=̄C
) ′. Then, the departures C and  ′C are coupled as  ′C = C + /C , where
C is a Binomial-(=̄C , ` ) variable and /C is a Binomial-((=̄C ) ′ − =̄C , ` ) variable. That is,
the number of departures in the B′ system is always at least as many as the number in
the B system. Finally, if an identical action 3 is taken in each system, the random utility
components YC (3) and Y′C (3) associated with that action 3 coincides for the two systems in
every period C.
Under the coupling described above, we first prove following lemma that establishes the
relationship between intermediate states and states at the start of next period.






















Proof: See Appendix C.4.1. 2
Mimicking Policy: We now define the policies used in each system. We assume the
system B′ always takes its optimal action which achieve the supremum in (C.6). For system
B, we define a mimicking policy c which mimics the action taken in the B′ system whenever
possible; if it is not possible, it takes its own optimal action. We denote the value function
associated with this policy by + c (B), which is defined by (C.6) with optimal action 3C
replaced by the one under policy c. Such a policy is not necessarily optimal for system B
and, by definition, we have
+̃ ( B̃0) ≥ + c ( B̃0). (C.11)
To prove the proposition, we will establish following two properties under our coupling
and the policy c. First, two systems always have same number of patients in the ED, but










Second, the action taken in the B′ system is always admissible for system B; thus system B
always mimics the action of B′ under c:
3C = 3
′
C ∈ Π(BC ), ∀C. (C.13)
Note that (C.12) directly implies (C.13), as it follows from (3.1) that given the same number
of patients in ED, the system with fewer ICU patients has a larger admissible action set,
leading to 3 ′C ∈ Π(B′C ) ⊆ Π(BC ).
Induction: We establish (C.12) for every C by induction.
Base Case: The base case follows directly from the relationship of the initial intermediate










Inductive Step: We assume (C.12) holds for period 9 and show this implies it holds for
period 9 + 1.
In period 9 , under policy c, system B takes the same action of B′ since by the inductive
hypothesis the action is admissible, i.e., 3 9 = 3 ′9 . Given the same action is taken in each
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system, the intermediate states after action, satisfy the following relationship:
=̃8, 9 = =









for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ},
=̃9 = =












Finally, we can apply Lemma 3 to prove the relationship (C.12) holds for period 9 + 1. This
completes the inductive step.
Per-Period Utilities: We have shown that under our coupling and the policy c for the B
system, at the start of each period, the two systems always have same numbers of patients in
the ED, and system B always has fewer patients in the ICU than that in system B′. Thus, the
system B always mimics the action by B′ under the policy c. We next prove the per-period
utilities always coincide for the two systems, which follows by:








=8,C − 08,C − A8,C
)













− 0′8,C − A ′8,C
)
+ Y′C (3 ′C ) = * (B′C , 3 ′C , Y′C ).
This is because: (i) Both systems take the same action, thus they admit and reroute same
numbers of patients, this leads to same non-ICU admission costs; (ii) As both systems have
same numbers of patients in the ED, the number of patients remaining in the ED after
actions are also the same, leading to the same waiting costs; (iii) By our coupling, the
random utility components coincide for the same action 3C = 3 ′C , i.e., YC (3C ) = Y′C (3 ′C ).
As the per-period utilities coincide for every period given system B takes policy c and
system B′ takes its own optimal policy, we have
+ c ( B̃0) = +̃ ( B̃′0),
then it follows by (C.11)
+̃ ( B̃0) ≥ + c ( B̃0) = +̃ ( B̃′0).
This proves the proposition. 2
C.4.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: The result follow directly from the coupled arrivals and departures in the two
systems. Since we start from the intermediate state, the system evolution to period C is only
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dictated by the stochastic arrivals to the ED, external arrivals to the ICU, and departures
from the ICU during period C − 1.
It is trivial to see the relationship for the ED patients holds by our coupling of the ED








for 8 ∈ {;, ℎ}







We now consider the ICU patients. By our coupling, the B and B′ systems see the same
number external arrivals, C−1 =  ′C−1. Then, the total number of ICU patients in each
system before departures satisfies the following relationship:
=̄C = min
{




(=̃C−1) ′ +  ′C−1, 
}
= (=̄C ) ′, (C.16)
By our coupling, the number of departures from the ICU in the B system is related to the















− =̄C−1 − /C−1 ≥ 0.




) ′ − =̄
C−1. This completes the proof for Lemma 3.
2
C.5 Proof for Lemmas 1 and 2
We first provide the proof for Lemma 1.
Proof: Recall the two states are given by B1 = (1, 0, 0) and B2 = (0, 1, 0), i.e., B1
and B2 have one patient in the ED from the low and high severity class, respectively .
The probabilities of admitting the patient to ICU and non-ICU units under the two states
are denoted by Pr(0 |B1), Pr(A |B2), Pr(0 |B1), and Pr(A |B2). Following Proposition 1, we can
compute the log of these choice probabilities as
ln Pr(0 |B1) = V+̃ (B0) −  (B1), (C.17a)
ln Pr(A |B1) = −2A ,; + V+̃ (BA ) −  (B1), (C.17b)
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and
ln Pr(0 |B2) = V+̃ (B0) −  (B2), (C.17c)
ln Pr(A |B2) = −2A ,ℎ + V+̃ (BA ) −  (B2), (C.17d)
where B0 = (0, 0, 1) denotes the system state after the patient is admitted to the ICU,
and BA = (0, 0, 0) denotes the system state after the patient is admitted to non-ICU unit
(ward). Note the choice probabilities of admission decisions in (C.17a) and (C.17c) used
the assumption that the per-period cost of admitting a patient to the ICU is zero for both
classes of patients. Taking the differences in the choice probabilities across the two states
for ICU and non-ICU admission decisions respectively, we obtain
ln Pr(0 |B1) − ln Pr(0 |B2) =  (B2) −  (B1). (C.18a)
and
ln Pr(A |B1) − ln Pr(A |B2) = 2A ,ℎ − 2A ,; +  (B2) −  (B1). (C.18b)
Here we see the terms involving the value function +̃ (·) in (C.17a) – (C.17d) are cancelled
out in the differences. Further subtracting (C.18a) from (C.18b), we get rid of the terms
related to state-dependent function  (·) and identify the non-ICU admission cost difference
as












This proves Lemma 1. In particular, the steps in (C.18a), (C.18b), and (C.19) show how
well-constructed state and action pairs can be used to disentangle the complex structure in
the choice probability expression (3.12). By taking differences across the two states for ICU
and non-ICU admission decisions in (C.18a) and (C.18b) respectively, we remove the term
V+̃ (·) that is related to future payoff. Then, by taking difference between the two decisions
in (C.19), we further remove the state-dependent terms  (·) to expose the cost parameters.
2
We then provide the proof for Lemma 2.
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Proof: In Lemma 2, the two states considered are B1 = (0, 1, 1) and B2 = (0, 1, 0).
That is, there is one patient in the ICU in B1, and one high severity patient in the ED in
both states. Following Proposition 1, we can compute the log probabilities for admitting
the patient to ICU and non-ICU unit under the two states as
ln Pr(0 |B1) = V+̃2 −  (B1), (C.20a)
ln Pr(A |B1) = −2A ,ℎ + V+̃1 −  (B1), (C.20b)
and
ln Pr(0 |B2) = V+̃1 −  (B2), (C.20c)
ln Pr(A |B2) = −2A ,ℎ + V+̃0 −  (B2); (C.20d)
here +̃: = +̃ ((0, 0, :)) denotes the value function of the state with : patients in the ICU and
no patients in the ED. Computing the difference in log probabilities across the two states
for ICU and non-ICU admission decisions respectively, we get
ln Pr(0 |B1) − ln Pr(0 |B2) = V(+̃2 − +̃1) +  (B2) −  (B1), (C.21a)
ln Pr(A |B1) − ln Pr(A |B2) = V(+̃1 − +̃0) +  (B2) −  (B1), (C.21b)
Then we can remove the terms related to state-dependent function  (·) by subtracting the
above two equations, which leads to
V
[













This proves Lemma 2. Again, this well-constructed state and action pair enable us to unpack
the terms in the log choice probability (3.12). By taking differences across the two states
in (C.21a) and (C.21b), we get rid of the terms related to the per-period costs. Then, by
taking differences between the two actions in (C.22), we further remove the terms related
to  (·) to get the desired result of the value function. 2
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Appendix D
Chapter 4 Supplemental Information
D.1 Description and Summary Statistics of Independent
Variables in (4.1) and (4.2)
To control for the effects of patient’s characteristics and severity levels, we include a
comprehensive list of demographic, risk, operative, and operational factors as independent
variables in our estimation. Some of these factors are already discussed in Section 4.3. We
now provide the description and summary statistics for other independent variables included
in -8 for our models (4.1) and (4.2).
In Table D.1, we document the descriptions, types, and summary statistics of the inde-
pendent variables. Besides, we provide their locations in the STS data collection form. We
handle the missing values in the binary and categorical variables as follows: if the number of
missing observations is smaller than 100 (1.8% of the sample), we impute their values using
the majority from the cases in the same NYHA class. Otherwise, we add a new category
“Unknown” to represent the missing values. The summary statistics of the categorical vari-
ables are reported in Table D.2. Note that the NYHA classification is not available (N/A)
if the patient has not experienced a heart failure. The PA pressure is coded as “High” if it
is higher than 55mg, and “Low” otherwise.
We classify the cases to different surgery types to control for the procedures performed by
the surgeons. First, we have eight standard surgery types from the STS data. For the cases
that do not fall into the standard types, we classify their surgery types by the following
heuristic rule. We collect from the STS data which of the following four procedures are
performed in the surgery: coronary artery bypass, valve, other cardiac procedure, and other
non-cardiac procedure. If only one of the four procedures is performed, we classify the case as
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a non-standard isolated type, e.g., “non-standard isolated valve” if only the valve procedure
is conducted. If more than one of the procedures are performed, we classify the case as
the “non-standard multiple” type. Finally, if none of the four procedures is performed, we
classify it as “not identified.” In total, we have six types for the non-standard cases, i.e.,
four non-standard isolated ones, non-standard multiple, and not identified. The numbers of
cases of each type (both standard and non-standard ones) are summarized in Table D.3.
Table D.1: Description and Summary Statistics of Other Independent Variables in Models
(4.1) and (4.2)
Variable Description Section in STS Type Mean
Race Patient’s race Demographics Categorical -
Endocard Endocarditis Risk factor Binary 0.053
PeriAD Peripheral arterial disease Risk factor Binary 0.088
Lung Lung disease with severity ≥ mild Risk factor Binary 0.192
Hypertension Hypertension Risk factor Binary 0.777
CaroStenosis Carotid Stenosis Risk factor Binary 0.054
Syncope Syncope Risk factor Binary 0.031
Dialysis Dialysis for renal failure Risk factor Binary 0.030
Diabetes Insulin control for diabetes Risk factor Binary 0.111
Liver Liver disease Risk factor Binary 0.022
Cancer Cancer within five years Risk factor Binary 0.062
Thoracic Thoracic aorta disease Risk factor Binary 0.094
DrugUse Recent or remote drug use Risk factor Binary 0.088
Smoke Smoke status of patient Risk factor Categorical -
PrevCI Previous cardiac intervention Previous Intervention Binary 0.431
CardShock Cardiogenic shock Preoperative Binary 0.076
MI Prior MI Preoperative Binary 0.120
NYHA NYHA classification Preoperative Categorical -
Aorta Aorta procedure performed Operative Binary 0.123
Incidence Non-initial cardiovascular surgery Operative Binary 0.188
PA_Pressure PA systolic pressure Hemodynamics Categorical -
TotCABG Number of arteries bypassed Coronary Bypass Continuous 1.36
In summary, the independent variable -8 in (4.1) and (4.2) includes the factors in Table
D.1, patient’s gender and age, surgery status, patient’s admission type, surgery type in
Table D.3, surgeon’s identifier, patient’s pre-LOS, block schedule status, and dummies for
weekday, month, and year of the surgery.
263
Table D.2: Summary Statistics of Categorical Variables in Table D.1
Variable Category Num Obs. Ratio










Smoke FALSE 2694 0.503
TRUE 2429 0.454
Unknown 229 0.043
PA Pressure High 376 0.070
Low 2247 0.420
Unknown 2729 0.510
Table D.3: Numbers of Cases by Surgery Types





CABG + AVR 318 0.059
CABG + MVR 57 0.011
CABG + MVr 58 0.011
AVR + MVR 107 0.020
Non-standard isolated Valve 574 0.107
Non-standard isolated CAB 28 0.005
Non-standard isolated cardiac 369 0.069
Non-standard isolated non-cardiac 15 0.003
Non-standard multiple 690 0.129
Not identified 256 0.048
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D.2 Definition of Independent Variables in the Schedule
Imputation Model (4.3)
In this section, we document the independent variables included in - ′B,C for the logistic
regression model (4.3). To impute whether the surgeon is assigned a block schedule on a
given day, we include multiple operational factors related to the workload of the focal and
other surgeons. As we mentioned in the main body, future information can be included in
- ′B,C as we are imputing the block schedule instead of making any prediction.
Table D.4 summarizes the variables included in - ′B,C (plus a constant term) for the logistic
model (4.3). In particular, $')8<4B,C denotes the sum of OR time of the cases by surgeon
B on day C, ignoring overlapping due to surgery parallel. (C0AC>DAB,C and =3>DAB,C are
calculated using the OR entry and exit time of the cases by surgeon B on day C; (C0AC>DAB,C
(resp. =3>DAB,C) corresponds to the OR entry (resp. OR exit) time of the earliest (resp.
latest) case, rounded to the nearest hour. %0C'4<08=B,C is the number of patients remaining
in the hospital for surgeon B. This refers to the patients that (1) already admitted to the
hospital by day C−1, (2) surgeries have not been performed by day C−1, and (3) surgeries are
eventually performed by surgeon B. Besides, ,;42'0C8>B,C is the proportion of elective
cases by surgeon B in [C − 180, C + 180] that fall on the same weekday as C. This variable
is included as surgeons’ blocks tend to fall on specific weekdays to reduce the variation in
surgeons’ schedule. Besides, most of the elective cases are performed in their surgeons’ block.
We have in total 23 independent variables (plus a constant term) in the logistic model (4.3)
for imputing the block schedule.
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Table D.4: Definition of Independent Variables in the Schedule Imputation Model (4.3)
Variable Definition
(DA6B Dummy variable for surgeon identifier
,44:0HC Dummy variable for weekday of C
;42DAB,C , *A6DAB,C , <4A6DAB,C Number of elective/urgent/emergent cases by surgeon B on day C
;42$CℎB,C , *A6$CℎB,C , <4A6$CℎB,C Number of elective/urgent/emergent cases by other surgeons on day C
$') 8<4B,C Total OR time of cases by surgeon B on day C
(C0AC>DAB,C , =3>DAB,C Start and end of the cases by surgeon B on day C
(C0AC!0C4B,C , =30A;HB,C Indicators for (C0AC>DAB,C ≥ 8AM and =3>DAB,C ≤ 3PM
3<DAB,C Numbers of patients admitted by surgeon B on day C
%0C'4<08=B,C Numbers of patients remaining in the hospital for surgeon B
#D<%A40HB,C , #D<%>BC0HB,C Numbers of cases by surgeon B in the previous and next weekday
,>A:%A40HB,C , ,>A:#4GC0H Indicators for #D<%A40HB,C ≥ 1 and #D<%>BC0HB,C ≥ 1
#D<DA, 44:B,C Numbers of days worked by surgeon B in current calendar week
8BC!0BCB,C , 8BC#4GCB,C Number of days from the previous and next working day of surgeon B
,;42'0C8>B,C Proportion of elective cases by surgeon B in [C − 180, C + 180]
that are performed on the same weekday as C
D.3 Supplementary Tables
This section includes the supplementary tables. In particular, Tables D.5 and D.6 report
the estimated effects on surgery duration and patient outcomes when we use total incision
time of other cases ((D< =28) as surgeon’s daily workload measure. Tables D.7 and D.8
show the estimated coefficient W for the two workload measures in (4.2) for the three binary
outcomes.
Table D.5: Estimated Effects of Daily Workload (Total Incision Time of Other Cases) on Surgery
Duration and Patient Outcomes: Full Sample
Continuous H8 : Coefficients Binary H8 : AME
Incision time Post-LOS Total ICU time Reoperation Readmission Mortality
Panel A: Full 0.083∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.005∗ 0.013† 0.002
(0.038) (0.100) (0.088) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Num Obs. 5345 5344 5319 5345 5116 5081
Panel B: Full (w/o IV) −0.016 0.015 0.009 −0.000 −0.000 0.002†
(0.010) (0.034) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Num Obs. 5345 5344 5319 5345 5116 5081
The estimated effects of surgeon’s daily workload (total incision time of other cases) on surgery duration and patient
outcomes for the full sample. We report the estimated coefficients in (4.1) for the three continuous dependent variables,
and the AME from (4.2) for the three binary dependent variables. Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1,
∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
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Table D.6: Estimated Effects of Daily Workload (Total Incision Time of Other Cases) on Surgery
Duration and Patient Outcomes: Elective and Non-elective Sample
Continuous H8 : Coefficients Binary H8 : AME
Incision time Post-LOS Total ICU time ReOp Readmission Mortality
Panel A: Elec 0.072∗∗ −0.063 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.012
(0.025) (0.182) (0.135) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Num Obs. 2474 2474 2454 2394 2398 1897
Panel B: Non-elec 0.098 0.606∗ 0.384∗ 0.010∗ 0.018∗ −0.001
(0.064) (0.264) (0.192) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002)
Num Obs. 2871 2870 2865 2871 2697 2769
The estimated effects of surgeon’s daily workload (total incision time of other cases) on surgery duration and
patient outcomes for the elective and non-elective sample. We report the estimated coefficients in (4.1) for
the three continuous dependent variables, and the AME from (4.2) for the three binary dependent variables.
Standard error is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
Table D.7: Estimated Coefficients of Daily Workload in (4.2) for Binary Outcomes: Full Sample
Reoperation Readmission Mortality
#D<0B4B (D<=28 #D<0B4B (D<=28 #D<0B4B (D<=28
Panel A: Full 0.268∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.371† 0.075† 0.197 0.039
(0.089) (0.021) (0.203) (0.041) (0.213) (0.039)
Num Obs. 5345 5345 5116 5116 5081 5081
Panel B: Full (w/o IV) −0.019 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.190∗ 0.034†
(0.038) (0.006) (0.050) (0.008) (0.083) (0.018)
Num Obs. 5345 5345 5116 5116 5081 5081
Estimated coefficient W in (4.2) for the full sample. Standard error is reported in parenthesis;
†? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
Table D.8: Estimated Coefficients of Daily Workload in (4.2) for Binary Outcomes: Elective and
Non-elective Sample
Reoperation Readmission Mortality
#D<0B4B (D<=28 #D<0B4B (D<=28 #D<0B4B (D<=28
Panel A: Elec 0.273 0.040 0.183 0.024 1.035∗ 0.202∗
(0.524) (0.096) (0.411) (0.077) (0.422) (0.082)
Num Obs. 2394 2394 2398 2398 1897 1897
Panel B: Non-elec 0.329∗ 0.065∗ 0.452∗ 0.098∗ −0.060 −0.010
(0.131) (0.028) (0.186) (0.040) (0.197) (0.038)
Num Obs. 2871 2871 2697 2697 2769 2769
Estimated coefficient W in (4.2) for the elective and non-elective samples. Standard error
is reported in parenthesis; †? < 0.1, ∗? < 0.05, ∗∗? < 0.01, and ∗∗∗? < 0.001.
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